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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis studies the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s capacity to rule in 
contemporary China by examining (a) its quest for popular legitimacy and (b) its search for 
party cohesion. In explaining the CCP’s ruling basis, a plethora of political science and 
economics literature has pointed to China’s economic growth. Conventional wisdom 
considers ideology to be obsolete and the political reform to be too limited to take any 
substantive effect in China.  
 
This thesis argues that ideological adaptation and the institutionalization of power 
succession play crucial roles in maintaining the CCP’s popular legitimacy and party cohesion. 
China’s economic success is certainly important, however, it also creates a fundamental 
dilemma of the CCP’s rule. If a communist party is not to deliver communism and class 
victory, why is it there at all? There is a potential contradiction between generating economic 
success by utilizing quasi capitalist economic policies on the one hand, and the fact that this 
is a communist party that supposedly justifies its rule by being the vehicle to deliver a 
communist society on the other. This thesis shows how the CCP has been constantly revising 
its ideological basis for justifying – if not legitimizing – its rule. By studying the CCP’s 
ideological discourses, the mechanism of ideological promotion, and their effectiveness, this 
thesis makes a valuable contribution to the relevant literature.  
 
In addition to ideology, the institutionalization of power succession is also crucial to the 
CCP’s rule. During Mao Zedong’s rule, an un-institutionalized power system had caused 
endless fierce power struggles within the party, which indirectly led to economic stagnation 
and social unrest. Thirty years of institutionalization has made leadership transitions in China 
more stable, transparent, predictable, and smoother now than ever before. By offering a large 
amount of first- and second-hand data on China’s leadership transition, this thesis shows how 
the institutionalization of power succession helps to maintain regime stability and legitimacy.  
 
 
  
 
1 
 
Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
“The Chinese Communist Party is the vanguard of the working class … the realization of 
communism is the highest ideal and ultimate goal of the Party.” 
– The Chinese Communist Party,  excerpt from its constitution (CCP, 2013) 
 
“What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a 
particular period of postwar history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of 
mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the 
final form of human government.” 
– Francis Fukuyama (1989), excerpt from his essay “The End of History?” 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Since the beginning of human civilization, humanity has been looking for the best form 
of government. For thousands of years, our political systems constantly evolved with the 
changing political values and the progress of human civilizations until the late 1980s – when 
it was claimed that this evolution had met an end. The collapse of the communist regimes in 
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union seemed to mark the death knell of communism and 
seemed to suggest the superiority of Western liberal democracy. Since then, Western liberal 
democracy has been claimed as “the end point of mankind's ideological evolution” and “the 
final form of human government” (Fukuyama, 1989). It seemed that, sooner or later, Western 
liberal democracy – the so-called “best” political system and the “ultimate” achievement of 
humanity – would defeat all other forms of political system of inferior quality and become 
the only form of government in the world.   
Yet, authoritarianism has not been eliminated as many expected. On the contrary, the 
resilience of authoritarianism has been posing unprecedented challenges to the overwhelming 
dominance of Western democracy. Now, three decades after the fall of communism in 
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the communist party in China has posed a strong 
challenge to Western liberal democracy. Instead of collapsing as many have expected for 
decades, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has delivered a remarkable economic miracle 
and led China to become the second largest economy in the world. Now more than ever 
before, the world, including the communities of international relations, has been wondering 
whether or even when China – a country governed by an authoritarian regime – will lead the 
world. Why did the CCP not follow the failure of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe 
and the Soviet Union? 
This thesis examines this question by studying two crucial strategies that the CCP feels 
it needs to put in place for staying in power – ideological adaptation and the 
institutionalization of power succession. A core argument of this thesis is that: 
The CCP’s rule in contemporary China is decided by its quest for popular legitimacy 
on the one hand and its search for party cohesion on the other hand; and the CCP does 
this by adapting its ideology and institutionalizing its power succession. 
2 
 
Ideology and power succession play crucial roles in the CCP’s survival. However, they 
have not received sufficient attention in the relevant literature. In analysing the continuation 
of one-party rule in China, conventional wisdom focuses on economic performance. Thirty 
years of spectacular economic growth led by China’s market reforms have prompted a 
sizeable amount of economics and political science literature to link it with the CCP’s rule 
  rugman         alibert  and  anteigne      b  Perry         hambaugh        Wang  
2005a; Wang, 2005b; Zhao, 2009). Economic success is absolutely important; however, it 
alone is not enough to explain the entire legitimation of the CCP, and China’s economic 
miracle also creates many legitimacy problems.  
More importantly, while the CCP created the economic miracle, it also put its existence 
into a fundamental dilemma. As quoted at the top of this thesis, according to the CCP 
constitution  its “highest ideal and the ultimate goal”,  and theoretically the only reason for its 
existence, is to achieve communism(CCP, 2013). If a communist party is not to deliver 
communism and class victory, why is it there at all? It seems even more strange that it now 
plans to establish a capitalist society – and indeed, the mainstream literature misguidedly 
suggests that the creation of a form of capitalism is a key for the CCP to stay in power. Since 
the beginning of the CCP’s market reforms in the late 1970s, the CCP’s rule has been facing 
a fundamental contradiction between generating economic success by utilizing quasi-
capitalist economic policies, and the fact that this is a communist party that supposedly 
justifies its rule by being the vehicle to deliver a communist society.  
Moving away from communist ideals inevitably led to the decline of communist beliefs 
in China and a huge ideological vacuum. This vacuum made the CCP’s ideological basis 
vulnerable when facing pro-liberal social values in the late 1980s, which gave ways to waves 
of popular pro-democracy protests across the country. In addition, it did not only shake the 
CCP’s ideological basis but also split the party from the inside. From 1979 to 1992, the 
fundamental contradiction between quasi-capitalist economic policies and the CCP’s 
socialism commitment generated endless ideological battles among the ruling elites over 
whether it was right for a communist party to introduce elements of a capitalist system. The 
reform-minded ruling elites who considered the quasi-capitalists economic policies essential 
to promote growth were attacked by other groups of less reform-minded ruling elites – from 
either real conviction or more pragmatic power motivation. This division within the CCP led 
to a series of serious, negative consequences – notably, strangling the decision-making of the 
party when dealing with popular protests in 1989, which almost put the party on the brink of 
death.  
Since the official recognition of the market economy in 1992, the cleavage within the 
party gradually evolved to how far towards capitalism the CCP should or could go and how 
to deal with the negative consequences of rapid economic growth – such as corruption and 
socioeconomic inequality. The “New Left” elites – who are critical of capitalism and prefer a 
new form of national socialism – favour a bigger role of the state in socioeconomic affairs, 
whilst the pro-liberal elites – who embrace universal values – attempt to put forward liberal 
reforms not only in socioeconomic affairs but also in the political system, including 
democratization. By holding high the banner of the New Left and ideological orthodoxy, Bo 
Xilai took advantage of the ideological division within the CCP to launch democratic, 
election-like publicity campaigns in order to compete for top power, which posed a strong 
challenge to the unity of the party and the legitimacy of the power succession system in 
China.  
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As such, ideological transitions are important not only to maintain pro-authoritarian 
values and thus legitimacy, but also to maintain consensus within the party and thus the unity 
of the CCP’s leadership. However, conventional wisdom overemphasizes government 
performance and pays insufficient attention to ideology. Many consider ideology as obsolete 
in contemporary China (Dreyer, 2012: 330, 360; Lynch, 1999:10; Misra, 1998; Ramo, 2004). 
As Holbig (2013:61) points out,   
“In the political science literature on contemporary China, ideology is mostly regarded 
as a dogmatic straitjacket to market reforms that has been worn out over the years of 
economic success, an obsolete legacy of the past waiting to be cast off in the course of 
the country’s transition toward capitalism.”  
Generally speaking, the topic of ideology in contemporary China is under-researched. 
Although China’s assertive foreign policies generated many studies on Chinese nationalism  
this thesis does not consider nationalism as an ideology, as I will explain below. This thesis 
contributes to the limited studies on ideology by arguing that  
Ideology is by no mean obsolete; in contrast, it still plays a crucial role in legitimizing 
the authoritarian rule and maintaining party cohesion in contemporary China.  
In addition to ideological adaptation, the institutionalization of power succession is a 
relevant crucial survival strategy of the CCP. As mentioned, since the late 1970s, the 
ideological turns of the CCP have split the party from the inside and this elite division almost 
put the party on the brink of death in 1989.  The danger of elite divisions is frequently proven 
by the history – the majority of authoritarian regimes failed not because of being overthrown 
by the masses, but because of divisions amongst the elites (O'Donnell, et al., 1986; Svolik, 
2012). As such, the unity of the ruling elites is crucial to regime survival, and a key threat to 
this unity is power succession.  
For an authoritarian regime, successfully transferring power at the top and preventing a 
leadership split during this process has always been extremely challenging. During Mao 
Zedong’s rule, an un-institutionalized power system caused endless, fierce power struggles 
within the party, which indirectly led to economic stagnation and social unrest. Afraid of elite 
divisions and brutal power struggles, the CCP has taken great efforts to settle disputes of 
power succession through institutional channels. Thirty years of institutionalization has made 
leadership transitions in China more stable, transparent, predictable, and smoother now than 
ever before. A U  Congress report called the CCP’s leadership transition in      “one of the 
very few examples of an authoritarian state successfully engineering a peaceful, 
institutionalized political succession”(Dotson, 2012:4). Dickson (2011:212) argues that 
China’s “routinized process for replacing ruling elites is a remarkably rare practice among 
authoritarian regimes”.  
Arguably, this institutional development is important not only to the internal stability of 
the CCP but also to its legitimacy. In the CCP’s discourses  its ruling capacity is a 
fundamental inner cause of its legitimacy, as I will explain below. By offering a large amount 
of first- and second-hand data on China’s leadership transitions, this thesis shows how the 
institutionalization of power succession helps to maintain regime stability and legitimacy. So, 
this thesis establishes that: 
The institutionalization of power succession is a key for maintaining the CCP’s internal 
stability and its ruling capacity to maintain legitimacy.  
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1.2 Legitimacy and Party Cohesion  
Legitimacy is a complex term, as Chapter 2 will discuss in more details. In this thesis, 
legitimacy refers to “the capability of the system to engender and maintain the belief that 
existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society” (Lipset, 1981:64). 
As Huntington (1993) argued  legitimacy is “mushy” but “essential to understanding the 
problems confronting authoritarian regimes in the late twentieth century”. Legitimacy lies in 
the centre of both the history of political philosophy (White, 2005:1) and contemporary 
Chinese politics (Gilley and Holbig, 2009; Gilley and Holbig, 2010). It provides explanations 
on the failure of communism and the survival of the CCP. Arguably, a key reason for western 
scholars failing to predict dramatic changes of the Soviet Union and many Eastern European 
countries before the fall of those regimes is their insufficient attention paid to the relationship 
between legitimacy and political stability (Zhao, 2012) – the relevant literature still did not 
pay sufficient attention to this issue, although there were some studies on legitimacy in the 
1980s (e.g. White,1986).  
Popular legitimacy is crucial; however, it is not a sufficient condition of regime 
survival. Regime survival does not only need the external stability of the regime that is 
reflected in popular legitimacy, but also the internal stability of the regime that is reflected in 
the unity of the ruling elites. The relevant literature largely focuses on popular support but 
pays insufficient attention to the ruling elites. Indeed, how ruling elites view the regime – a 
kind of self-legitimation – also matters. As Rothschild (1977:491) argues, 
“Discussions of legitimacy and legitimation risk irrelevancy if they overlook this 
crucial dimension of a ruling elite's sense of its legitimacy and focus exclusively on the 
other dimension of the public's or the masses' perception of that elite's legitimacy.”  
Lewis (1984) argues that “it is elite disintegration and the failure of its internal mechanisms 
of authority that have engendered the more general collapse of legitimacy and the onset of 
political crises in communist Eastern Europe”. 
Following the Weberian typology, the proponents of Weber have widely examined the 
crucial role of political elites in deciding legitimacy. Therborn (1980:109) argues that “the 
really critical factor is a basic consensus among the ruling groups themselves, and consent to 
their legitimacy by members of the state apparatus”. Bialer (1982:194) argues that “what is 
crucial is the legitimacy of these claims to the other centers of power and not their legitimacy 
among the people who must take the consequences”. According to Palma (1991:57) “when 
legitimation comes from the top, the decisive operative relationship is not that between rulers 
and people, but that between rulers and Weber’s administrative staff – in communist parlance, 
the cadres. When chiliasm becomes embodied in the state, cohesion among power holders, 
rooted in unimpeachable doctrine  becomes essential for endurance.” The influence of elites 
and the government is particularly notable in China, which is in the shadow of Confucianism. 
The cultural traditions of low political participation and high trust in government made the 
role of ruling elites and the Chinese government more influential. 
In addition, most of the relevant quantitative studies heavily relied on the subjective 
opinions and values of citizens (i.e. surveys); however, how the regime produced its 
legitimacy claims has not been given a central place. Arguably  the regime’s legitimacy claim 
is a notable inner cause of popular legitimacy. Thus  the CCP’s ideological discourses that 
this thesis studies are particularly important to capture the regime’s legitimacy claims and 
their survival strategies.  
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More importantly, the CCP’s legitimacy and its cohesion are indivisible. Arguably, 
legitimacy is considered by the CCP as an external manifestation of its ruling capacity. In 
   4  the CCP issued a party resolution on strengthening the CCP’s ruling capacity (zhizheng 
nengli) that explicitly attempted to gain legitimacy (CCP, 2004). As one scholar of the 
Central Institute of Socialism read it, legitimacy was the “unspoken word left to the 
understanding of the audience” of this resolution (Gilley and Holbig, 2009:341). Another 
Chinese scholar considered legitimacy as “the key element reflecting the ruling capacity of 
the CCP” (Gilley and Holbig, 2009:341). This resolution stimulated an intensive debate 
among Chinese intellectuals on regime legitimacy. In this debate, Chinese intellectuals 
proposed a variety of policy suggestions to strengthen the ruling capacity of the CCP and thus 
its legitimacy, as this thesis will show. Obviously, this ruling capacity is built on the CCP’s 
internal cohesion. In other words, this party cohesion is a prerequisite of the CCP’s ruling 
capacity to maintain legitimacy – including promoting economic growth, maintaining social 
stability, and defending China’s national interests. Therefore, instead of focusing on the 
masses’ support alone, this thesis explores  
the relationship between both the external stability of the regime (i.e. popular 
legitimacy) and the internal stability of the regime (i.e. party cohesion). 
This study on the CCP’s survival strategies makes a valuable contribution the literature 
of Chinese studies, international relations, and comparative politics. This study provides clues 
to predict whether the authoritarian system in China is sustainable, and whether and when 
China will democratize driven by its rapidly socioeconomic modernization. Such a study has 
great implications for international relations scholars’ attempts to understand “the rise of 
China”. This thesis also contributes to the field of Chinese studies by re-examining the role of 
ideology and power succession in maintaining the legitimacy and internal stability of the 
CCP. In addition, it provides a notable addition to the literature on authoritarian resilience by 
showing the adaptability and learning ability of the CCP.  
 
1.3 Existential Crises in China?  
Nowadays, the international world has two contrary views about the Chinese state. On 
the one hand, some are optimistic about China’s future (e.g. Jacques, 2009). After China 
successfully held the Beijing Olympics in 2008 and became the second largest world 
economy in 2010, and following the 2008 financial crisis that undermined Western power, it 
seems that the world is waiting for the age of China (Jacques, 2009). According to a Pew 
research survey (Pew, 2013), nearly half (47%) of American and over half of European– 
including 71% Spanish, 70% French, 66% British, and 66% German – respondents agree that 
China will ultimately or has already replaced the US to become a leading superpower. In this 
sense, as long as China can maintain economic growth, Chinese leaders should be cheering 
for their success and should take over the world order. On the other hand, many consider the 
CCP’s rule as immoral and illegitimate because of its authoritarian nature. Some argue that 
the spectacular economic growth in China is at the expense of violations of human rights, 
environmental pollution  and a “Ponzi” economic growth model (Krugman, 2013). Others, in 
particular the Collapsing China School, doubt the future stability of the regime in China 
(Feng, 2013a; Pei, 2006; Shirk, 2007). For example, after Chang’s (2002) first prediction that 
the CCP would fall before 2011 was proven to be wrong, Chang (2011) again predicted that 
“instead of       the mighty Communist Party of China will fall in 2012. Bet on it”.  
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In the academic community, Chinese intellectuals and Western scholars have very 
different views on the CCP’s legitimacy. On the one hand, many experts outside mainland 
China argue that the CCP enjoys strong legitimacy (Chen, et al., 1997; Fewsmith, 2007; 
Gilley, 2009; Shi, 2001; Shi, 2008; Tang, 2001; Tong, 2011). This view is strongly supported 
by various cross-national surveys including the Asian barometer and the World Values 
Survey (Chen, 2004; Gilley, 2006; Gilley, 2008; Lewis-Beck, et al., 2013; Li, 2004b; Munro, 
et al., 2013; Shi, 2001; Tang, 2005; Yang and Tang, 2013). For example, the 2008 Asian 
Barometer Survey finds that 74% of Chinese respondents positively responded to the 
statement that “whatever its faults may be  our current system of government is still the best 
for the country” (Chu, 2013:5). According to a professor at the Chinese University of Hong 
Kong, Wang Shaoguang (2010b:139; 2012b), and a professor at the National Taiwan 
University, Chu Yunhan (2013:4), the CCP’s strong legitimacy is a “consensus” of “scholars 
familiar with the field”. On the other hand, Chinese intellectuals are much more pessimistic 
than this “consensus”. Of 125 Chinese articles on the subject of political legitimacy published 
in party school journals, university journals, and public policy journals that this thesis studies, 
over 40% of Chinese intellectuals writing on the subject of legitimacy argue that the regime 
is in certain forms of legitimacy crises or challenges, while only 1% of them consider 
legitimacy in China to be high.  
Indeed, not only Chinese intellectuals but also Chinese leaders have been seriously 
concerned about the CCP’s rule. As this thesis will show, the existential crisis has been a 
constant concern of Chinese leaders. Why are they so pessimistic? What are they worrying 
about? Why does the CCP think reclaiming legitimacy is essential for them? Arguably, this 
concern is mainly generated by communist ideology, the political legacy of Mao Zedong, and 
problems caused by rapid economic growth. In Mao Zedong’s era  communist ideology and a 
cult of personality used to be the lynchpin of legitimacy in China for a couple of decades 
until a series of political campaigns and policy failures seriously undermined the regime 
legitimacy. After Mao Zedong passed away, the party leaders felt that the CCP’s legitimacy 
reached its lowest point. Driven by the concerns about existential crisis, the CCP was forced 
to change its primary task from Mao’s “class struggle” to economic reconstruction – an 
approach that shifted the ruling basis of the communist rule from being ideology-based 
toward being performance-based. However, such a fundamental transition was destined to be 
challenging because it was more or less an attempt to throw away everything that the party 
had been previously doing to build revolutionary legitimacy – in particular the communist 
ideology and Mao Zedong.  
Unlike the Soviet Union, that could take a de-Stalinization approach but still adhere to 
Leninism as the party ideology, the CCP cannot completely get away from its past and negate 
its founder Mao Zedong  otherwise  the party’s history and rule would be put into an  
illegitimacy dilemma. As Xi Jinping clearly pointed out, “if then we completely negate 
comrade Mao Zedong, is our party tenable? Is our socialist system tenable? It is not tenable. 
If it is not tenable, there will be great disorder in China” (Qi, 2013). Thus, on the one hand, 
the CCP remained to identify Mao Zedong Thought as its guiding theory. On the other hand, 
it reinterpreted a usable version of Mao Zedong Thought  departing from Mao’s literal words. 
More importantly, moving away from revolutionary idealism did help the government 
to improve their performance and deliver economic benefits to the people; however, it lost 
the very basis of the communist’ monopoly on power. As already noted, there is a potential 
contradiction between the CCP’s quasi-capitalist economic policies and the ultimate goal of a 
communist party – to establish a communist society. This contradiction did not only threaten 
popular legitimacy but also split the party from the inside. The economic plans of reformists 
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were frequently attacked by other groups of ruling elites as products of capitalism. As 
mentioned, this elite division almost led to the collapse of the CCP in 1989. 
In the early 1990s, after the failure of the Soviet Union, the party conducted a large 
number of systematic studies on the failure of communist regimes through its various party 
organs and think tanks – especially the Chinese Academy of Social Science (CASS). The 
CASS analysts summarized the failure of Eastern European communist regimes in three 
reasons (Zhou, et al., 2000:119-120):  
1. Democratization within the ruling party led to divisions among the ruling elites. 
2. The increasing discontent of the masses was utilized by opposition forces. 
3. Western countries’ “peaceful evolution” campaign undermined popular support for 
the one-party rule.  
In other words, the lesson that the party learnt from the failure of those communist regimes is 
to strengthen the unity of party leaders, build popular legitimacy, and resist the “invasion” of 
liberal political values. In this context, ideological changes and the institutionalization of 
power succession are crucial to maintaining party cohesion on the one hand and to building 
popular legitimacy on the other hand.  
 In contemporary China, although the CCP led China to become the second largest 
world economy and helped over 600 million people out of poverty, its concerns about 
existential crisis did not lessen because of problems caused by rapid economic growth. Now 
more than ever before, the CCP is concerned that economic performance might not be 
enough to provide sufficient legitimacy, as this thesis will reveal. Rampant corruption, for 
example  has been threatening the party’s rule. As Jiang Zemin (1997b) clearly pointed out at 
the 15
th
 Party Congress,  
“The fight against corruption is a grave political struggle vital to the very existence of the 
Party and the state. Our Party can never be daunted and vanquished by any enemy. But 
the easiest way to capture a fortress is from within, so in no way should we destroy 
ourselves. If corruption cannot be punished effectively, our Party will lose the confidence 
and support of the people.” 
 In addition to corruption, the further deterioration of socioeconomic inequality and 
changing values provided a widening ground for power struggles under the cover of ideology 
(i.e. ideological battles / line struggles). As mentioned, Bo Xilai held high the flag of New 
Left for winning a seat in the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC). The orthodox doctrines 
of Marxism and Maoism were again used as a powerful weapon for power struggles. 
Although the leadership transitions in China were institutionalized to a certain level at that 
time  Bo Xilai’s way of competing for the top power – through democratic, election-like 
publicity campaigns involving a distinct policy agenda and a strong appeal to the masses – 
posed a strong challenge to the unity of the party and the legitimacy of the power succession 
system. Facing the increasing threats of corruption, socioeconomic inequality and changing 
values, Xi Jinping clearly warned the party that “popular support decides the survival or 
death of the party” (Xu and Zhou, 2013). 
Above all, driven by those concerns of existential crisis that were generated from 
communist ideology, Mao Zedong, and problems caused by rapid economic growth, 
contemporary Chinese leaders have a delicate task built on four things:  
(1) Continuing to stress the importance of economic development. 
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But (2) explaining why China still needs a communist party to hold a monopoly on power.  
(3) Fending off potential internal attacks from within the party itself and from people who 
might criticize the ideological turn – either from real conviction or from more pragmatic 
power motivation  
And also (4) dealing with the negative social consequences of rapid economic 
development.  
In this context, the CCP has continually promoted economic reforms (i.e. market 
reforms for economic performance), political reforms (e.g. the institutionalization of power 
succession for undermining the negative effects of power struggles), and ideological reforms 
(i.e. justify the CCP’s rule not only to the society but also to the party itself). While economic 
reforms are extensively studied in the relevant existing literature  the party’s efforts in the 
ideological and political fields are under-researched, as the following section will discuss. 
  
1.4 Popular Legitimacy in China: Bridging the Wide Gulf between Western and 
Chinese Scholarship  
In the understanding of popular legitimacy in China, this thesis reveals a wide gulf 
between Western and Chinese scholarship. In this thesis, “Western scholars” refers to those 
who are not based in mainland China, but they are not necessarily from the West. “Chinese 
intellectuals” refers to those who are based in mainland China. 
 
1.4.1 Understanding Popular Legitimacy in China from a Western Perspective  
1.4.1.1 Performance Legitimacy Approach  
In explaining legitimacy in China, literature in English concentrates on performance 
legitimacy. In this thesis, performance legitimacy refers to the idea that a state’s right to rule 
is justified by the performance of all government functions. Pragmatism and market reform 
have gradually shifted the legitimacy of the CCP from ideology to performance (Zhao, 2009). 
On the one hand, many consider the communist ideology obsolete under market reforms 
nowadays, as mentioned. In this sense, with the decline of communist beliefs, the CCP has 
little ideological legitimacy left in contemporary China. On the other hand, modern history 
has proved the ultimate failure of communist rule, and classic theories have frequently 
pointed out the fatal weaknesses of authoritarianism. According to many, the authoritarian 
system does not have as much rational-legal legitimacy as democratic systems do (Zhao, 
2009). It seems that performance legitimacy is the last straw for the CCP’s rule. As  a 
professor of the University of Chicago, Zhao Dingxin, argues (2009:428)  “government 
performance stands alone as the sole source of legitimacy in China.” This thesis poses a 
series of theoretical and empirical challenges to such a claim. 
Economic performance is the most frequently mentioned element of performance 
legitimacy. The conventional wisdom of Western scholarship holds that economic 
achievement is a principal (if not the sole) pillar of legitimacy in contemporary China 
  rugman         alibert  and  anteigne   008b; Perry, 2008; Shambaugh, 2001; Wang, 
2005a; Wang, 2005b; Zhao, 2009; Yang and Zhao, 2014). In a major textbook on Chinese 
politics, Tony Saich (2004:347) argues that “[CCP] legitimacy is currently based on the 
capacity to deliver the economic goods”.  
9 
 
Economic performance is absolutely important. However, empirical studies show that 
economic performance matters, but there is no strong evidence to prove that it is the sole, let 
alone the principal pillar of legitimacy (Chu, 2013; Lewis-Beck, et al., 2013; Munro, et al., 
2013; Yang and Tang, 2013). In addition, if economic prosperity leads the high levels of 
popular support for the government, why do other countries such as Indian and Brazil – that 
also enjoy economic prosperity  – not have high levels of support like China does (Tang, et 
al., 2013)? Based on a 2010 national survey in China, Dickson (2013) finds a negative 
relationship between economic development and popular support.       
In addition to economic performance, social stability is another key element of 
government performance, and it has also been widely accepted as a key pillar of legitimacy in 
China  Breslin         ickson         alibert  and  anteigne      b   hue     4; Sandby-
Thomas, 2011). Shue (2004)  for example  argues that the CCP “stakes” its legitimacy on its 
capability to maintain social stability. Needless to say, social stability and economic growth 
are interdependent. Without a stable social order, the economy cannot grow rapidly; 
conversely the welfare materials delivered by economic growth might help to enhance social 
stability. This interdependence suggests that the rules of modern states are based on different 
combinations of legitimacy sources rather than a sole pillar. 
 
1.4.1.2 Limits of Performance Legitimacy  
Legitimacy by nature has many dimensions and its sources are often inter-related. 
Ideology in particular plays a crucial role in influencing other sources of legitimacy. 
Arguably, a fatal weakness of the performance legitimacy approach is its insufficient 
attention to ideological factors. As mentioned, the mainstream of Western scholarship 
overemphasizes economic growth, and many assume that market reform has also rendered 
ideology obsolete. This misguided view has underestimated the role of ideology in 
contemporary China. 
Legitimacy generated from government performance is not directly through 
government performance per se but from citizens’ subjective perceptions of this performance. 
Ideological factors play a crucial role in shaping people’s subjective perceptions over this 
performance. Thus, economic performance – crisis or growth – per se is not directly reflected 
in legitimacy (Gilley and Holbig, 2010); the performance will be framed by ideological 
factors and transformed by conductive ways into people’s subjective perceptions of economic 
performance. If economic performance is the sole legitimacy pillar in China, then economic 
deterioration will unavoidably lead to political crisis. However, the financial crisis of 2008 
did enhance rather than weaken the CCP’s rule (Holbig, 2011). By using the Chinese media 
to highlight the good performance of coping with the financial crisis domestically and the 
disaster that this crisis caused in other countries, the CCP managed to manipulate this crisis 
as an opportunity to gain legitimacy and achieve its political purposes – such as marketing its 
official ideology, Scientific Outlook of Development (Holbig, 2011).   
My recent study on Wenzhou’s financial reform of      also shows how the Chinese 
government could manipulate the idea of “reform” as a political symbol to maintain the status 
quo when facing the regional debt crisis (Zeng, 2015). By using reform ideas as substitutes 
for the actual practices, the Chinese government managed to solve the Wenzhou debt crisis 
without really tackling the core problem. This symbolic financial reform helped the CCP to 
maintain socioeconomic stability during the power succession at the 18
th
 Party Congress. The 
case of the 2008 financial crisis and the Wenzhou debt crisis suggests that there is a great 
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deal of rooms for the government to manipulate people’s subjective perceptions of economic 
crisis, and thus maintain – or even strengthen – the CCP’s rule. 
In addition, many legitimacy problems are caused by rapid economic growth. Now 
more than ever before, the CCP is concerned that economic performance might not be 
enough to provide sufficient legitimacy. The three most perceived threats to legitimacy by 
Chinese intellectuals – changing values, socioeconomic inequality, and corruption – are all 
problems caused by economic growth. Take environmental pollution led by rapid economic 
growth as another example. When Beijing’s fog haze becomes more visible and undermines 
the quality of people’s lives  people become more and more concerned about the negative 
effects of economic growth. This negative perception of economic growth has no doubt 
undermined the positive impact of growth on legitimacy. Indeed, not only this domestic 
perception but also the international perception of China’s growth matters. As mentioned, on 
the one hand  China’s economic growth can be perceived as a symbol of “a rising China” and 
a role model for developing countries. On the other hand, it can also be described as an 
immoral, costly growth model, which violates human rights and sacrifices the poor and the 
environment. These two images of China certainly have contrary impacts on regime 
legitimacy. 
Similarly, ideology also plays a significant role in maintaining social stability. It 
crucially interacts with the CCP’s capability to maintain social stability. As Chapter 5 will 
discuss, the CCP’s (in)stability discourse – liberal democracy brings instability and the CCP 
is the only capable force to maintain stability – helps to generates popular support for the 
current political system and thus maintain stability. This stability in return reinforces the 
regime’s stability discourse – the current political system is more capable of maintaining 
stable a social order and protecting personal safety. In short, ideological factors are important 
in affecting the impacts of economic performance and social stability on legitimacy. 
 
1.4.1.3 Nationalism 
 In addition to government performance, nationalism is another frequently mentioned 
explanatory factor of regime legitimacy in China. China’s assertive foreign policies have 
generated enormous academic and public interest in Chinese nationalism. Many argue that 
nationalism plays a crucial role in legitimizing the CCP’s rule (Breslin, 2009; Darr, 2011; 
Fang, 1997; Lam, 2003; Li, 2001b; Lieberthal, 2004:334-335; Lin and Hu, 2003; Ostergaard, 
2004; Saich, 2004; Shambaugh, 2001; Zheng, 2004). As Gries (2005:112) argues: 
“Lacking the procedural legitimacy accorded to democratically elected governments 
and facing the collapse of communist ideology, the CCP is increasingly dependent upon 
its nationalist credentials to rule.”  
Thomas Christensen (1996) also argues:“Since the Chinese Communist Party is no longer 
communist  it must be even more Chinese.” As these scholars pointed out, nationalism is no 
doubt important to the CCP’s rule. However, as mentioned in the Introduction Chapter, 
empirical work finds that there is no evidence to prove that nationalism is a superior source of 
legitimacy in China (Chu, 2013).  
 Many also argue that Chinese nationalism has gradually become the ideological 
foundation of the CCP by replacing the communist ideals – which has been largely 
marginalized and weaken nowadays (Christensen, 1996; Gries and Rosen, 2004; He, 2007; 
Link, 2008; Metzger and Myers, 1998; Zhao, 1997; Zhao, 1998; Zhong, 1996). For example, 
a professor of Duke University, Liu Kang, argues that:  
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“‘The current Chinese communist government is more a product of nationalism than a 
product of ideology like Marxism and Communism ’… today nationalism has probably 
‘become the most powerful legitimating ideology.’” (cited from: Bajoria, 2008) 
These kinds of arguments suggest that nationalism is an independent value system i.e. 
ideology. However, nationalism alone does not provide any source of legitimacy for certain 
political systems or the appointment of political actors (Beetham, 2008). In addition, as 
Shaun Breslin (2009) argues, Chinese nationalism “seems to lack sufficient coherence and 
guiding principles to be counted as an ideology as such – it is not a ‘science of ideas’”. Thus, 
nationalism alone is not an ideology, and so it alone cannot replace communist ideology. In 
the CCP’s official discourse  nationalism is a part of the “socialist core value system”. As 
such, the legitimizing role of nationalism is better addressed in the broader context of 
ideological constructions in China. This thesis agrees that nationalism is crucial to the CCP’s 
legitimacy, but it considers nationalism a part of the CCP’s broad ideological construction.  
  Above all, sources of legitimacy in China are a hotly-debated topic. Although scholars 
have different emphases  the legitimacy formulation “economic growth + social stability + 
nationalism” is more or less a consensus  Breslin         ickson         alibert  and 
Lanteigne, 2008b). All those factors are crucial to the CCP’s legitimacy; however, ideology 
plays a role in affecting all those factors. Thus, the role of ideology in China should be 
considered to be more important when analysing legitimacy in contemporary China.  
  
1.4.2 Understanding Regime Legitimacy in China from a Chinese Perspective  
Party intellectuals within China may have valuable insights unavailable to those outside 
and perhaps better understand how China is ruled. In order to investigate the opinions of 
Chinese intellectuals, this thesis analyses   5 Chinese articles with “legitimacy” in the title 
published between 2008 and 2012. Based on this primary database, this thesis juxtaposes the 
Chinese literature with the English literature on this subject. A core finding of this thesis is 
that  
There is a remarkable cleavage between the international perceptions of the Chinese 
state and the pessimistic views among Chinese intellectuals about the party’s ruling. 
In terms of the CCP’s level of legitimacy, pessimistic views commonly exist in the 
writing of Chinese intellectuals. As mentioned above, in the Chinese intellectual’s debate on 
legitimacy, more than 40% of the party intellectuals argue that the CCP is in certain forms of 
legitimacy crises or challenges, while only 1% of them argue the CCP’s legitimacy is strong. 
In order to rescue the CCP’s rule, Chinese intellectuals proposed various strategies to 
maintain popular legitimacy.  
Moreover, this thesis finds that Chinese intellectuals are more pessimistic about 
performance legitimacy than many Western scholars. In China, it is clearly recognized that 
simply relying on economics is not enough – even if the economy continues to do well (and 
of course, there is a clear understanding that bad economic performance will harm 
legitimacy). Problems caused by economic growth –changing values, socioeconomic 
inequality, corruption – are considered to be the most perceived legitimacy threats by Chinese 
intellectuals nowadays. In particular, Chinese intellectuals expressed their serious concern 
with changing values. How to maintain pro-authoritarian values has become a more and more 
crucial, urgent challenge to the one-party rule in China.  
12 
 
As such, ideology has been proposed by Chinese intellectuals as a leading strategy to 
maintain legitimacy. Chinese intellectuals’ high emphasis on ideology is in stark contrast 
with Western scholarship’s insufficient attention to this issue. The above findings of this 
thesis suggest a distinct research agenda of Chinese intellectuals. Indeed, not only Chinese 
intellectuals but also party leaders considered ideology to be crucial to regime legitimacy. In 
the past three decades, the party has invested a great amount of energy and human capital in 
modernizing its ideological basis. In order to understand the CCP’s impressive efforts in 
ideological work, this thesis contributes to the limited studies on ideology by studying the 
CCP’s ideological discourses  mechanisms of ideological promotion, and their effectiveness.  
   
1.5. Ideological Adaptation in Contemporary China: A Dual-Ideological Strategy 
1.5.1 Is Ideology Obsolete Nowadays?  
As mentioned, many Western scholars consider that thirty years of market reforms in 
China have rendered ideology meaningless nowadays. This understanding suffers from two 
major conceptual weaknesses: (1) consider ideology to be communism and (2) consider 
ideology to be a belief system. First, conventional wisdom solely refers ideology in China to 
communism.
1
 In the context of declining communist beliefs in contemporary China, this 
conceptualization seems to suggest logically that ideology becomes meaningless. This is 
obviously inaccurate because the CCP has put forward various formulas of party theories and 
ideologies – such as Jiang Zemin’s Three Represents and Hu Jintao’s Scientific Outlook of 
Development – to justify if not to legitimize its rule.   
Moreover, putting aside other ideological formulas, even communism alone is still 
significant to the CCP’s rule. As mentioned above, theoretically, the only reason for a 
communist party to exist is to achieve communism. The CCP needs constantly to find some 
ex post facto ways of explaining why the reality of political economy is not incompatible 
with its commitment to socialism. This is relevant to the second conceptual weakness of the 
existing literature: ideology as a belief system. It suggests that the power of ideology comes 
from people’s faith  implying that ideology is only powerful if people believe it. 
Yet, even if nobody believes the communist doctrines, they are still powerful in 
influencing Chinese politics. For example, any party leader who openly supports abandoning 
the doctrine of Mao Zedong Thought and communism would soon find a powerful coalition 
within the party against him or her – from either real conviction or more pragmatic power 
motivation. This is why the reform-minded leaders carefully portrayed their reforms and 
policies in socialist terms to fend off attacks from the conservative ruling elites who were 
dissatisfied with market reforms, as Chapter 2 will discuss.  
In order to address the above conceptual weakness, this thesis endorses  chull’s 
approach that considers ideology to be a form of discourse (i.e. political language) that 
includes but is not limited to a belief system. As Schull argues (1992), people who have 
different personal beliefs can adhere to the same ideology, and the power of ideology does 
not only lie in faith but also in respect. In the public occasion, the CCP leaders need to show, 
at least, respect for the communist doctrines no matter whether they believe in them or not. 
This explains why communist doctrine can still constrain party elites in the context of 
declining communist beliefs. It is also clearly evidenced by the case of the then party head of 
Chongqing, Bo Xilai. Orthodox doctrines of Marxism and Maoism and the ideological flag of 
                                                            
1 I owe this idea to Peter Sandby-Thomas (private communication).  
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the New Left were used by Bo Xilai as a powerful weapon to compete for a PSC seat. As 
Chapter 2 will discuss, Bo Xilai’s ideological flag is not only motivated by fundamentally 
different beliefs but is also an attempt to grab hold of power using ideology. 
The above two approaches of ideology raise a notable distinction between legitimacy 
and regime survival. The first approach that considers ideology as a belief system suggests 
that ideology is solely about influencing world views and cultivating political beliefs. In this 
sense, ideology is only produced for legitimacy produces. The second approach that considers 
ideology to be a discourse suggests that ideology is not only produced for influencing world 
views and cultivating political beliefs, but also for maintaining socialist conventions that 
justify the CCP’s rule. In this sense  ideology is for maintaining both legitimacy and party 
cohesion. As discussed earlier, regime survival is not only decided by popular legitimacy (i.e. 
the external stability of the regime) but also by party cohesion (i.e. the internal stability of the 
regime). Thus, the second approach enables a more comprehensive understanding of the role 
of ideology in consolidating and legitimizing the one-party rule. In sum, this thesis argues 
that:   
In contemporary China, ideology still plays a crucial role in maintaining the CCP’s 
rule. 
 
1.5.2 Is Ideology for Legitimation or Power Consolidation in Contemporary China?  
 Unlike conventional wisdom, a few keen China scholars still consider ideology 
important. As Breslin (2009) argues: “despite the promotion of apoliticism and the transition 
from revolutionary to ruling party  ideology is far from dead in contemporary China.” Shih 
     :   6) also argues that “ideological campaigns are by no means obsolete”. Among the 
already limited literature in English, there are roughly two major explanations. On the one 
hand, some argue that ideological changes were produced for legitimizing the CCP (Bondes 
and Heep, 2012; Bondes and Heep, 2013; Brady, 2009; Brown, 2012; Gilley and Holbig, 
2010; Holbig, 2009; Holbig, 2013; Sausmikat, 2006; Su, 2011; Sandby-Thomas, 2011). For 
example, Holbig (2013:62) argues that “ideology still  and with a renewed emphasis since the 
turn of the century, plays an indispensable role in the quest to legitimize authoritarian rule in 
contemporary China”. In addition  the CCP’s mass persuasion is also considered to be 
important to the CCP’s legitimacy (Bondes and Heep, 2013; Brady, 2009).  
On the other hand, many contend that it was a factional tool to struggle for power (Bo, 
2004; Fewsmith, 2003b; Lieber, 2013; Shih, 2008; Zheng and Lye, 2003). For example, 
Zheng and Lye (2003:65) argues that “Jiang Zemin has succeeded in securing a legacy for 
himself with his ‘Three Represents’ theory and in putting his own men in key positions of the 
Party and government.” Shih (2008:1177) argues that “ideological campaigns function as 
radars that allow senior leaders to discern the loyalty of faction members”.   
 The above cleavage lies in the primary audience and function of the CCP’s ideological 
discourses. If ideology is a legitimizing device to gain popular support (i.e. the first view), the 
people should be the primary audience. If ideology is a just tool of factional struggles (i.e. the 
second view), then its primary audience should be the party members (i.e. the party itself). 
Indeed, neither of these two views is wrong, and the major division between these two views 
partly lies in the distinction among the CCP’s ideologies.  
 This thesis proposes a new analytical framework to divide the CCP’s dual ideological 
strategy: formal ideology and informal ideology. Formal ideology refers to those official 
ideological discourses that are narrowly concerned with the CCP’s discipline and the socialist 
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doctrines, which were incorporated in the CCP constitution including Zhao Ziyang’s primary 
stage of socialism  Jiang Zemin’s Three Represents  and Hu Jintao’s Scientific Outlook of 
Development. Informal ideology refers to those popular ideations that are broadly concerned 
with the justification of the party’s rule to the entire society including the party  such as the 
promotion of nationalism/patriotism and the emphasis on virtue. Formal ideology and 
informal ideology play inter-related but different roles in justifying the party’s rule.  
 Notably, Sandby-Thomas (2014) also holds a similar view. However, Sandby-Thomas 
(2014) only mentions this view in a single paragraph without giving more details. Moreover, 
his definition of informal ideology and formal ideology seem to be different from this thesis. 
For example, Sandby-Thomas considers “reform and opening up” as a formal ideology and 
“market liberalism” as an informal ideology, while this thesis does not.   
  
1.5.3 Division of Formal Ideology and Informal Ideology    
The CCP’s dual ideological strategy involves two inter-related but different types of 
justification: the communist rule and the authoritarian rule. The first one is to justify why 
China still needs a communist party to monopoly on power. As mentioned above, while the 
CCP created the economic miracle, it also put its existence into a dilemma. Since the CCP 
launched market reforms in the late 1970s, there has been a fundamental contradiction 
between the CCP’s quasi-capitalist economic policies and its socialist commitment. This 
contradiction led to endless ideological battles/line struggles within the CCP, as mentioned 
above. The second problem is to justify why China needs one-party rule rather than liberal 
democracy, which deals with the popular legitimacy of the authoritarian system in China. 
Arguably, the CCP adopts its dual ideological strategy to deal with these two problems. 
Specifically, the CCP employs formal ideology to justify its communist rule and 
informal ideology to justify its authoritarian rule. This thesis also argues that the major 
audience of formal ideology is the CCP itself rather than society. This is not to say formal 
ideologies such as Marxism-Leninism doctrines are not propagated to society. Of course, 
those formal ideologies will propagate to society; however, their primary goal is to settle 
ideological battles within the CCP by making the reality of the political economy in China 
consistent with its ideological basis and commitment to socialism. In other words, formal 
ideology is produced for justifying the CCP’s existence to itself  i.e. a kind of self-
justification). When it comes to legitimizing the CCP’s authoritarian rule as a whole  this is 
the arena in which informal ideology takes place. In short:  
Formal ideology is used mainly for justifying the communist rule to the party itself, while 
informal ideology is for justifying the authoritarian rule to the entire Chinese society 
including the party. In this way, this dual ideological strategy deals with the internal 
stability (party cohesion) and external stability (popular legitimacy) of the regime 
respectively.  
 
1.5.3.1 Formal Ideology: a kind of Self-Justification 
1.5.3.1.1 Message of Formal Ideology 
Formal ideology signals two primary messages: (1) an ex post facto justification of the 
CCP’s rule and (2) establishing ideological orthodoxy and a leader’s credentials. As 
mentioned, the CCP is facing a fundamental contradiction between its quasi-capitalist 
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economic policies and its socialist commitment. The most important function of formal 
ideology is to redefine what is meant by socialism at that moment in time, and thus to provide 
an ex post facto justification of explaining why the current political economy is not 
incompatible with the CCP’s ideological basis and its commitment to socialism. In short, 
formal ideology justifies if not legitimizes the CCP’s communist rule. Second, formal 
ideology also establishes ideological orthodoxy and a leader’s credentials. As formal 
ideology is clearly identified with specific leaders in China, it reflects the personal authority 
of Chinese leaders and carries a special meaning to assert their power.  
Arguably, formal ideology is crucial in settling ideological battles (or so-called line 
struggles) within the party and thus maintaining party cohesion. As Chapter 2 will discuss, 
there were intense debates among the CCP elites over whether it was right for the CCP to 
introduce elements of the capitalist system for generating economic success. In order to fend 
off the conservative forces’ attacks, the reformists had carefully constructed various 
ideological discourses by portraying their economic policies in socialist terms. In this way, 
those discourses helped to minimise opposition from the conservative forces and thus 
maintain party cohesion. However, as formal ideology closely links with power, it can also 
cause problems: when it is a manifestation of factional positioning, it can lead to fissures in 
the party. As Chapter 5 will discuss  Jiang Zemin’s motivation for power through Three 
Represents partly led to factionalism and thus undermined party cohesion. Thus, the impact 
of formal ideology on party cohesion is decided by how formal ideology is employed.  
 
1.5.3.1.2. The Major Audience 
As the major audience of formal ideology is the party, formal ideology is mainly 
constructed by communist language that is used by the communist elites to communicate 
with each other. This communist language might not be easily decoded and understood by 
outsiders, but they contribute to the smooth flow of relevant information within the party. For 
example  as Chapter   will discuss  when confronting Hua Guofeng’s “two whatevers” 
argument, Deng Xiaoping launched various intra-party discussions about “the sole criterion 
for testing truth” and “seek the truths from facts”. In this case  when reading the relevant 
discourse of party documents and newspapers, the party elites who were familiar with 
political vocabularies could soon understand who (i.e. Deng, in this case) was going to 
against whom  i.e. Hua) for what  i.e. Hua’s “two whatevers”).  
On the contrary, the masses that were less educated in general and less familiar with 
communist vocabularies had many difficulties in understanding the real meaning of those 
formal discourses. For example, as Chapter 2 will discuss, there was an intense debate over 
whether the commodity economy was compatible with the socialist planned economy within 
the CCP. Could the masses understand what “socialist planned economy” and “commodity 
economy” were? Did they really care? In addition, the masses also had fewer channels 
through which to receive information about formal ideology. This was particularly true when 
the Internet was not that popular. At that time, the mechanisms of ideological promotion 
heavily relied on party newspapers and journals, and government meetings, which were not 
accessible to the masses. Indeed, the CCP’s communication with the masses has usually been 
conducted by mass propaganda that involves populist elements such as popular slogans, as I 
will explain below.  
 
1.5.3.1.3. The Changing Tendency of the Dual-Ideological Strategy  
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 Since the CCP was founded, it has valued the importance of mass propaganda. In the 
early revolutionary era, mass propaganda was heavily used by the CCP to promote the 
communist revolution. After the People’s Republic of China  PRC) was established, mass 
propaganda was used to mobilize the entire Chinese society to participate in mass campaigns 
during Mao Zedong’s rule. At that time, socioeconomic affairs were highly politicized and 
ordinary people were expected to participate in those mass campaigns. However, those mass 
campaigns led to long-term national chaos and economic stagnation, and thus undermined the 
CCP’s legitimacy. In the     s  after the CCP adopted  eng Xiaoping’s de-politicisation 
approach that emphasized economic reconstruction, mass propaganda became much less 
important when reform-minded leaders Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang were in charge (Brady 
and Wang, 2009:771). During the leadership of Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, there were 
even some kinds of open debates over whether mass propaganda should play a role in the 
reform era (Brady and Wang, 2009:768,771).  
  As the popular belief in communist ideology was considered by the reform-minded 
leaders as less critical in the 1980s, the less reform-minded leaders still stressed communist 
beliefs. As Chapter 2 will discuss, in the early 1980s, the primary cleavage within the party 
changed to whether it was right for a communist party to do what it was doing and to 
introduce elements of capitalist system. As mentioned, the reformists constantly had to 
portray their economic plans in socialist terms in order to fend off attacks from the 
conservatives. In this context, from 1979 to 1989, the CCP had produced various formal 
discourses to justify why China still needed a communist party to the CCP itself, as Chapter 2 
will discuss. As such, the party members were the principal audience of the CCP’s 
ideological work. The masses received very limited information about the CCP’s ideological 
transition because of limited knowledge and communication channels. At that time, almost all 
the promotion of those ideological discourses relied on several party newspapers such as the 
People’s Daily, which were not for the consumption of the masses.  
 Yet, the CCP’s ideological strategy gradually shifted after the protests of 1989 taught 
the party a painful lesson about the importance of popular beliefs. Deng Xiaoping (1989) 
clearly pointed out that failed to maintain popular beliefs is “the biggest mistake” of his 
reform.  earning from the protest of      and heeding  eng’s warning  the CCP leaders 
gradually turned the CCP’s ideological work from the party to the society, and mass 
propaganda became a renewed focus for the CCP. The main goal of ideological transitions 
also shifted from justifying why the communist rule adopted quasi-capitalist economic 
policies (for maintaining party cohesion) to addressing the negative consequences of rapid 
growth (for popular legitimacy). This shift was reflected in two ways: the popularization of 
formal ideology and the increasing production of informal ideology.  
 Previously, formal ideology was not produced for the consumption of the masses, but it 
is increasingly produced for that purpose today. For example, Hu Jintao’s Scientific Outlook 
of Development strongly signaled to the masses whether China is going and what China will 
look like in the future. Scientific Outlook of Development includes more elements of populist 
language than previous ideologies such as the “primary stage of socialism” and “Three 
Represents”. This tendency is also accompanied by the development of technology and the 
CCP’s reforms. Nowadays  the masses can assess political information from the Internet very 
easily and information about the CCP also becomes more transparent. The smooth flow of 
information to the masses and their increasing educational qualifications led to a tendency to 
popularize formal ideological discourses, as Chapter 5 will discuss. 
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 More importantly, the CCP has made more efforts in its political and ideological 
education for the masses since 1989. As mentioned, the danger of changing social values 
toward liberal democracy was clearly evidenced by the protests of 1989. The party gradually 
realized that its ideological problems did not only include the justification of its communist 
rule within itself but also that of its one-party rule to society. In this context, the CCP has 
produced various informal ideological discourses to discredit liberal democracy for justifying 
its one-party rule, as the following section will discuss.  
 
1.5.3.2 Informal Ideology: legitimizing the authoritarian rule by delegitimizing alternatives 
 As mentioned, informal ideology justifies authoritarian rule to the entire Chinese 
society; thus, informal ideology is formed by populist language that is more convincing to the 
masses – as opposed to formal ideology that consists of communist language. Arguably, the 
justification of informal ideology is a sort of negative approach that attempts to delegitimize 
alternative political systems – especially liberal democracy, which legitimates the current 
political system in reverse. In this way, the ideological legitimacy of the one-party rule is 
enhanced by undermining the legitimacy of liberal democracy. Specifically, various informal 
ideological discourses focus on justifying why China does not have to follow the (purely) 
Western road to liberal democracy, such as why not liberalism or constitutionalism. For 
example, the CCP’s (in)stability discourse argues that liberal democracy brings instability 
and chaos.  
 This approach also entails going back to create history to emphasize Chinese difference.   
For example, the proponents of the “China model” and “Chinese exceptionalism” argue that 
China has carved out its own path to modernization without following the West and that 
China’s unique cultural heritage makes it possible for it to have its own political system 
rather than liberal democracy (Kang, 2004; Pan, 2003; Pan, 2009; Pan, 2011; Wang, 2012b; 
Yao, 2011; Zhang, 2010; Zheng, 2010). In order to strengthen its ideological persuasiveness, 
informal ideology has incorporated various cultural values and patriotic elements into the 
socialist agenda of the CCP. For example, Jiang Zemin (2001) officially proposed combining 
“rule by law” with “rule by virtue” as the CCP’s governing strategy for establishing a 
socialist ideological and ethical system. Under Xi Jinping’s leadership  this anti-liberal 
democracy approach becomes more explicit. A goal of the national security commission, 
established in 2014, is to undermine the influence of Western values in order to prevent the 
Arab Spring from occurring in China (Hayashi, 2014).  
Yet, unlike formal ideology that consists of a coherent value system, informal ideology 
is formed by a set of relatively fleeting and incoherent values. It alone cannot replace the 
value system to justify the party’s rules – it neither provides an ideological basis for forming 
certain policies nor guides the establishment of a political system. Thus, informal ideology is 
a kind of short-term solution that has a shelf life rather than more fundamental things – it 
might even be used to go against the CCP’s rule in the long run. For example  if Chinese 
people take China’s status as a global power for granted, they will have high expectations of 
China’s role in dealing with international conflicts. If the CCP failed to show it is as strong as 
it claims to be, its discourse of national rejuvenation and patriotic campaigns might be used to 
overthrow its own rule. Thus, informal ideology can only discredit liberal democracy in the 
short term; in the long run, the changing political values might still be inevitable without a 
widely accepted belief system in China.  
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Because of different audiences and goals, the mechanisms for promoting informal 
ideology mainly rely on mass propaganda that is embedded into every aspect of Chinese 
society, such as school educations, popular newspapers, movies, songs, literary works, 
advertising slogans, big events such as the Beijing Olympic, and others. The promotion of 
formal ideology employs a series of institutionalized channels, such as party newspapers and 
journals, documents, school training, study groups, and meeting amongst others. Notably, 
there is no clear line between formal ideology and informal ideology. As I mentioned above, 
with the CCP’s increasing ideological education for the masses after 1989, the boundary 
between these two types of ideology in terms of functions, audience, and goals becomes less 
clear. Table 1 summarizes the major distinctions between formal ideology and informal 
ideology that I discussed above. 
 
Table 1: Major distinctions between informal ideology and formal ideology in China 
 Informal Ideology Formal Ideology 
 
 
Examples 
 (In)stability discourse 
 National condition discourse 
 Discourse of national 
rejuvenation and the 
promotion of patriotism  
 The emphasis on virtues 
 Socialist Commodity Economy 
 Primary Stage of Socialism 
 Three Represents 
 Scientific Outlook of Development 
Major 
Audience 
The entire society including the 
CCP members 
The CCP 
Composition of 
languages 
Purely populist language 
 
 Communist/socialist language  
 Populist language 
Discourse 
System 
A set of relatively incoherent and 
fleeting values 
A coherent value system  
 
 
 
Function 
 Supplement formal ideological 
discourse 
 Legitimize the authoritarian 
rule by delegitimizing 
alternatives – especially liberal 
democracy (i.e. justifying the 
authoritarian rule) 
 It redefines what is meant by socialism 
at that moment in time and thus 
provides an ex post facto justification to 
make the current political economy 
compatible with the CCP’s ideological 
basis and its commitment to socialism. 
(i.e. justifying the communist rule) 
 Establish ideological orthodoxy and a 
leader’s credentials  
 
Mechanism of 
ideological 
promotion 
Mass Propaganda including 
school education, popular 
newspapers, movies, songs, 
literary works, advertising 
slogans, 
big events such as the Beijing 
Olympics, etc. 
Party newspapers and journals, documents, 
school training, study groups, meetings 
Its primary 
role in regime 
survival 
Popular legitimacy Party cohesion 
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1.6. The Institutionalization of Power Succession 
In addition to ideological reforms, the institutionalization of power succession is 
another crucial survival strategy of the CCP. In this thesis, the institutionalization of power 
succession refers to “the creation and perpetuation of formal and informal guideline that 
stipulate how and by whom leaders are selected and removed from power” (Frantz and Stein, 
2013:2). As mentioned, ideology and power succession are inter-related. As Chapter 5 will 
discuss, the CCP has produced various informal ideological discourses, such as political 
meritocracy and traditional abdication, to justify if not legitimize its power succession. More 
importantly, ideological battle or line struggle is essentially a kind of power struggle. During 
Mao Zedong’s rule, ideological battles and power struggles were inseparable elements of 
mass campaigns – such as anti-rights campaigns and the Cultural Revolution. After the CCP 
launched its market reforms, the huge gap between communist ideology and the reality of the 
political economy led to wider ideological cleavages within the party. As mentioned, the elite 
division seriously strangled the CCP’s decision-making when facing the protests of 1989 and 
put the party on the brink of the collapse. In this context, the institutionalization of power 
succession is crucial to minimizing the negatives effects of ideological battles.  
As mentioned, the majority of authoritarian regimes failed because of elite divisions 
rather than being overthrown by the masses. For an authoritarian regime, how successfully to 
transfer power at the top and prevent a leadership split in the process have always been 
extremely challenging. Before institutionalization, power succession in China had always 
been a moment of crisis and chaos  which seriously delegitimized the CCP’s rule. The purge 
of Mao Zedong’s successors, Liu Shaoqi and Lin Biao, plunged the country into chaos. 
During the Cultural Revolution in particular, Chinese leaders were dismissed in an arbitrary 
way. In addition to the national upheaval that was brought about by power struggles, the lack 
of an institutionalized power had made the general public wary of the party and the way it 
operated and thus undermined regime legitimacy.  
Afraid of elite divisions and brutal power struggles, the CCP has taken great efforts to 
institutionalize its power succession system. It helped the regime to reduce the negative 
effects of elite divisions that commonly exist in authoritarian regimes. Through 
institutionalization, the CCP has developed a power succession system with Chinese 
characteristics that is capable of maintaining the unity of the leadership during power 
transitions. Thus, this thesis argues that  
In contemporary China, the institutionalization of power successions is key to 
maintaining the CCP’s internal stability and ruling capacity to maintain legitimacy. 
This institutionalization has significantly changed contemporary Chinese elite politics. 
My empirical study on the selection of PSC members suggests that institutional rules have 
become increasingly important in selecting Chinese leaders at the expense of patron-client 
ties (Zeng, 2013). The selection of 18
th
 PSC members in 2012 strongly emphasized the 
stability among top leaders.  
Although there are many doubts about the hidden intense political struggles among 
Chinese leaders, an undeniable fact is that the CCP has managed to maintain a critical degree 
of internal stability in the past two decades. The fall of top officials – Chen Xitong in Jiang 
Zemin’s era  Chen  iangyu and Bo Xilai in Hu Jintao’s era– suggests that power struggles 
within the CCP remain intense; however, the removal of those officials followed certain rules, 
such as trial. In Mao Zedong’s era  the interrogation of Mao’s heir apparent and PRC 
President Liu Shaoqi and his wife had neither formal resolution nor formal written document. 
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In this regard, the removal of those top officials is much more institutionalized now than in 
Mao’s era. 
More importantly, none of the power struggles or the removal of those top officials has 
generated a considerable level of instability and crisis compared with the cruel political 
purges before institutionalization. This is not to say that the current level of 
institutionalization is sufficient to guarantee the unity of the leadership in the long run. Of 
course, even institutionalized bodies can be subject to manipulation, and there are many grey 
areas, as this thesis will examine. In the long run  the CCP’s destiny is in the hands of internal 
consensus (i.e. party cohesion) and external support (i.e. popular legitimacy).   
The core arguments raised by this thesis are summarized in Figure 1.  
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Figure 1: Core Arguments of This Thesis 
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1.7. Research Method: A Mixed Qualitative/Quantitative Approach 
This thesis involves a number of qualitative and quantitative research methods. First of 
all, it relies on a discourse analysis to investigate various Chinese newspapers and journals in 
order to study the CCP’s ideological discourses. The influence of media and state propaganda 
on authoritarian rule has been widely studied not only in the field of Chinese studies but also 
in comparative politics. Contrary to the standard claim that the marketization and the 
diversification of media and the development of the Internet would undermine authoritarian 
rule, empirical studies on China suggest that they play a positive role in generating legitimacy 
in China(King, et al., 2013; Stockmann and Gallagher, 2011). Empirical evidence shows that 
more exposure to official propaganda generates greater support for the regime (Bernstein and 
Lü, 2000; Li, 2004b). The experiment and survey-based quantitative approach provides a way 
to understand the overall impact of political messages on legitimacy; however, a 
comprehensive understanding on this issue cannot be reached without studying the specific 
content and the development of the CCP’s ideological discourses. Thus, this thesis adopts a 
qualitative approach in order to study the CCP’s ideological discourses.  
Moreover, this thesis also employs a mixed qualitative/quantitative analysis for 
investigating the views of Chinese intellectuals on the subject of legitimacy. Specifically, I 
collected 125 Chinese articles with legitimacy in the title published between 2008 and 2012. 
By using a content analysis, I read all 125 articles and coded them with 75 variables. In terms 
of data analysis, this thesis uses Pearson's Chi-squared test to analyse how the Chinese 
intellectuals’ arguments are influenced by their research background (including institutions, 
research locations, and funding sources). It also employs a principal component factor 
analysis to study how different policies proposed by Chinese intellectuals are knitted together. 
After factor analysis framed the debate among Chinese elites, I used discourse analysis to 
study the specific content of the Chinese debate on legitimacy. In addition, I also conducted 
email interviews with four influential Chinese intellectuals who contributed to this debate in 
order to study some distinct features of Chinese literature.  
  
1.8.Contribution to the Literature 
This thesis makes a number of empirical, theoretical, and methodological contributions 
to the literature. Parts of this thesis have already been published or are under-review by some 
journals, as listed on the section of declaration.  
   
1.8.1 Empirical contribution 
The empirical contribution of my thesis involves primary data and empirical findings. 
As mentioned above  this thesis establishes a primary database about the Chinese intellectuals’ 
debate on legitimacy. This Chinese language materials database provides a shortcut for non-
Chinese speakers to understand Chinese discourses of legitimacy. Thus, it can be used to 
build future research studies.  
Based on my primary database, this thesis presents many new empirical findings. First, 
Western scholarship focuses on performance legitimacy and pays insufficient attention to 
ideology; however, analysts within China still consider ideology to be crucial and express 
serious concern about performance legitimacy. Second, while many in the West frequently 
point out the successes of the Chinese response to the financial crisis, Chinese intellectuals 
seem to become more pessimistic. Third, this thesis finds a fundamental shift in the 
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legitimacy debate in China, which is driven by various worsening problems caused by 
economic growth – socioeconomic inequality in particular. Fourth, while many overseas 
China observers are focusing on the search for Chinese philosophies to underpin a new polity, 
the Chinese intellectuals are looking to the West instead. Fifth, there is a distinct rising appeal 
of social autonomy that runs counter to the dominant official line in this debate. Finally, this 
study finds a correlation between authors’ backgrounds  institutions  research locations  and 
funding sources) and their dominant arguments about legitimacy. Overall, my empirical study 
reveals a variety of different views on the CCP’s legitimacy between the Western and 
Chinese scholarship.  
In addition, in order to study the institutional development of power succession in 
China, this thesis also collects a large amount of primary and secondary data about Chinese 
elite politics. 
  
1.8.2. Methodological Contribution  
The mixed qualitative/quantitative research method is developed from the pioneering 
work of Gilley and Holbig (2009). More details about how it departs from the previous work 
will be explained in Chapter 4. This research method can be used in many other fields, as it 
provides a systematic way to study Chinese language materials. For example, it can be used 
to study the domestic discourse of China’s foreign policies.  pecifically  it can help to 
understand how Chinese intellectuals view “China  ream” and contribute to the field of 
international relations.   
  
1.8.3. Theoretical Contribution  
1.8.3.1. Literature of Chinese Studies  
This thesis poses a series of theoretical challenges to the relevant literature on the 
subject of the CCP’s legitimacy. As mentioned  conventional wisdom argues that 
performance legitimacy – in particular economic performance and stability – is a principal 
pillar of legitimacy in China. If we observe China from the outside, it is very easy to focus on 
economic performance. However, within China itself, it is clearly recognized that economic 
growth may also undermine legitimacy and that economic growth alone may not be able to 
provide sufficient legitimacy for the CCP’s rule  as Chapter 4 will show. Thus  this thesis 
suggests that China observers should move from simply growth/performance-focus to 
consider other elements – for example, how to deal with the negative consequences of 
economic growth. 
Moreover, although there were a few studies on ideology, as discussed above, the issue 
of ideology is still under-researched in the political science literature on contemporary China 
in general. This thesis contributes to the limited studies on this topic. By proposing a new 
analytical framework, this thesis shows how the regime used informal ideology and formal 
ideology to maintain its rule, which provides a valuable contribution to fill the gap in the 
relevant literature. 
This thesis also contributes to the limited studies on political reforms in China. As 
Schubert (2008:191) pointed out:  
“Political reform is not considered viable and usually discredited as too limited and 
manipulated by the Communist Party as to deserve its name. Consequently, the impact 
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of these reforms on the current regime’s legitimacy is under-researched, arguably 
blinding us for a better understanding of its resilience.” 
 
As such, Schubert (2008:191) proposes a new research agenda to study the CCP’s legitimacy. 
Unlike  chubert’s agenda that focuses on political reforms at local levels  this thesis 
contributes to the relevant literature by studying political reforms at the top (i.e. the 
institutionalization of power succession).  
There are many studies that focus on political reforms at local levels – in particular 
village elections and their impact on regime legitimacy – in both English and Chinese 
language literature (e.g. Kennedy, 2009; Ma and Wang, 2012; O' Brien and Han, 2009; 
Schubert, 2008; Schubert, 2014; Schubert and Chen, 2007). Both Chinese and Western 
scholars agree that village democracy has enhanced legitimacy of local governments in China. 
As Chapter 4 will discuss, many Chinese intellectuals suggest the further implementation of 
elections at local levels to maintain legitimacy. Although many Chinese intellectuals highly 
value village elections, it is notable that none of them suggests extending them to the national 
level. 
Many Western scholars are also very positive on the development of village elections. 
The positive consequences of village elections in increasing political participation and 
legitimacy have inspired a debate on future research agendas for the study of village 
democracy (O' Brien and Han, 2009; Schubert, 2008; Schubert, 2014; Schubert and Chen, 
2007). For example, O' Brien and Han (2009) argue that future research should focus less on 
election procedures and more on democratic quality. In other words, the outcome of 
democratic election in Chinese villages is worth more attentions than the specific election 
procedures. However, Kennedy (2009:359) argues that “reseachers should not dismiss the 
importance of elections procedures too quickly.”In my view  election procedures and 
outcomes are perhaps equally important. Procedures are the essence of electoral democracy; 
however, only with a positive democratic outcome, electoral democracy will be appealing to 
the Chinese society.  
This thesis accepts that institutional changes at local levels are clearly important – and 
this is reflected in the relatively large body of work that these elections have spawned. The 
intention here is not to deny their significance, but instead to focus on the much less often 
studied dimension of institutional development at the top, and its impact on regime legitimacy. 
This relative lack of interest is understandable given the opaque nature of elite politics in 
China and, more importantly, the lack of any move towards elections of top leaders, as I will 
discuss in Chapter 3. However, the argument here is that there is more to institutional change 
at the top than elections, and by focusing on the institutional development at the top and its 
implications for regime survival, this thesis can make a more substantial contribution to the 
study of legitimacy in China than repeating existing debates on local elections.    
 
1.8.3.2. Literature of Comparative Politics: Authoritarian Resilience?  
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 Authoritarian systems are widely considered as rigid; however, the theory of 
“authoritarian resilience” suggests that authoritarian regimes can be resilient. By providing a 
notable addition to support this theory, this thesis also contributes to the literature on 
comparative politics. Indeed  the debate on authoritarian resilience is inspired by the CCP’s 
first smooth leadership transition in 2002. While some argue that the institutional changes 
have made the authoritarian system more sustainable (Miller, 2008; Nathan, 2003; 
Shambaugh, 2008c:176) and served to strengthen the CCP’s rule (Brown, 2009; Dickson, 
2008; Fewsmith, 2006), others contend that this view overestimates the strength of the 
authoritarian system and ignores its vulnerability (Baum, 2007; Gilley, 2003; Li, 2012a; Pei, 
2008; Shirk, 2007). 
 The success of the leadership transition in 2012 further supports the existence of 
authoritarian resilience. In 2002, Jiang Zemin only handed over the posts of PRC President 
and CCP head and still retained the post of military head until 2004. However, in 2012, Hu 
Jintao handed over all power including military head to Xi Jinping. It was the first time that a 
new CCP head could take charge of the Chinese army at the beginning of his term since 1978. 
The full retirement of Hu Jintao marked a more complete and normalized leadership 
transition. In this regard, the transition in 2012 was more institutionalized than that in 2002.  
 As mentioned, how to successfully transfer power at the top and prevent a split in the 
leadership during this process have always been extremely challenging to authoritarian 
regimes. However, having learnt from the dangers of elite divisions, the CCP has taken great 
efforts in institutionalizing power succession. The CCP has instituted many rules – such as a 
retirement age limit – to ensure a rapid cycle of ruling elites without holding democratic 
elections. Its peaceful leadership transition is arguably a role model for other authoritarian 
regimes.  
 Moreover, as mentioned learning from the protest of 1989 and the fall of other 
communist regimes, the CCP gradually realized the danger of the changing social values 
toward liberal democracy. In order to maintain its rule, the regime has produced various 
informal ideological discourses to delegitimize liberal democracy. By deploying this 
ideological strategy, the CCP has managed to maintain its one-party rule. It posed a strong 
challenge to the theory of modernization, which asserts that socioeconomic modernization 
brings value shifts and democratization. 
 
1.9. Thesis Structure  
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 looks into the CCP’s concerns about its 
rule after post-Mao China (from 1976-2012). It shows that the existential crisis has been a 
constant concern of the party leaders. It argues that the Chinese leaders’ concerns are 
generated mainly from communist ideology, Mao Zedong, and the negative effects of rapid 
economic growth. 
Chapters 3 and 4 review and juxtapose the English language and Chinese language 
literature on the subject of regime legitimacy in China respectively. Chapter 3 studies the 
topic of legitimacy from a Western perspective. Its first part reviews concepts and theories of 
legitimacy and discusses whether those Western theories can be used to analyse the case of 
China. The second part of Chapter 3 reviews the English language literature on the subject of 
legitimacy in China.  
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Chapter 4 turns to Chinese literature on the subject of legitimacy. It presents an 
empirical study of Chinese intellectuals’ debate on legitimacy by analysing 125 Chinese 
journal articles with “legitimacy” in their title. Based on this primary dataset, I employed a 
mixed qualitative/quantitative analysis to understand Chinese discourses of legitimacy. 
Chapters 3 and 4 reveal a wide gulf between Western and Chinese scholarship in 
understanding legitimacy in China. 
Chapter 5 studies the topic of ideology in contemporary China. It examines formal and 
informal ideological discourses, the mechanisms of ideological promotion, and their 
effectiveness. It shows how the regime deployed informal ideology and formal ideology to 
build popular legitimacy and maintain party cohesion respectively. 
Chapter 6 studies the issue of power succession in China. Specifically, based on a large 
amount of data on Chinese elite politics, it discusses the institutional development of power 
succession in the past three decades. It argues that the institutionalization of power succession 
is key to maintaining the CCP’s internal stability and capability to maintain legitimacy.  
Chapter 7 summarizes the arguments and findings of this thesis and its implications for 
China’s future.  
 
All in all, while Fukuyama (1989) predicted Western liberal democracy as “the end 
point of mankind's ideological evolution” and “the final form of human government”. 
Ideology and the political system of the authoritarian rule has constantly adapted in China. 
China provides an invaluable case for understanding the authoritarian resilience and testing 
our established political theories. But in any case, the evolution of human society in particular 
ideological and political systems will never meet an end.  
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Chapter Two 
Existential Crises of the Chinese Communist Party? 
 
 “If we do not reform now  our modernization program and socialist cause will be doomed.”  
– Deng Xiaoping(1978), excerpt from his talk at a conference   
 
 “Popular support is related to the survival or the death of the party.”  
– Xi Jinping, excerpt from his report at a conference (Xu and Zhou, 2013) 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter studies the CCP’s concerns about the continuation of its rule and how it 
addressed these concerns in post-Mao China (1976 – 2012). As it will show, existential crises 
have been a constant concern of Chinese leaders. This chapter argues that the CCP’s concerns 
mainly derive from the gap between the reality of the political economy in China and its 
ideological basis and commitment to socialism, the justification of its founder Mao Zedong, 
and the negative consequences caused by rapid economic growth. These three sources of 
existential concerns have been shifting with time in the past four decades. 
The first and foremost fundamental dilemma of the CCP’s rule is how to make its 
ideological basis and commitment to socialism consistent with the reality of the political 
economy over which it was ruling. As mentioned in the Introduction Chapter, the success of 
market reform has also created a fundamental dilemma for the CCP’s rule. As this chapter 
will show, this dilemma has constantly generated the CCP’s concerns about illegitimacy and 
forced party leaders to portray their economic plans in socialist terms in order to undermine 
resistance from within the party. In this context, the CCP has constantly put forward various 
formal ideological discourses to provide an ex post facto way of justifying why the current 
political economy is not incompatible with its commitment to socialism. As this chapter will 
show, those formal ideologies – such as the socialist commodity economy and the primary 
stage of socialism – were produced for the party itself rather than society.   
The second dilemma of the CCP’s rule comes from the justification of the CCP’s 
founder  Mao Zedong  and his rule. Recognizing the failure of Mao Zedong’s policies  the 
CCP fundamentally shifted its primary focus from Mao’s “class struggle” into economic 
reconstruction after Mao died. However, as established in the Introduction Chapter, if the 
CCP completely purge the memories and polices of its founder leader Mao, its rule would 
have a legitimacy crisis. As this chapter will show, the resolution on the party’s history in 
1981 officially set the tone to evaluate Mao Zedong and ended the then cleavage within the 
party; however, driven by the changing socioeconomic and political landscapes, the 
justification of Mao Zedong has again become a problem for contemporary leaders.    
In the case of the second dilemma  the party’s concerns about existential crises are 
generated from the past. It is about how the party justifies what it is doing now in light of 
what it has done in the past (i.e. from 1949-1976). In other words, the concerns about 
existential crises are from what was done and said before. Unlike the second dilemma, the 
party’s concerns about the existential crisis in the third dilemma are generated from the 
party’s present problems – in particular the problems caused by economic growth. When it 
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comes to these problems, the existential crisis derives from what is being done now. As this 
chapter will show, the problems caused by economic growth, such as corruption, are 
considered by the party leaders as a matter of “life and death”.  
This chapter explores how the above three issues have combined together and 
dominated the CCP’s concerns about the continuation of its rule by analysing a series of 
debates within the party since 1976. This chapter divides the intra-party debates into three 
stages. During the first stage (1976-1981), the debate was primarily about how the party 
should deal with Mao Zedong and his political legacies (i.e. party history). While Hua 
Guofeng and his supporters continued to stress the “genius of Mao” after   76   eng 
Xiaoping claimed that parts of Mao’s policies were wrong. This debate ended with  eng’s 
victory after the CCP released the resolution on party history in 1981, which officially 
evaluated Mao Zedong’s contribution and mistakes, as this chapter will discuss.  
Afterwards, the focus of the intra-party debate shifted to whether it is right for a 
communist party to be doing what it was doing and introducing elements of a quasi-capitalist 
system. The reformists considered the quasi-capitalist economic policies to be essential to 
promote economic growth, whilst the conservatives argued that the economic plans of the 
reformists were products of capitalism that betrayed communism. After the second stage of 
debates (1981-1992) ended with the CCP’s determination to establish a market economy in 
the early 1990s, the debate moved to the third stage (1992- present) that is still on-going. It 
focuses on two major issues: (1) how far towards capitalism the CCP should/could go and (2) 
how to deal with the negative consequences of the transition from socialism and the impacts 
on legitimacy that were beginning to emerge. 
 
2.2 The Existential Crisis in Mao Zedong’s Era (1949–1976): the fall of communist 
fanaticism and the cult of personality 
As mentioned above, the ultimate goal of – and theoretically the only reason for the 
existence of – a communist party is to deliver communism.  uring Mao Zedong’s rule, the 
CCP primarily legitimized its monopoly on power by being a vehicle to deliver a communist 
society. After the CCP established the PRC in 1949, the party explicitly built its legitimacy on 
communist ideology. Although communist ideology in China integrated the elements of 
Chinese nationalism, as Chapter 4 and 5 will discuss, it did not undermine the determination 
of the CCP to achieve communism. The CCP (1958) clearly pointed out that the fundamental 
goal of its second five year plan (1958-1962) was to complete the socialist construction and 
“to create conditions for the transition into communism”.  uring the Great Leap Forward 
campaign, the entire country was enthusiastic about establishing a communist society under 
the communist slogans such as, “to establish a decent communism within two years” and, 
“one day is equivalent to twenty years  communism is in sight”.  
A clear-cut line between communism and capitalism was another distinctive 
characteristic during Mao’s rule. Mao’s “continuous revolution under the dictatorship of the 
proletariat” theory suggested that the CCP should continue the communist revolution even 
after it took power in order to eliminate capitalism completely. According to Mao  the “major” 
contradiction of Chinese society was still “between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, and 
between the socialist road and the capitalist road” (CCP, 2001). “Class struggle” was thus set 
as a primary task of the CCP. The party launched waves of radical mass campaigns – such as 
the anti-rightist campaign of 1956 and the Cultural Revolution – to eliminate private 
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ownership, exploitation, and capitalism. At that time, the entire country had been 
encompassing the pervasive communist projects; socioeconomic affairs were highly 
politicized and ordinary people were expected to participate in those mass campaigns.    
In addition to the above communist fanaticism, the cult of personality of Mao Zedong 
was another key pillar of legitimacy in Mao’s era. Mao’s loyal supporters deliberately built 
Mao’s personal authority. For example  in the mid-  6 s  the party’s various mouthpieces –
including the People’s Daily, the Liberation Army Daily, and the Red Flag – published a 
series of articles entitled: “to vigorously and particularly establish the absolute authority of 
Chairman Mao and Mao Zedong Thought” (e.g. Yang, 1967). “The great leader Chairman 
Mao” was then described as a figure who led China to fight against imperial invaders and 
feudalism and to establish a “new China”.  ome propaganda also deified Mao  for example  
as “‘the venerable heavenly ruler’ who was ‘better than the Red sun’ and ‘more enduring than 
heaven’” (Weatherley, 2006:33). Yet  the rise of Mao’s personal authority (i.e. charismatic 
legitimacy) was made at the expense of the authority of rules and the law (i.e. rational-legal 
legitimacy).
2
 Mao frequently used his personal authority to go against the established rules 
and procedures, and the decisions of the majority of the leadership, which seriously 
undermined the authority of those rational-legal procedures (Weatherley, 2006:34).  
Arguably, communist ideology and the charismatic authority of Mao Zedong had been 
the foundation of regime legitimacy in China for a couple of decades after the PRC was 
founded until a series of policy failures and radical campaigns led to certain kinds of 
legitimacy crises. Lack of an institutionalized power succession system led to cruel power 
struggles within the party in Mao’s era. Driven by the power struggles within the party, the 
CCP launched a series of mass campaigns under the name of ideology (i.e. line struggle or 
ideological battle). As Chapter 6 will discuss  both of Mao’s heirs apparent who were also the 
second-most powerful men in China – Lin Biao and Liu Shaoqi (then the PRC President) – 
fell during these campaigns, followed by waves of large-scale political purges to their 
families and supporters. The lack of an institutionalized succession system made the general 
public wary of the party and the way it operates  and this therefore undermined the regime’s 
legitimacy. 
Moreover, the long-term national chaos – instigated by endless radical campaign and 
many flawed economic policies – seriously damaged the Chinese economy. The Cultural 
Revolution in particular had already begun to unravel the old system even before Mao died 
(Weatherley, 2006). Driven by the radical communist ideology, many economic principles – 
such as “the development of productive forces”  “the development of the commodity 
economy”  and “distribution according to work” – were criticized as products of capitalism 
and thus abandoned. In the meantime, the radical communist slogans – for example  “it is 
better to have socialist grass than capitalist seedlings”  “to cut off the tail of capitalism” and 
“to criticize ‘the theory of productive forces’” – seriously undermined the enthusiasm of the 
entire society for economic production.  
In addition, the long-term national chaos led by the Cultural Revolutions did not only 
seriously disrupt people’s normal lives but also many normal economic activities. As Hua 
Guofeng (1978) clearly recognized at the 5
th
 People’s Congress  “from   74 to   76 …  the 
entire national economy almost reached the brink of collapse”. Economic stagnation 
instigated by the Cultural Revolution made the CCP increasingly incapable of delivering the 
                                                            
2 The definition of legitimacy including rational-legal legitimacy will be discussed in Chapter 3 
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socialist goods that it promised before. The widening gap between the poor reality of people’s 
living standard and the utopia of the communist ideology inevitably led to Chinese people’s 
doubts about the party and its communist ideals.   
 
2.3 The Existential Crisis under Hua Guofeng’s rule (1976-1981): the Shadow of 
Chairman Mao Zedong 
 In the mid-1970s, the existential crisis deteriorated after Mao Zedong, whose charisma 
was a key source for the CCP’s legitimacy  passed away. In the same year  the death of all 
three key founders of the PRC and the CCP (Chairman Mao Zedong, Premier Zhou Enlai, and 
Marshall Zhu De) and the 1976 Tangshan Earthquake were considered by many Chinese 
people as an indicative of the coming regime change that the CCP had lost its “mandate of 
Heaven” (Zhong, 1996) – a traditional Chinese philosophy concerning legitimacy as Chapter 
3 will discuss. In addition, as mentioned, the long-term national chaos and the nearly 
collapsed economy seriously undermined the CCP’s popular support. All the above factors 
together led to the CCP leaders’ serious concerns about the continuation of the CCP’s rule. In 
1978, Deng Xiaoping (1978) clearly pointed out the possibility of “the death of the party and 
the state” and warned that “if we do not reform now  our modernization program and socialist 
cause will be doomed”.   
After the end of the Cultural Revolution and the death of Mao, ideology and 
politicisation became the problem rather than the solution, because people were reluctant to 
participate in mass campaigns.  riven by the party’s concern about the existential crisis, the 
reformists finally grasped the initiative to make a fundamental shift in the CCP’s ruling 
strategy from “class struggle” in Mao’s era to “four modernizations”– especially economic 
reconstruction. In other words, the party attempted to shift its legitimation from being 
ideology-based towards being performance-based. This transition turned a new page in the 
PRC’s history  however  such a fundamental transition was destined to be challenging, 
because it was more or less an attempt to throw away everything that the party had been 
previously doing to build revolutionary legitimacy  – in particular the communist ideology 
and Mao Zedong.   
After 1976, there were a series of debates within the CCP about how to justify the 
shifting emphasis on “four modernizations” in light of Mao and his political legacies. Based 
on their contrary views about Mao and Mao’s policies   eng Xiaoping and Hua Guofeng 
adopted two different approaches to justify the party’s shifting emphasis on economic 
reconstruction: Hua Guofeng attempted to redefine Mao’s speech and thought, whilst Deng 
Xiaoping chosen to re-justify the party’s history including Mao. 
 
 . .  Hua Guofeng’s Redefinition of What Mao Thought and  aid  
After Hua arrested the Gang of Four in 1976, Hua Guofeng attempted to get rid of the 
radical Maoist policies and put forward his new agenda; however, such a transition was 
extremely difficult to Hua – a hand-picked heir apparent of Mao. As mentioned earlier, Mao 
Zedong’s excessive charismatic legitimacy left little room for rational-legal legitimacy at that 
time, because Mao frequently used his personal authority to go against the established rules 
and laws. Although Hua was then the Premier and the first deputy chairman of the CCP, these 
institutional posts did not grant Hua much rational-legal legitimacy. The legitimacy of Hua 
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Guofeng as the top leader mainly came from Mao’s words  “with you in charge  I am at ease”  
thus, Hua had to keep his loyalty to Mao Zedong and Mao’s doctrines (Weatherley, 2006; 
Weatherley, 2010).  
In this context, Hua and his supporters continued to stress the “genius” of Mao 
(Weatherley, 2006). In justifying the party’s shifting focus on to economic reconstruction, 
Hua Guofeng attempted to legitimize this shift by using Mao Zedong’s legacies. On the one 
hand  Hua proposed a “two whatevers” argument – “we firmly uphold whatever policy 
decisions Chairman Mao made and we unswervingly adhere to whatever instructions 
Chairman Mao gave”. By endorsing Mao’s decisions  including the decision to select Hua as 
heir apparent, Hua intended to consolidate his power.  
On the other hand, Hua began to redefine what Mao thought and said in order to justify 
why the party shifted its focus from Mao’s “class struggle” to “four modernizations”. At that 
time  a series of Mao’s texts that mentioned economic problems were first officially 
published in newspapers under Hua’s leadership (Chen, 1995a). In short  what Hua’s 
leadership really argued was that it was Chairman Mao’s ideas to stress economic 
development.  
 
2.3.2  eng Xiaoping’s Re-justification of Mao Zedong 
Contrary to Hua Guofeng’s full adherence to Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping and his 
supporters held that Mao should be considered responsible for the failure of past policies, 
especially the Cultural Revolution. However   eng Xiaoping also recognized that the CCP’s 
rule would be in danger if the party fully repudiated Mao and Mao’s doctrines. Thus, on the 
one hand, when launching an alternative way of Mao’s agenda   eng Xiaoping actually 
called his approach “holding high the banner of Mao Zedong Thought”. On the other hand  
Deng Xiaoping launched a series of intra-party debates to prepare a theoretical basis for his 
new agenda. In order to oppose Hua Guofeng’s “two whatevers” argument   eng Xiaoping 
chose to highlight Mao Zedong’s words about “seeking truth from facts”.  eng criticized 
some party cadres who “talk about Mao Zedong Thought every day  but often forget Comrade 
Mao Zedong’s fundamental Marxist viewpoint and abandon or even oppose his method of 
seeking truth from facts and of proceeding from reality and integrating theory with practice” 
(English translation: Chen, 1995a: 42). Indeed, what Deng really argued was that it was 
Mao’s ideas to focus on “seeking the truth from the facts”  and thus the party should assess 
Mao Zedong and Mao’s legacies from the facts. The theory of “seeking truth from facts” did 
not only help  eng to defeat Hua Guofeng’s “two whatevers” argument  but also provided a 
theoretical basis from which to reassess Mao Zedong.  
Moreover   eng Xiaoping and his supporters also launched a “socialist democracy 
campaign” in the late   7 s. This “socialist democracy campaign” advocated a collective 
leadership and opposed the cult of personality  and thus undermined Hua’s position 
(Goodman, 1985). This campaign is also related to the CCP’s institutionalization of 
leadership transition, as I will discuss in Chapter 6. In addition to intra-elite conflicts, the 
CCP also attempted to use this campaign to legitimize its rule by providing democracy under 
its leadership (Goodman, 1985). 
In the late 1970s, after Deng gradually seized the initiative, Deng and his supporters 
considered a re-justification of the party history – especially of Mao Zedong – to be essential 
for reconciling the party’s past and their new agenda on economic reconstruction. In this way  
the party blamed a part of the past failure on Mao Zedong, and thus legitimized the new 
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emphasis on economic reconstruction by being distinct from Mao’s wrong policies. However  
as mentioned, if the CCP completely purge the memories and policies of its founder Mao 
Zedong, the party’s history and rule would be in trouble. Thus   eng’s strategy was to 
maintain Mao Zedong Thought as the guiding theory, but distance this from what Mao 
Zedong himself actually thought and what was done under the banner of his thought.   
In this context, the resolution on the party history was made in 1981 after two years of 
drafting work led by Deng Xiaoping and Hu Yaobang. The “resolution on certain questions in 
the history of our party since the founding of the PRC” was the first official evaluation of the 
party on several crucial, controversial issues. The resolution was largely positive about Mao 
Zedong’s contribution  but it also clearly pointed out Mao’s mistakes. It denounced the failure 
of Mao’s ruling strategies and policies – such as the Cultural Revolution and the Great Leap 
Forward – which were mainly based on communist ideology and the cult of personality, and 
thus provided a theoretical basis for Deng to take a different approach based on economic 
performance. In addition, it also contributed to ending the cleavage within the party on the 
topic of the party’s history so that the party could concentrate on economic reconstruction. 
Yet, thirty years later, with the problems caused by economic growth – especially corruption 
and socioeconomic inequality – had deteriorated: Mao Zedong and his doctrines again 
became a problem for the CCP, as I will discuss below.  
In short  by criticizing the failure and the loss of Mao’s agenda on “class struggle”  
Deng and his supporters legitimized their new agenda – a de-politicisation approach that 
shifted the legitimation of the communist rule from being ideology-based toward being 
performance-based. This de-politicisation approach allowed room to make quasi-capitalist 
policies for generating economic success; however, the loosening ideological and political 
control also inevitably led to an ideological crisis. This ideological crisis did not only 
undermine the popular support of the CCP but also split it from the inside, which almost 
overthrew the CCP in the late 1980s, as I will discuss below. Ironically, the danger of the de-
politicisation approach – that was used by Deng as an alternative to correct the problems with 
Mao Zedong’s ideology-oriented approach – was clearly highlighted by Mao in 1958:   
“To ignore ideology and politics, to be always preoccupied with business matters— the 
result will be a disoriented economist or technologist and that is dreadful. Ideological 
and political work is the guarantee for the completion of economic, technological work 
and it serves the economic base. Ideology and politics are, moreover, the commanders, 
the ‘sour’. A slight relaxation in our ideological and political work will lead our 
economic and technological work astray.” (Mao, 1990) 
   
2.4 The Existential Crisis under Deng Xiaoping’s Rule: Walking the Tightrope between 
Economic Success and Communist Doctrines (1981-1992)  
The above section explores the disputes within the CCP over how to deal with Mao 
Zedong and his legacies (1976-1981). In the early 1980s, this cleavage was settled by the 
resolution on the party history, and the focus of the intra-party debate gradually moved to the 
second stage. Simply by not being Mao and the Gang of Four, Deng was allowed room to 
promote his own policy agenda (Weatherley, 2006); however, Deng and his supporters used 
two different strategies to prove to the party and to society that their de-politicisation 
approach was theoretically the right way forward.  
In dealing with economic affairs, the CCP leadership avoided the influence of Marxist-
Leninist doctrines in order to be more flexible in promoting economic growth. As 
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productivity and efficiency were the core of  eng’s reforms  a series of quasi-capitalist 
economic policies were adopted. This strategy had been successful in winning popular 
support for the party until at least the 1980s when the negative consequences of rapid growth 
emerged. However, in the political field, the CCP leadership still strictly endorsed Marxist-
Leninist doctrines  and any challenge to the party’s monopoly on power was an absolute 
taboo. In this way, Deng attempted to prove to the party that his reforms would not harm the 
party’s rule.    
The CCP’s contrary attitude in economic and political fields led to a fundamental 
contradiction of its rule between generating economic success by utilizing quasi capitalist 
economic policies and the fact that this was a communist party that should justify its rule by 
achieving communism. As this section will show, this contradiction generated endless power 
struggles within the CCP – from either real conviction or more programmatic power 
motivation. This stage of debate mainly lay in the cleavage between the reform-minded 
leaders (reformists) and the less reform-minded leaders (conservatives). Notably, there was 
no clear division between these two groups of leaders, and it was not just a completely two-
line struggle; however, this simple, defective framework helped us to understand better the 
forces that were for and against market reforms.  
The reformists felt that it was essential to adopt more quasi-capitalist economic policies 
for generating economic success. The pragmatic economic policies helped to promote growth; 
however, they also challenged the ruling basis of the communist party – a vehicle to deliver a 
communist society. From the perspective of orthodox communism and the conservative 
ruling elites, the communist party’s initiatives in market reforms were illegitimate because 
they veered away from communism. Using the orthodox of Marxist and communist doctrines, 
some conservatives accused the privatization and quasi-capitalist policies of reformists as 
being products of capitalism that would put an end to socialism. For example, many argued 
that the development of the private economy – in which exploitation widely existed – had 
gradually replaced the dominant role of the state economy, and that the party members should 
get away from those private businesses (Ding, 2006:172). Indeed, these kinds of disputes 
commonly existed in communist regimes. As the Marxist literature does not endorse 
privatisation, the question of private property was one of the most fundamental challenges to 
communist regimes that promoted economic reforms (Schroeder, 1988).  
In short, the second stage of debates within the party (1979-1992) was about whether it 
was right for a communist party to introduce the elements of a quasi-capitalist system and to 
move away from communist doctrines. The resistance of the conservatives increased the 
difficulties of making and implementing the market reform programmes. In this context, on 
the one hand, the reformists continued to push forward market reforms in order to use 
economic success to establish their credentials. On the other hand, they portrayed their 
economic plans in socialist terms in order to undermine the resistance from the conservatives. 
In this context, various formal ideological discourses were produced for the self-justification 
of the CCP. 
 
2.4.1 The Evolution of Ideological Discourse on the Socialist Economy: the Birth of a Market 
Economy from the Body of a Planned Economy (1982-1992) 
This section explores the debates that occurred in the second stage (1982-1992), and 
how they were resolved by analyzing the evolution of the CCP’s ideological discourses on the 
socialist economy from the “planned economy supplemented by the market economy”  the 
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“socialist commodity economy”  “the combination between planned economy and market 
regulation”  to the “socialist market economy”.  
 
 .4. .  The Battle over the Market Elements: “Planned Economy  upplemented by Market 
Economy”  jihua jingji weizhu, shichang jingji weifu, 1982) 
In order to promote economic transition, the reformists gradually embedded market 
elements into China’s planned economy after   7 . In the relevant period  a series of market 
elements, such as the law of value, were hotly debated among the party theorists. During the 
Cultural Revolution, the law of value was not highly esteemed, as it was often linked with 
capitalism. Even in 1978, some still held that the law of value might destroy the socialist 
planned economy and even lead to capitalism if not halted (Liu and Gong, 1978:6). After 
1979, the Chinese academics gradually reached the consensus that the state should apply the 
law of value (e.g.Tao and Cao, 1979; Yuan and Zhang, 1979).  
 uring the first stage of China’s market reforms    7 -   4)  the role of the “planned 
economy” – that was widely considered as the principal (if not sole) subject of the socialist 
economy – was unshakable. According to the birdcage theory of Chen Yun (1995b), who was 
one of the top leaders, the relationship between economic development and national plans 
was like that between a bird and its cage. In other words, economic development (i.e. the bird) 
needed to be controlled by the national plans (i.e. the cage). At that time, the party theorists 
widely agreed that the socialist economy was equivalent to the planned economy; however, 
their disagreements lay in the extent to which the planned economy should contain the market 
elements (Zhu, 2006:110). The mainstream view was that the socialist economy should be a 
planned economy but one from which the market should not be excluded (Su, 1982:17; Tao 
and Cao, 1979:51; Yuan and Zhang, 1979). Some pro-reform theorists took a further step to 
support the development of the “commodity economy” in the late   7 s. For example  Zhang 
Yuanyuan  an economist based in Guangdong  argued that China’s socialist economy was a 
commodity economy rather than a planned economy (Zhang, 1980). However, the discourse 
of the “commodity economy” was still a relatively sensitive concept, because it was often 
linked with capitalism. Thus  Zhang’s argument received wide criticism from the 
conservatives at that time (e.g.Jiang, 1981).  
 oon after Hua Guofeng’s fall  the formulation of the “planned economy supplemented 
by the market economy” appeared in the 12th Party Congress report. As this report clearly 
pointed out (Hu, 1982)  a fundamental principle of China’s economic reforms should be that 
“a planned economy is the principal subject of the Chinese economy  whilst the production 
and the circulation of some products could be adjusted by the market”. This official 
recognition of the market marked the victory of the reformists; however, there was still much 
resistance to the increasing proportions of the market elements in the Chinese economy. For 
example, some party theorists criticized the reformists for their over-emphasis on the market 
and their ignorance towards the planned economy (e.g.Tian and Zhang, 1981; Ye, 1982).   
The discourse of the “planned economy supplemented by the market economy” 
succeeded in breaking down the commonly held views of Mao’s era that the socialist 
economy should be a pure, planned economy. Yet, in essence, this discourse was still a 
formulation of the planned economy because it considered the state plan as the essence and 
the foundation of socialism with the market as the secondary and the subordinate. In other 
words, the market was operated in the framework of a planned economy.  
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Did the masses in the early 1980s understand and care what the “planned economy 
supplemented by the market economy” is? The audience of this battle over the planned 
economy and market elements was clearly the party rather than society.   
 
 .4. .  The Battle over Commodity: “ ocialist Commodity Economy” (shehui zhuyi 
shangping jingji, 1984)  
Driven by rapid economic growth, the market gradually took root in the Chinese 
economy in the mid-1980s. The reformists attempted to push for further market reforms and 
to recognize officially the development of the commodity economy; however, they received 
much resistance. Following the debate in the late 1970s, the relationship between the 
commodity economy and the planned economy became a hot topic among the party theorists. 
On the one hand, some argued that the planned economy and the commodity economy were 
mutually exclusive because they were fundamentally contradictory (Ma, 1982). According to 
this view, the commodity economy could easily be outside the planned economy’s control  
and only the production and exchange of commodities rather than a commodity economy 
existed in the socialist economy (Ma, 1982). More importantly, many considered the 
commodity economy a product of capitalism. For example, a party theorist argued that if the 
commodity economy were to be highly developed, China would no longer be a socialist 
society (Ma, 1982).   
On the other hand, some argued that the commodity economy and the planned economy 
were not mutually exclusive (Peng, 1982). According to this perspective, as China had 
already allowed the production and the exchange of commodities, the development of a 
commodity economy seemed to be inevitable. This view argued that the state could control 
enterprises in many ways, even in a commodity economy, so it could therefore reconcile the 
fundamental contradiction between the commodity economy and the planned economy (Peng, 
1982).   
In the end, the reformists won the battle over the commodity economy, marking a 
remarkable milestone in China’s market reforms. In    4  the discourse of the “socialist 
commodity economy” was officially introduced by the party document “The CCP’s  ecisions 
on Economic System Reform”. This document addressed a series of theoretical conundrums 
about the socialist economy. The most notable ideological transition was to break the view 
that “the planned economy and the commodity economy are mutually exclusive”. It argued 
that: (1) only by developing a commodity economy could the party invigorate the economy, 
which could not be achieved purely by administrative measures and mandatory plans; and, (2) 
the development of the socialist commodity economy needed certain kinds of planned 
regulations and administrative management; therefore, the planned economy and the 
commodity economy were not mutually exclusive (CCP, 1984). In order to highlight the 
importance of the commodity economy, this document clearly pointed out that a commodity 
economy was a “prerequisite” for China’s modernization.  
In order to justify the socialist nature of this discourse, the party document also clearly 
distinguished the socialist commodity economy from the capitalist economy. It claimed that 
 “Regarding the issues of the commodity economy and the law of value, the 
fundamental difference between the socialist economy and the capitalist economy do 
not lie in whether a commodity economy exists and whether the law of value plays a 
role, but in the different ownership, the existence of the exploiting classes, whether 
labouring people are masters, the purposes of production, whether the party could 
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consciously apply the law of value to the scale of the society, and the different range of 
commodity relations. In China’s socialist conditions  labor and all state-owned 
enterprises and resources – including land, mines, banks, and railways – are not 
commodities” (CCP, 1984). 
According to a party theorist, the discourse of the “socialist commodity economy” was 
an attempt of the CCP’s ideological construction to foster the ideas of the commodity 
economy in the minds of the party cadres and the masses for promoting a smooth transition 
toward a new economic structure (Liu, 1991). By moving the relevant theoretical obstacles of 
the commodity economy and socialism, the reformists intended to put their relevant economic 
policies into practice in a more effective and efficient way. However, as established in the 
Introduction Chapter and mentioned above, the audience of the formal ideology was the party. 
Did ordinary Chinese people really understand what the “socialist commodity economy” was? 
Did they care whether the commodity economy was compatible with the socialist planned 
economy? Obviously, the masses who were less educated and less familiar with communist 
vocabulary were not the major audience of the relevant communist discourses.  
  
2.4.1.3 Primary Stage of Socialism (shehui zhuyi chuji jieduan): “the state regulates the 
market and the market guides enterprises”  guojia tiaojie shichang, shichang yindao qiye, 
1987) 
Following the establishment of the socialist commodity economy, the role of the market 
was further elevated by the CCP in    7. Zhao Ziyang’s report at the   th Party Congress, 
(Zhao, 1987) introduced a new discourse: “the state regulates the market and the market 
guides enterprises”. Notably  this report did not mention the “planned economy” at all  which 
was the first time that a relevant party report had abandoned this discourse. Moreover, facing 
increasing pressure from the conservatives on the growth of the private economy in the mid-
    s  Zhao’s leadership also put forward the theory of the “primary stage of socialism” at 
Congress in 1987.  
According to Zhao, this theory has two key meanings (CCP, 2001). The first is that 
“China has already been a socialist society  and we should insist on rather than abandon 
socialism”. Although the practical significance of this theory did not lie in its first meaning  
the emphasis on socialism was quite important for the reformists to demonstrate their 
loyalties to the party and to communist ideology, and thus to fend off attacks from the 
conservatives who were criticized of reformists’ quasi-capitalist policies – either from real 
conviction or from more pragmatic power motivation.  
The second meaning of this theory was that “China is still at the primary stage of 
socialism”. In essence  the primary stage of socialism meant a stage of underdevelopment – 
which would endure for at least 100 years according to Zhao Ziyang (CCP, 2001). Unlike the 
previous communist discourses that emphasized whither China was going (e.g. communism 
and prosperity), this theory justified where China was now. This theory also justified the huge 
gap between China’s socioeconomic reality and the utopian ideology of Marxism. In other 
words, it provided an ex post facto way of explaining why China was still – and would 
continue to be – poor after almost 4  years’ rule of the “brilliant” CCP leadership. It 
suggested that the poor socioeconomic reality of China was not a result of the CCP’s rule but 
of the “objective historical circumstances” (Weatherley, 2006:113).  
This theory also provided a justification for the party’s history and the focus on 
economic construction. It explained why the past policies of the CCP in Mao’s era failed. As 
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Zhao argued (CCP, 2001), the primary stage of socialism was a special stage that China – but 
not all socialist countries because of China’s lagging productivity and underdeveloped 
commodity economy – was bound to go through, which China could not simply go beyond. It 
suggested that the past strategies of Mao – such as the “Great  eap Forward” that intended to 
“jump” from the primary stage of socialism into full communism – were wrong in the first 
place. In this way  it justified why  eng’s leadership moved away from Mao’s “class struggle” 
towards economic reconstruction.  
Most importantly, this theory suggested that the primary stage of socialism cannot be 
surpassed, and thus the party had to concentrate on economic development so that full 
communism would be achieved one day. At this stage  the “means” of capitalism could be 
used for the “ends” of achieving communism. In other words  the quasi-capitalist economic 
policies were legitimate for achieving the goals of communism. This theory thus provided a 
basis to allow the reformists to adopt more quasi-capitalist economic policies. In practice, this 
concept was so widely used by local officials to defend their economic policies that it was 
surrounded by widespread cynicism. A popular Chinese saying was that “the theory of the 
primary stage of socialism is like a big basket that everything can be put in” (Ding, 2006:173).  
 imilarly with the discourse of the “socialist commodity economy”  the masses were 
clearly not the major audience of the “primary stage of socialism”. Zhao’s words that the 
“primary stage of socialism would endure for at least     years” might pass a message to 
society for justifying why people’s poor situation would not be improved soon  however  the 
primary audience of the “primary stage of socialism” was clearly the party itself  because this 
theory attempted to fend off attacks from the conservatives and allow more rooms for 
reformists to make more quasi-capitalist economic policies.  
 
2.4.1.4 The Protest of      and “the Combination Between the Planned Economy and the 
Market Regulations” (jihua jingji yu shichang tiaojie xiang jiehe, 1989) 
As mentioned above, a delicate task for the reformists to push forward their plans was 
to use economic success to convince the party and society on the one hand and to construct 
various socialist discourses to justify the socialist nature of their economic policies on the 
other. This already complex task became increasingly unlikely in the mid-1980s – when the 
social complaints about the negative social consequences of rapid economic growth gradually 
exacerbated and gave way to popular protests. Social instability caused by those complaints 
undermined the reformists’ power to confront the oppositions from other groups of elites.  
The conservatives joined forces with other elites whose benefits were undermined by 
market reforms and argued that the popular protests were a result of Hu Yaobang’s – the 
General Secretary and a reform-minded leader – connivance in “bourgeois liberalization”  
thus Hu was held responsible for social instability. After Hu Yaobang was dismissed under 
the pressures exerted by those dissatisfied leaders in 1987, the CCP leadership split further. 
On the one hand, the then Premier Zhao Ziyang – a reform-mind leader – replaced Hu 
Yaobang to put forward continually market reforms. On the other hand, Li Peng – a 
conservative leader – was appointed as the new Premier. Unlike his predecessor Zhao Ziyang, 
Li Peng was more critical of market reforms. The disputes over market reforms within the top 
leadership left a hidden danger the effects of which eventually surfaced in 1989.  
Arguably  the protest of      was so dangerous and damaging to the CCP’s rule mainly 
because it happened when two “contradictions” coincided. In       the party was highly 
divided by the struggles between the conservatives and the reformists. This intra-party 
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contradiction more or less strangled the decision-making of the party when the protests broke 
out. At the same time, the external contradiction between the party and the society became 
sharp with the deteriorating negative consequences of market reforms. The complaints of 
society gradually erupted in the form of extensive popular protests across the country. A 
highly divided party was thus unable to confront the social forces and maintaining social 
stability in 1989. In the same logic, a key for the CCP’s survival after the protest of      was 
the re-unification of ruling elites led by the strong intervention of the veteran leaders. Soon 
after the CCP reached a consensus at the expense of the reformists, it was able to put down 
the protest immediately. 
The CCP survived the protest of 1989 with the resurgence of conservative forces. Five 
days after 4 June, 1989, during his talk with the martial law troops in Beijing, Deng Xiaoping 
(1989) reaffirmed that China should continue to adhere to “the combination between planned 
economy and market regulation”.  eng’s discourse of the socialist economy was quite similar 
to Zhao Ziyang’s “the state regulates the market and the market guides enterprises”. 
Nonetheless, market reforms were inevitably obstructed with the fall of the reformists in the 
late 1980s.  
As mentioned in the Introduction Chapter  after the protest of       the CCP’s 
ideological focus gradually shifted from the internal consumption (i.e. how to justify what the 
party was doing to itself) towards the external consumption (i.e. how to justify negative 
consequences to society). In the mid-1980s, the CCP gradually realized that not only the self-
justification of its communist rule but also the broader justification of its authoritarian rule to 
society was important. Five days after the CCP used military forces to end the protest on 9 
June, 1989, Deng Xiaoping (1989)  pointed out clearly in his speech to martial units that:  
“ uring the last ten years, our biggest mistake was made in the field of education, 
primarily in ideological and political education – not just of students but of the people 
in general”. 
 earning from the protest of      and heeding  eng’s warning  the CCP made greater efforts 
in the political and ideological education of the masses. In this context, many informal 
ideological discourses have been produced to resist pro-liberal democratic values in order to 
maintain popular beliefs in the one-party system, as Chapter 5 will discuss.  
 
2.4.1.5 The  ocialist Market Economy and  eng Xiaoping’s  outhern Tour (1992) 
The political climate changed dramatically after the protest of 1989. Many reformists 
including the then General Secretary Zhao Ziyang fell, and the conservatives who turned 
against liberalism and market reforms took control of the party. After 1989, as the term 
“reform” was easily linked with “bourgeois liberalization” and “peaceful evolution”, many 
party bureaucrats deliberately kept their distance from it. In the meantime, the argument of 
the conservatives – that the market economy was a product of capitalism – prevailed. For 
example, the then head of People’s Daily, Gao Di (1990), argued that “the market economy is 
going to remove public ownership; in other words, it rejects the leadership of the CCP and the 
socialist system  and it is going to promote capitalism”. Accordingly  the CCP’s emphasis on 
the planned economy increased at the expense of the market economy.  
Yet, the dominance of the conservative forces did not last long. In 1991, the collapse of 
the Soviet Union shocked the CCP. The CCP’s increasing concern about whether it would 
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repeat the failure of other communist regimes stimulated its desire to change. As mentioned 
in the Introduction Chapter  after      the CCP’s think tanks conducted a large numbers of 
systematic studies on the failure of communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union. CASS analysts summarized the failure of Eastern European communist regimes in 
three ways (Zhou, et al., 2000): the division among rule elites, dissatisfied masses, and the 
penetration of pro-liberal values. The CCP realized the urgency and significance of 
reclaiming legitimacy.   
Under pressure to generate popular support, the CCP was forced to promote market 
reforms for economic performance. In this context, the market reform programme re-captured 
the CCP’s attention. In        eng Xiaoping started his famous “southern tour” to push for 
the market reform programme. Soon afterwards, the report of the 14
th
 Party Congress 
officially set the establishment of “the socialist market economy” as a fundamental goal. 
After over two decades of theoretical and practical exploration, the market economy finally 
replaced the planned economy in China. In addition to economic reform, the CCP also put 
forward further ideological reforms (e.g. informal ideology) and political reforms (e.g. 
institutionalization of power succession). Yet, whilst the CCP’s efforts in economic reform 
have been widely acknowledged, the relevant literature pays insufficient attention to those 
reforms in the discourses of ideology and the political system.    
In sum, the above section explores the debate over the socialist economy within the 
party (1979-1992). It shows how various ideological discourses were constructed by the 
reformists to fend off the attacks from the conservative ruling elites. As I argued in the 
Introduction Chapter, these formal ideological discourses were not for the consumption of the 
masses but the party itself. In other words, at this stage these formal ideologies were still 
primarily there for reconciling the contradictions among ruling elites (i.e. party cohesion) 
rather than building popular legitimacy. The understanding of the masses was not only 
restricted by their poor educational background and knowledge about communist 
vocabularies but also the limited channels to transfer the relevant information – party 
newspapers such as the People’s Daily that was not mainly for the consumption of the masses.  
In the early 1990s, the second stage of debate was over. After two decades of debating 
the socialist economy, the CCP finally decided to embrace a market economy. Then, the 
intra-party debate entered the third stage that is still on-going. In this stage (1992- present), it 
focuses on two major aspects: (1) how far towards capitalism the CCP should and can go and 
(2) how to deal with the negative consequences of the transition from socialism, and those 
consequences’ impacts on legitimacy  which were beginning to emerge  such as corruption 
and socioeconomic inequality.  
 
2.5 The Existential Crisis in Post-Deng China (1989-2012): the Side Effects of Economic 
Growth 
The economic success completely changed the political-socioeconomic landscapes in 
contemporary China. As Chapter 3 will discuss, economic performance is widely considered 
by Western scholars as a principal pillar of the CCP’s legitimacy. It seems that as long as 
China can maintain economic growth, the Chinese leaders can sit back and relax. However, as 
Chapter 4 and the following section will show, economic success does not undermine the 
CCP’s concerns about the continuation of the one-party rule; indeed, those concerns are 
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generated by this growth. Problems caused by rapid economic growth have created both 
internal and external problems of the CCP’s rule: popular legitimacy and party cohesion. 
First of all, problems caused by economic growth have been undermining popular 
legitimacy in China. In other words, thirty years of spectacular economic growth – a major 
source of legitimacy in China – is also a major source of legitimacy crisis. In contemporary 
China, the top three perceived legitimacy threats by Chinese intellectuals are all problems 
caused by economic growth – socioeconomic inequality, changing values, and corruption, as 
Chapter 4 will discuss. With the further deterioration of those problems, reclaiming 
legitimacy became more urgent and important to the CCP’s rule.  
As such  the primary focus of the CCP’s ideological work shifted from justifying why 
the CCP should adopt some quasi-capitalist economic policies (for maintaining party 
cohesion) to addressing the negative consequences of rapid growth (for popular legitimacy). 
As Chapter 5 will discuss, the party has produced various informal discourses to delegitimize 
pro-liberal democracy values and has revised formal ideological discourses to provide an ex 
post facto justification of the negative consequences of rapid growth.  
Notably  this shifting focus is not driven by the declining importance of the CCP’s self-
justification but the urgency of reclaiming popular legitimacy. The self-justification of the 
party is still crucial for: (a) maintaining the already unpopular communist beliefs within the 
party; and, (b) justifying why the current reality of political economy in China is not 
incompatible with its commitment to socialism. As discussed above, moving away from 
revolutionary idealism did help the government to improve their performance and deliver 
economic benefits to the people  however  it lost the very basis of the communist party’s 
monopoly on power – a vehicle to deliver the class victory and a communist society.   
Moreover, although the danger of the elite divisions declined in comparison with before 
– a decline which was driven by the institutional development of power succession and the 
changing elite politics –, the danger was still fatal. The deterioration of problems caused by 
economic growth exacerbated the ideological division between the New Leftists and the 
Liberals. This ideological division provided a widening ground for ideological battles and 
power struggles.  imilar to Mao’s era  ideology continues to be used as a weapon for power 
in contemporary China, as the following section will discuss in the case of Bo Xilai.  
In sum, after 1989, the contemporary Chinese leaders had a delicate task built on four 
factors: 
(1) continuing to stress the importance of economic development,  
(2) explaining why the communist party has a monopoly on power;  
(3) fending off potential internal attacks from within the party itself and from people 
who might criticize the ideological turn – either from real conviction or from more 
pragmatic power motivation;  
(4) dealing with the negative social consequences of rapid economic development.  
As proved by the fall of Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, the above, complicated task seem to 
be an impossible mission. As such  Chinese leaders’ concerns about the continuation of the 
CCP’s one-party rule have not lessened in contemporary China. 
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 .5.  Corruption and Three Represents in Jiang Zemin’s term 
 In Jiang Zemin’s era  the rampant corruption bred by economic growth had become 
increasingly damaging. The report of the 16
th
 Party Congress clearly pointed out that if the 
party did not crackdown on corruption  “the party will run the risk of losing its ruling position 
and the party might head for self-destruction” (Jiang, 2002). Towards the end of his term, 
Jiang Zemin put forward his formulation of party theories: Three Represents. This theory 
urged the party members to maintain their “advanced nature”  e.g. probity). More importantly, 
the first ‘represent’ of Three Represents – to represent the most advanced social productive 
forces – provided a theoretical basis for expanding party membership to private entrepreneurs. 
In other words  it justified why those “capitalists” could be a part of the party. It seemed to be 
an attempt of the CCP to form a kind of alliances between political and economic elites, 
marking a transition of the CCP from a proletariat party towards an elite governing party. 
Yet, this transition towards the elite approach seems to get away from the very basis of 
the CCP’s rule – communism and being there for the proletariat. Expanding the party’s 
membership to private entrepreneurs suggests that the CCP officially acknowledges 
entrepreneurs and managers as the new social “strata” (jie ceng) – a major target that was 
destroyed by Mao’s “class struggle” (Holbig, 2009). As such, Three Represents inevitably led 
to strong resistance from many party elites. Some party members criticized that the 
ideological turn of Three Represents disobeys the CCP’s commitment to socialism and thus 
made the CCP illegitimate. For example, Zhang Dejiang (2000b; 2000a) – who was then the 
party chief of Zhejiang Province and is now the chairman of the People’s Congress – 
published an article in      in which he accused some party cadres of having “many muddled 
understandings” over this issue and argued that private entrepreneurs should not be allowed to 
join the CCP. Otherwise, Zhang (2000b) warned: 
“It will make indistinct the party’s nature and its standard as vanguard fighter of the 
working class and mislead people into thinking that ‘he who is rich has the qualification 
to join the party’. The basic masses of workers and peasants who knew just too well the 
pains of what it was like in the old society when people fawned on the rich and looked 
down on the poor would be led to misunderstand the party ideologically and distance 
themselves from the party emotionally. This will affect and weaken the mass basis of 
the party.”(English Translation:Holbig, 2009) 
In order to end the dispute within the party and maintain the unity of the party, Hu Jintao 
reinterpreted Three Represents as “Three for People”  san wei min). Hu’s emphasis of Three 
Represents shifted from the first ‘represent’  the most advanced social productive forces  to 
the third ‘represent’  the interests of most Chinese people. In this way, this new interpretation 
reverted back to the populist approach of the party. 
  
 .5.  The Widening  ocioeconomic Inequality and Ideological  ivisions in Hu Jintao’s Era 
 In Hu Jintao’s term  China became the second largest economy in the world. 
Nonetheless  economic success did not reduce the party’s concern about legitimacy  on the 
contrary, this concern became more explicit. The report of a party plenum in 2004 clearly 
expressed this concern (CCP, 2004):   
“It is not easy for a proletarian political party to seize power  and still less easy for it to 
hold onto power, and especially over a long period. The party's governing status is not 
congenital, nor is it something settled once and for all. We must think of danger in time 
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of peace, strengthen our awareness of peril, profoundly absorb the experiences and 
lessons of the rise and fall and success and failure of certain ruling parties in the world, 
more consciously strengthen the building of the party's ability to govern, and always 
govern and hold power well for the people.” (English translation: Ash, 2004:1154)  
This report explicitly warned of the importance and the urgency to strengthen the 
CCP’s ruling capacity for maintaining legitimacy. As I mentioned in the Introduction Chapter, 
the CCP considers this ruling capability as an inner cause of its legitimacy. According to the 
report (CCP, 2004)  to strengthen the CCP’s ruling capacity is “a major strategic issue 
bearing on the success or failure of China’s socialist cause  the future and destiny of the 
Chinese nation  the life or death of the party  and enduring political stability in the land” 
(English translation: Ash, 2004:1153). Notably, the above report significantly intensified the 
debate over legitimacy among Chinese intellectuals that is observed in Chapter 4 and in a 
previous study of Gilley and Holbig (2009). As Chapter 4 will discuss, over 40% of the party 
intellectuals in the legitimacy debate argue that the regime is in certain forms of legitimacy 
crises or challenges, compared with only 1% of them who considered legitimacy in China to 
be high.  
 In Hu Jintao’s era  the problems caused by economic growth further deteriorated. The 
control of corruption did not improve. As Hu Jintao (2012b)  clearly warned at the 18
th
 Party 
Congress, “if we fail to handle this issue [corruption] well  it could prove fatal to the Party  
and even cause the collapse of the Party and the fall of the state”. In addition to rampant 
corruption, the further deterioration of socioeconomic inequality became another crucial 
obstacle to the CCP’s rule. In this context, Hu Jintao proposed his formulation of party 
theories – Scientific Outlook of Development and Harmonious Society. As Chapter 5 will 
discuss, Scientific Outlook of Development attempted to adjust the party’s ruling 
philosophies from being efficiency-oriented towards being equality-oriented in order to 
promote more sustainable development.  
 
2.5.2.1 Division between the Leftists and the Liberals 
The problems of corruption and socioeconomic inequality did not only threaten popular 
legitimacy but also party cohesion. Indeed, for the past three decades, the CCP has not been 
singing with one voice. The ideological battles between the pro-left elites and the pro-liberal 
elites have never ended. Although there is neither clear division between these two groups of 
elites nor consensus on the definitions of “The  eftist” and “the  iberal”  these two terms 
help us to understand the general ideological divisions between elites in contemporary China. 
 The Leftists and the Liberals point out the same problems in contemporary China, such 
as the widening socioeconomic inequality and corruption; however, their solutions are 
completely different (Ma and Zhang, 2014). The Leftists consider the inequality to be a 
product of liberalism and market reforms. They argue that the state should play a bigger role 
in China’s socioeconomic affairs, such as providing more social welfare, and redistributing of 
socioeconomic resources. Some Maoists argue that China should move towards Maoism and 
socialism. However, the Liberals consider the inequality to be a result of inadequate market 
reforms; thus their solution is that the state should retreat from socioeconomic affairs. Over 
the issue of ideology, they argue that China should accept universal values – democracy, 
human rights, and freedom.  
 The different visions of the Leftists and the Liberals lead to a series of disputes. The 
justification of Mao Zedong and the party’s history is particularly notable. As discussed 
43 
 
above, the resolution on the party history in 1981 ended the dispute  however  the party’s 
history again becomes a problem for contemporary CCP leaders  influenced by today’s 
various problems created by economic growth. The major cleavage lies in the assessment of 
Mao Zedong’s rule – in particular the merits and demerits of Mao Zedong and the Cultural 
Revolution – and  eng Xiaoping’s “reform and open up”.  
 From the perspective of the Leftists, the current socioeconomic problems are a result of 
over-marketization and moving away from socialism in the period of “reform and open up”. 
Although it is questionable whether the majority of the Leftists really support Mao’s policies 
such as mass campaigns and communes, Mao Zedong is used as a political symbol to support 
pro-left policies in contemporary China. The Leftists attempt to arouse underprivileged 
groups’ and nationalists’ memories of Mao’s rule – a “great" era without corruption and 
inequality and a strong China that had a hardline stance against the West. To some extremists 
among the  eftists   eng Xiaoping’s new approach of “reform and open up” was a kind of 
coup that betrayed Maoism and communism. In their discourses, Mao Zedong is a hero who 
saved China, and the Cultural Revolution achievements outweigh its errors. Thus, some, such 
as members of Utopia, argue that China should move back to the first thirty years of Mao’s 
rule.  
 From the perspective of the Liberals, Mao Zedong’s rule including communist 
fanaticism and the cults of personality in the first thirty years of the PRC is completely wrong, 
and the new period of “reform and open up” is moving toward universal values. As the 
Liberals intend to push for further market reforms and even political reforms that move 
towards liberal democracy, they appeal to the party to get further away from the communist 
doctrines and Maoism. In the discourse of some Liberals, Mao is nothing but a dictator who 
brought disaster to China (e.g. Mao, 2013). 
 
2.5.2.2 Bo Xilai’s Challenge: fundamentally different beliefs or just an attempt to grab hold 
of power by using ideology? 
 The above ideological battle combined with the disadvantaged groups’ discontent about 
the negative consequences of the rapid economic growth intensified the power struggles 
among the CCP leaders. In this context, the then Chongqing party head Bo Xilai held high the 
flag of New Leftists in order to gain the membership of 18
th
 PSC. In Chongqing, Bo launched 
a series of red culture movements – including the promotion of Mao Zedong’s quotes  red or 
revolutionary songs, and revolutionary TV programmes – to establish his ideological 
orthodoxy. In order to cater to people’s dissatisfaction about socioeconomic inequality, Bo 
Xilai also launched the “strike the black / anti-organized crime campaign”  which brought 
about the arrest of many private entrepreneurs. At that time, Bo’s policies were widely 
endorsed not only by Chongqing people but also by New Leftists.
3
 For example, some pro-
left scholars including Wang  haoguang and Cui Zhiyuan argue that Chongqing’s 
development provide a unique experience and could be characterised as the “Chongqing 
model” (Cui, 2009; Ji, 2009; Su, et al., 2011; Wang, 2011b). This model relied on the role of 
                                                            
3 At that time, this view was shared by most of my friends in Chongqing where I was born and grew up. 
However, many entrepreneurs disliked Bo Xilai and his policies because he destroyed the local economic and 
political ecology; and some entrepreneurs fled from Chongqing because of his anti-organized crime campaign. 
Those New Leftists include nationalists and Maoists. Bo Xilai and his policies are acclaimed on the New  eftists’ 
websites including Utopia and Red China.   
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the state in socioeconomic affairs, which was different from the pro-liberal, market 
developmental models of coastal developed regions such as Guangdong.
4
  
  imilar to line struggle in Mao’s era  the orthodox doctrines of Marxism and Maoism 
were again used as a powerful weapon for power in Bo’s case. Although the leadership 
transition in China was institutionalized to a certain extent at that time  Bo Xilai’s way of 
competing for the top power – a democratic, election-like publicity campaign involving a 
distinct policy agenda and a strong appeal to the masses – posed a strong challenge to the 
legitimacy of the power succession system in China. Bo’s challenge suggests the significance 
to further institutionalizing the CCP’s power succession system – especially with regard to 
the contested elections of central leaders, as Chapter 6 will discuss.  
The case of Bo Xilai also raised a question that this thesis addresses: is Bo Xilai’s 
ideological banner motivated by fundamentally different beliefs or just an attempt to grab 
hold of power by using ideology? Is Bo Xilai a real left-wing advocate? Obviously  Bo’s 
challenge involved many elements of political opportunism. Bo Xilai neither showed his pro-
left nor orthodox Marxism stance when he served as the Mayor of Dalian, the Governor of 
Liaoning, and the Minister of Commerce. His pro-left approach became evident only after he 
was appointed to work in Chongqing. Chongqing’s special circumstances were a key factor 
leading to Bo’s pro-left campaigns and policies, because its growth heavily relied on the 
government. Bo would not have promoted the same policies and campaigns if he were 
appointed the governor of Guangdong. In this respect  Chongqing’s socioeconomic 
conditions played a role in affecting Bo’s policies.   
 Moreover, quite a few aspects of Bo Xilai’s economic policies were liberal. The foreign 
investments in Chongqing had increased by over 50% per year during the first three years 
after Bo arrived in Chongqing (Ji, 2009). The Chongqing government also took great effort to 
attract big enterprises including Foxconn who was accused of squeezing labour benefits. The 
Chongqing government also ambitiously planned to become a regional financial centre. In 
short, on the one hand, Bo used mass campaigns to portray himself as a protector of 
underprivileged social groups and to establish him as an orthodox socialist/communist leader. 
On the one hand, he maintained the liberal elements of his economic policies in order to 
maintain economic performance. All of these efforts were perhaps taken in order to 
strengthen his political bargaining chip for the 18
th
 P C seat. Thus  Bo’s challenge – a “self-
promotion campaign” – was not a pure product of his political beliefs. 
 As mentioned in the Introduction Chapter, there are two approaches to understanding 
ideology: through the belief system and through the discourse. Obviously in this case  Bo’s 
campaigns were driven not only by his beliefs but also by a more pragmatic power motivation. 
As long as Bo could show his respect to Maoism and Marxism, ideological orthodoxy would 
grant Bo power and influence – no matter if he really believed in them or not. In this sense, 
the approach that considers ideology to be a discourse enables a more comprehensive 
understanding over the role of ideology in China.   
 
 
 
                                                            
4 The Guangdong experience is also the so-called Guangdong Model, which is frequently mentioned in contrast 
to the Chongqing model. However, Zhang Dejiang, who replaced Bo as the Party Chief of Chongqing and who 
is now a PSC member, denied the existence of the Chongqing model  although the reports of the “Chongqing 
model” frequently appeared in Chinese newspapers before Bo’s fall.  
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2.6. Summary 
 This chapter explores the CCP’s concern about the continuation of one-party system 
(1976-2012). As it shows, existential crises have been a constant concern of party leaders in 
China. It argues that this concern mainly comes from how to justify the CCP’s rule in light of 
three issues: communist ideology, Mao Zedong, and the problems caused by economic 
growth. These issues combined have dominated the debates within the party. After Mao 
Zedong died in 1976, the cleavage within the party mainly lay in how to deal with Mao and 
his legacies. After this debate ended with  eng Xiaoping’s victory in the early     s  the 
focus of intra-party debates gradually moved to whether it was right for a communist party to 
introduce elements of a capitalist system and move away from communist doctrines. Since 
the final acknowledgement of a “market economy” in the early     s  the party elites have 
concentrated on: (1) how far towards capitalism the CCP should and can go and (2) how to 
deal with the negative consequences of the transition from socialism and their impact on 
legitimacy. 
 In order to reconcile the fundamental contradiction between the reality of the political 
economy and the CCP’s ideological basis and commitment to socialism, contemporary 
Chinese leaders have constantly revised party ideologies – not only formal ideologies such as 
Jiang Zemin’s Three Represents and Hu Jintao’s Scientific Outlook of Development, but also 
informal ideologies, as Chapter 5 will discuss. However, these heavy investments in ideology 
did not receive sufficient attention in the English language literature. As the next chapter will 
examine, in analysing regime legitimacy in China, the topic of ideology is under-researched, 
because conventional wisdom of Western scholarship highly emphasizes performance 
legitimacy and many consider ideology obsolete nowadays. 
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Chapter Three  
Understanding Popular Legitimacy in China from a Western Perspective 
 
“Everyone agrees that economic performance represents the foundation of the CCP’s 
continued ability to assert its authority.” 
  –   alibert  and  anteigne (2008b:5) 
 
“Government performance stands alone as the sole source of legitimacy in China.” 
–  Zhao Dingxin, a sociology professor of the University of Chicago (2009:428) 
  
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses and reviews concepts and theories of legitimacy and the English 
language literature on the subject of legitimacy in China. The first part discusses Western 
theories of legitimacy – including normative legitimacy, empirical legitimacy, and critical 
legitimacy – and their limits in analysing the case of China. The second part of this chapter 
reviews regime legitimacy in China from a Western perspective. It shows that ideology is a 
crucial topic that does not receive sufficient attention from the English language literature on 
the subject of regime legitimacy in China.  
As mentioned in the Introduction Chapter, conventional wisdom emphasizes 
performance legitimacy, especially economic performance, and many misguidedly consider 
ideology to be obsolete nowadays. However, economic success alone could not explain the 
entire legitimacy source of the CCP. The rapid economic growth also creates many 
legitimacy problems, as discussed in Chapter 4. Moreover, ideological factors play a 
significant role in transforming people’s perceptions of economic growth  as this chapter will 
discuss. In other words, the impact of economic growth on legitimacy is affected by ideology.  
Similarly, ideology is also important to the CCP’s capability to maintain social stability. 
As Chapter 5 will discuss, the CCP’s instability discourses carefully constructed and 
disseminated a potential scenario – that without a strong ruling party, China might fall into 
civil unrest, national turmoil, and economic stagnation. This discourse exploited the people’s 
concern about an unstable and splitting China and thus contributes to people’s compliance 
with the current social order.  
In addition to economic performance and social stability, nationalism is another 
important pillar of legitimacy in China (Breslin, 2009; Darr, 2011; Fang, 1997; Lam, 2003; Li, 
2001b; Lieberthal, 2004:334-335; Lin and Hu, 2003; Ostergaard, 2004; Saich, 2004; 
Shambaugh, 2001; Zhao, 1998; Zheng, 2004). Yet, nationalism alone is not an ideology, as 
this chapter will discuss. As such, the legitimizing role of nationalism is better addressed in 
the broader context of ideological discourse in China. 
In addition to ideology, institutional change is another crucial aspect that did not receive 
sufficient attention in the relevant literature. As Schubert (2008) argues, political reforms 
have been generating a “critical degree” of regime legitimacy in China. Thus, Schubert (2008) 
set up a new research agenda to study political reforms in China in order to fill the gap of the 
literature, as the Introduction Chapter discussed.  
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3.2 Legitimacy: Concepts and Theories  
Legitimacy is an important concept of political studies. This term comes from the Latin 
word legitimare/ legitimus, which means “to make lawful”  and is similar to the term legality. 
In the context of law  it refers to citizens’ compliance with the law no matter whether the law 
is right or not. In the field of political studies, legitimacy refers to the rightness of a state, 
which is more than just “legality”. The term legitimacy is used in many disciplines such as 
sociology, philosophy, and law. As a doctorate thesis in political studies, legitimacy here 
refers to political legitimacy. 
For the purpose of this thesis, I adopt  ipset’s (1981:64) definition of legitimacy that 
“involves the capability of the system to engender and maintain the belief that existing 
political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society”  as mentioned in the 
Introduction Chapter. Huntington (1993:46) suggests that political scientists should avoid 
discussing legitimacy because “legitimacy is a mushy concept.”  egitimacy is hard to 
measure, and the term per se is complex and controversial. Opinions differ on definitions and 
understandings of legitimacy. There are three main schools of legitimacy theories: normative 
legitimacy, empirical legitimacy and critical legitimacy. 
 
3.2.1 Three Schools of Legitimacy 
 . . . . Normative Theorists’ Approaches 
Normativists approach legitimacy from a philosophical perspective. The normative 
legitimacy of an institution or a regime is measured by a set of right and just standards. In 
other words, a regime is legitimate if it meets those standards. The moral justification of 
political authority is an essential element of political legitimacy; however, a potential problem 
with this approach is that it is hard to define what is just and right. As societies have different 
cultures, they therefore have different values. Liberal democracy, freedom, and human rights 
that developed from Western countries are limited in their ability to measure legitimacy in 
China – which has different normative values, as I will address below. 
Moreover, a set of eternal, universal values is almost unrealistic. Values and moral 
standards are dynamic rather than static. The ancient normative values, such as the divine 
right of kings, have now been replaced by democracy, human rights and freedom. Social 
values and norms are changing with time, and so are normative standards. The normative 
approach of legitimacy can be divided into three in terms of time periods: classical 
normativists, modern normativists, and contemporary normativists.  
 
3.2.1.1.1 Classical Normativists 
In Europe, studies of political legitimacy can be found as early as in Ancient Greek 
times. According to Habermas (1991:181): “problems of legitimacy are not a specialty of 
modern times. The formulas of legitimum imperium or legitimum dominium were widespread 
in Rome and in the European Middles Ages. Political theories occupied themselves with the 
issue of the rise and fall of legitimate domination, in Europe at the latest since Aristotle, if not 
since  olon”. 
Classical normativists are the earliest thinkers in the field of legitimacy. Classical Greek 
philosophers, including Plato (Plato, 2000) and Aristotle (Aristotle, 2000), were interested in 
searching for a set of eternal standards – particularly justice and virtues – and using them as 
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criteria to measure the legitimacy of political regimes. In ancient times, the justification of 
legitimacy was always associated with divine power. For example, the divine right of kings 
represent the foundation of legitimacy in ancient Western states.  
 
3.2.1.1.2 Modern and Contemporary Normativists 
The rise of modern normativists was perhaps associated with people’s declining belief 
in theocracy. Modern normativists gradually replaced old standards with new ones – the rule 
of law, democracy, and freedom. For example, The Social Contract of Jean Jacques Rousseau, 
who is one of the most famous modern normativists, reshaped the relationship between the 
citizens and the state (Rousseau, 2008). Building on the thoughts of those who previously 
studied the social contract, John Rawls (1971; 1993), one of the most famous contemporary 
normativists, proposes modernized values to measure legitimacy. In A Theory of Justice, for 
example, Rawls (1971) argues that there are two principles of justice:  
“First: each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty 
compatible with a similar liberty for others. Second: social and economic inequalities 
are to be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone's 
advantage  and  b) attached to positions and offices open to all.”   
These principles of justice tend to be so utopian that they are almost impossible to practice. 
Contemporary political philosophers are debating the relationship between democracy 
and political legitimacy. On the one hand, many considers democracy necessary for political 
legitimacy (Buchanan, 2002). Pure proceduralism holds that the legitimacy of democratic 
outcomes simply depends on the fairness of the democratic procedures rather than on the 
quality of such an outcome (Manin, 1987; May, 1952). In this sense, only democratic regimes 
are legitimate. Rational proceduralism contends that both the fairness of the democratic 
procedures and the quality of the democratic outcome are important (Pettit, 2001; Pettit, 
2003). On the other hand, some proponents of democratic instrumentalism argue that the 
quality of the democratic outcome is key to deciding whether democracy is necessary for 
legitimacy (Raz, 1995). In this sense, legitimacy does not necessarily need democracy if 
democracy does not produce a better outcome.  
The above debate emphasizes the quality of the democratic outcome and the fairness of 
the democratic procedures; however, the factors of historical traditions and political culture 
also matters. As Peter Burnell (2006:560) argues,  
“The absence of a democratic culture among the mass of society might not prevent 
autocratic opening by a regime  but it would certainly obstruct democratisation’s 
progress further on… an absence of liberal democratic convictions among both elite and 
mass looks very unpromising indeed, even if outside actors do tilt the incentive 
structure in favour of making some limited opening.” 
In the case of China, insufficient liberal democratic procedures have not prevented the 
authoritarian regime from receiving strong popular support. As the Introduction Chapter 
mentioned, various studies find that the CCP enjoys strong legitimacy. As China has different 
historical-cultural traditions, it has different legitimacy philosophies, as I will discuss below. 
Thus, using Western philosophies of legitimacy – such as democracy and human rights – to 
measure the normative legitimacy of the Chinese regimes, may meet with some problems. 
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 . . . . Empirical Theorists’ Approach 
Popular support plays a key role in the legitimacy of a regime; thus, unlike the 
normative approach that emphasizes normative values, the approach of empirical theorists 
focuses on empirical elements. This approach argues that the political legitimacy of an 
institution or a regime should be measured from the perceptions of its people. The most 
influential work of this approach is Max Weber’s classification of legitimacy. Weber’s 
formulation inspired many studies on legitimacy and is still one of the most influential works 
in political studies. Thus  some argue that Weber’s formulation “has the same status in social 
science that an older Trinity has in Christian theology” (Cited from White 1986). 
According to Weber (1968), a state is based on three aspects of legitimacy: traditional, 
charismatic, and rational-legal legitimacy. The traditional form of legitimacy rests on “an 
established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of the status of 
those exercising authority under them” (Weber, 1968). The traditional belief of the divine 
king is an example. The charismatic form of legitimacy rests on “devotion to the specific and 
exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person, and of the 
normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him” (Weber, 1968). It is relevant to 
those revolutionary or religious leaders, such as Lenin and Mao Zedong. The rational-legal 
form of legitimacy rests on a belief in the “legality of patterns of normative rules and the right 
of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands” (Weber, 1968). 
Democratic countries are most relevant to this form of legitimacy. Modern states are based on 
different combinations of the above forms of legitimacy. 
Notably, these three types of legitimacy are inter-related. Charismatic legitimacy might 
be a both a cause and consequence of traditional legitimacy. For example, the successor of a 
charismatic leader might acquire some charismatic legitimacy from the predecessor if they 
have a very close relationship – kin in particular. The long-existing ruling may become 
routine, and thus enhance traditional legitimacy. In ancient societies, traditions might 
generate charismatic legitimacy by idealizing and deifying the rulers. For example, in ancient 
China, the emperors declare themselves to be the sons of Heaven. In the long run, the belief 
that the emperor is the son of Heaven becomes a holy tradition, and thus generates traditional 
legitimacy for the empire. The new successor will gain charismatic power because he “is” the 
son of Heaven according to the holy tradition. In modern democratic countries, elections and 
democracy can form some kinds of traditions, and thus generate traditional legitimacy for the 
regime and newly elected leaders. 
Yet  Weber’s formulation work has also been widely criticized. According to Beetham 
(1991:8)  “the whole Weberian theory of legitimacy has to be left behind as one of the 
blindest of blind alleys in the history of social science.” Weber’s work on legitimacy has 
several flaws. First, it ignores the moral basis of legitimacy (Gilley, 2009). The empirical 
legitimacy approach emphasized whether people obey the rules of the regime, but paid 
insufficient attention to whether this regime is moral or not. Second, Weber emphasized the 
relationship between the leaders and their subordinates, but the relationship between the 
leaders/their subordinates and the ordinary people is much less examined (Pakulski, 1986). 
Third, claiming legitimacy does not define what legitimacy is, and nor does it equate to 
legitimacy (Gilley, 2009). Weber’s formulation of legitimacy suggests that legitimacy claim 
is equal to legitimacy; however, those claims per se are not a part of legitimacy, nor do they 
define what legitimacy is. Although the state always tends to legitimize itself, people do not 
always believe its claims.  
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Following Weber’s formulation  many political scientists have studied the topic of 
legitimacy further, and this topic has gradually become a core concept of political science. 
For example, Linz (1988) argues that legitimacy refers to “the belief that in spite of 
shortcomings and failures, the existing political institutions are better than others that might 
be established and therefore can demand obedience.”  ipset (1981) argues that legitimacy 
“involves the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing 
political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society.”  
 
 . . .  Critical Theorists’ Approach 
As discussed above, the normative school is considered to be flawed for ignoring 
empirical elements, and the empirical school is criticized for its insufficient attention to 
normative values. Habermas attempted to mix those two approaches and reconstructed 
legitimation theories by combining empirical elements and normative values – a school of 
critical legitimacy. Habermas (1991:204) argues that empirical legitimacy “can be employed 
in the social sciences but is unsatisfactory because it abstracts from the systematic weight of 
grounds for validity” and normative legitimacy “would be satisfactory in this regard but is 
untenable because of the metaphysical context in which it is embedded.” Thus  Habermas 
proposed a new concept of legitimation: “reconstructive legitimacy”.  
According to Habermas (1991:178), legitimacy refers to “a political order’s worthiness 
to be recognized.” Although there is much room to argue that this definition can be 
categorized into normative legitimacy, critical legitimacy is different from normative 
legitimacy in some ways. The values and norms of normative legitimacy tend to be eternal, 
ideal, and supernatural; however, those of reconstructive legitimacy are closer to the socio-
cultural circumstances at that time. Yet, as Zhao Dingxin (2009:417) argues, the critical 
legitimacy approach “can be very penetrating. At the same time  such analysis also tends to 
be elitist and arrogant, producing conclusions that are often empiricially unverifiable and in 
some cases naively wrong.” 
 
3.2.2 Western Legitimacy Theories and the Case of China  
After reviewing Western philosophies of legitimacy, this section discusses whether they 
can be used to explain political legitimacy in China.  
 
3.2.2.1 Can the Western Theory of Normative Legitimacy Explain the Case of China?  
 As discussed above, many contemporary political philosophers argue that democracy is 
necessary for legitimacy. In this sense, non-democratic regimes including the authoritarian 
rule in China are illegitimate. Indeed, except a few prominent scholars (e.g. Burnell, 2006; 
Burnell and Schlumberger, 2010), conventional wisdom of Western scholarship argues that 
autocracy is inherently instable and lacks of legitimacy. Fukuyama (1996), for example, 
classified China into the category of low “trust” nations. This view is theoretically and 
empirically flawed. Theoretically, as Sandby-Thomas (2014: footnote 9) argues  “if one 
accepts that all democratic systems are not equally legitimate, then it follows that all non-
democratic systems are not equally illegitimate and so the corollary must be that non-
democratic systems can acquire legitimacy”. Empirically, various survey data including the 
World Value Survey and the Asian Barometer Survey find that the CCP enjoys strong 
political support in China, as mentioned in the Introduction Chapter.  
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 Arguably, the deep-rooted ideological beliefs among many Western scholars are one 
reason for the normative inference that the CCP is “illegitimate”. In the     s  many Western 
scholarly journals refused to recognize the results of those surveys that found that the CCP 
enjoyed strong legitimacy. According to Wang Shaoguang (2010b; 2011a:304), those surveys 
had problems getting published in Western scholarly journals for a while because they 
challenged the popular bias against authoritarian regimes. The journal reviewers frequently 
doubted that political fear in China might lead to inaccurate responses to survey interviewers 
(Wang, 2010b; Wang, 2011a:304). Even now, some are still questioning the validity of 
attitude surveys in China (e.g. Feng, 2013a:10-11; Huang, 2013). However, almost no 
systematic empirical evidence is provided to support their normative understanding about low 
popular support in China. 
 On the contrary, the result of those studies about strong popular support in China 
remain robust, when many methods – such as “external validity of institutional trust 
measurement” and “control for political fear in multivariate analysis” (Yang and Tang, 2013) 
– are used to test their reliability, validity, and replicability (Chu, 2013; Kennedy, 2009; Yang 
and Tang, 2013). In order to address the concerns about politically sensitive questions in 
China  some surveys include “don’t know” answers. Previous literature suggests that if 
respondents want to “conceal” their true views  they will often refuse to answer or choose the 
“don’t know” option (Yang and Tang, 2013:420). However, the nonresponse level of the 
2004 China Values and Ethics Survey is lower than that of major democratic countries (Yang 
and Tang, 2013:420).   
 A core problem with the popular normative bias against the CCP’s strong legitimacy 
may be its insufficient attention to Chinese normative values of legitimacy. Many Western 
scholars tend to use Western normative values to measure political legitimacy in China. If we 
use Western values – democracy, human rights, and freedom – to judge the CCP’s rule  then 
the CCP is no doubt illegitimate. However, political legitimacy is formed by perceptions of 
Chinese people, not the outside world, including the West. As such, whether the CCP is 
legitimate or not should be measured by Chinese normative values (i.e. Chinese ruling 
philosophies). As some argue  “an observer sitting outside the system might find a particular 
arrangement unjust and unacceptable, but they must nevertheless conclude that it is legitimate 
when those governed believe it to be so” (Bradford, et al., 2013). Indeed, China has its own 
ruling philosophies that are distinct from those of the West, as the following section will 
discuss.  
 
3.2.2.1.1 Traditional Chinese Philosophies of Legitimacy: Confucianism, Daoism, and 
Legalism 
 Similar to Western classic philosophers, ancient Chinese thinkers also approach the 
right to rule from a normative perspective; however, their normative values of legitimacy are 
fundamentally different from the Western ones. In order to contrast the fundamental 
difference between Chinese and Western philosophies of legitimacy, it is necessary to review 
the ruling philosophies of ancient China here. The three major ancient Chinese schools of 
thoughts – Confucianism, Daoism, and Legalism – have their own discourses of legitimacy.    
 
3.2.2.1.1.1 Confucianism: Rule by Virtues  
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Confucianism is a developed ruling philosophy and the most influential school of 
thought in ancient China. Tiao dao (also tian ming) and wang dao are two core elements of 
Confucian philosophy. The first element, tiao dao, refers to the Mandate of Heaven. The 
Mandate of Heaven is the symbolic foundation of legitimacy of traditional Chinese dynasties. 
Chinese emperors claimed that their rights to rule were granted by Heaven; thus this 
legitimacy claim is called the Mandate of Heaven. The empire is also called the son of 
Heaven, which deifies the empire and justifies why Heaven grants power to the empire. The 
Mandate of Heaven is complementary with the second element of dao: wang dao. Wang dao 
refers to rule by virtue. A core element of wang dao is using the ruler’s virtues to make 
people obey and follow (yi de fu ren). Virtue here refers to benevolence (ren), and benevolent 
governance is a basic criterion of wang dao. According to Confucianism, a regime is 
legitimate if it practises benevolent governance.  
The Mandate of Heaven remained unchanged until the Shang dynasty was overthrown 
by King Wu of Zhou (zhou wu wang). King Wu of Zhou claimed his predecessor King Zhou 
of Shang (shang zhou wang) failed to practise benevolent governance and thus lost his 
mandate. King Wu of Zhou also claims the legitimacy of this regime change came from his 
benevolence and rule by virtue. In other words, the mandate is not granted forever, and the 
ruler will lose his or her mandate if he or she fails to practise benevolent governance. This 
revised version of the Mandate of Heaven justifies why it was entirely right for King Wu of 
Zhou to rebel and seize power from his predecessor King Zhou of Shang. In short, the 
Mandate of Heaven is a prerequisite for a regime’s rule  and the rule of virtue and benevolent 
governance is a criterion to measure whether a regime is legitimate or not. If a regime fails to 
practice the latter, it will also lose the former.   
Confucianism also argues that rule of virtue is superior to rule by force. It initiates wang 
dao (i.e. rule of virtue) and opposes ba dao. Ba dao refers to rule by force, and its core idea is 
repression. Ba dao is a philosophy that suggests the rulers to use military and state power to 
make people yield and obey. Mencius argued that wang dao and ba dao were different ruling 
philosophies (Feng, 2000).  In Gong Sun Chou I , Mencius (2011) said :  
“He who, using force makes a pretence to benevolence is the leader of the princes. A 
leader of the princes requires a large kingdom. He who, using virtue, practises 
benevolence is the sovereign of the kingdom. To become the sovereign of the kingdom, 
a prince does not have to own a large kingdom. Tang did it with only seventy li (a 
Chinese unit of measuring an area) territory, and king Wen with only a hundred. When 
one by force subdues men, they do not submit to him in heart. They submit, because 
their strength is not adequate to resist. When one subdues men by virtue, in their hearts' 
core they are pleased, and sincerely submit, as was the case with the seventy disciples 
in their submission to Confucius. What is said in the Book of Poetry  ‘From the west, 
from the east, from the south, from the north, nobody wants to resist his ruling ’ is an 
illustration of this”.5  
Mencius’ comparison of wang dao and ba dao above argues that a monarch should implement 
rule of virtue and practise benevolent governance. In short, according to Confucianism, rule 
of virtue that can convince people to obey the rule is much better than rule of force that relies 
on repression.     
                                                            
5 This translation is borrowed from the website http://ctext.org/mengzi/gong-sun-chou-i/zh?en=on  accessed on 
December 1, 2013; some parts of this translation have been revised by the author.  
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 Notably, those traditional philosophies of Confucianism still matter in contemporary 
China. Various studies suggest that the Mandate of Heaven and benevolence still play an 
important role in explaining the CCP’s legitimacy (Guo, 2003; Schneider and Hwang, 2014; 
Tong, 2011; Zhao, 2009; Zhu, 2011). The CCP also attempts to incorporate those traditional 
values into its socialist agenda for legitimizing authoritarian rule. For example, the CCP 
proposed using “rule by virtue” as its governing strategy in 2001, and some party theorists 
also use “the Mandate of Heaven” to justify the CCP’s historical mission  as Chapter 5 will 
discuss.  
 
3.2.2.1.1.2 Daoism: rule by doing nothing against nature (wu wei er zhi)   
Daoism/Taolism considers dao a natural law of Heaven and the Universe. Unlike “rule 
by virtue” of Confucianism   aoism advocates rule by doing nothing against nature. It 
initiates a philosophy of retreat and withdrawal and proposes that people control and reduce 
their appetence/desires. As Lao-Tzu elaborated in Dao De Jing:  
 
“If we stop looking for 'persons of superior morality’ to put in power, there will be no 
more jealousies among the people. If we cease to set store by products that are hard to 
get, there will be no more thieves. If the people never see such things as excite desire, 
their hearts will remain placid and undisturbed. Therefore the Sage rules by emptying 
their hearts, filling their bellies, weakening their intelligence and toughening their 
sinews. Ever striving to make the people knowledgeless and desireless, indeed he sees 
to it that if there be any who have knowledge, they dare not interfere. Yet through his 
actionless activity all things are duly regulated, particularly in the sense of 'having 
ideas of one's own'. ” (Lao 1997: 3)  
In other words, Lao-Tzus suggests that if people are all desireless and knowledgeless, they 
can be governed by actionless activity; in this way, a political order can be easily maintained. 
In short, Daoism advocates a ruling philosophy of retreat.  
 
3.2.2.1.1.3 Legalism: rule by law and governing strategies  
Legalism advocates a ruling philosophy that emphasizes rule by law and shu zhi. Rule 
by law here refers to making and implementing harsh, strict laws to punish and reward 
citizens. Shu zhi refers to using the rulers’ political trickery to govern their subordinates. 
Legalism argues that rule by law and shu zhi are two important strategies for emperors to stay 
in power.  
In sum, the above discussion shows that normative values of Chinese traditional 
philosophies, including Confucianism, Daoism, and Legalism, are fundamentally different 
from Western ones.   
 
3.2.2.1.2. The Distinct Understanding of Democracy in Contemporary China 
The traditional ruling philosophies have substantial impacts on socio-political values in 
contemporary China. Chinese people’s distinct understanding of democracy is an example. 
According to the      Asian Barometer  urvey  76% of respondents agree that “China is a 
full democracy  or a democracy with minor problems” (Wang, 2010e); however, Chinese 
people have very distinct understandings of democracy (Dickson, 2011:214; Shi and Lu, 
2010). Empirical studies find that the Chinese understanding of democracy is built on the idea 
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of “minben” that is very different from liberal traditions of democracy (Shi and Lu, 2010). 
Minben is a traditional Confucian ruling philosophy, and it is still frequently mentioned by 
the CCP leaders. Minben promotes the idea that the government should treat the well-being of 
people as its ruling foundation.  
Although both minben and liberal democracy highly value the significance of 
promoting public welfare, they are different in three important ways (Shi and Lu, 2010). First, 
when assessing regime legitimacy, the doctrine of minben emphasizes government 
performance rather than how the government took power, while liberal democracy heavily 
relies on the procedures of democratic elections (Shi and Lu, 2010). Second, liberal 
democracy often develops various democratic procedures to make the government 
accountable, whilst minben argues that “rulership should be entrusted to a minority of persons 
who are specially qualified to govern by reason of their superior knowledge and virtue” (Shi 
and Lu, 2010:125). Third, the minben doctrine suggests that ordinary people are much less 
capable than their leaders when making decisions (Shi and Lu, 2010). Thus, it argues that 
leaders should make decisions based on their own judgments instead of consulting the 
masses.  
 Above all, China has its own distinct ruling philosophies, and the cultural-historical 
traditions of China play an important role in affecting the CCP’s normative legitimacy. Thus  
Western normative values of legitimacy have many difficulties in measuring the legitimacy of 
the CCP.   
 
3.2.2.2 Can Weber’s  egitimacy Framework Explain the Case of China?  
This section discusses whether Weber’s legitimacy framework can explain the case of 
China. It is necessary to revisit past debates over the legitimacy of communist states here. 
Some scholars endorse Weber’s legitimacy framework to explain the legitimacy of 
communist states. Lane (1984), for example, argues that the legitimacy of the Soviet Union is 
“best characterized in the terms of Weber’s remaining type-traditional authority.” According 
to Lane (1984)  traditional legitimacy is related to the claimed “three holy  oviet traditions  
the revolutionary tradition (the time of the Revolution and Civil War), the patriotic tradition 
(the War period) and the Labour tradition (starting with industrialization in the early 
thirties) ” rather than the Russian tradition. 
On the other hand  many scholars argue that none of Weber’s types of legitimacy 
captures the essence of legitimacy in communist states; and thus they began to look for new 
explanations. Rigby (1982), for example, developed a new type of legitimacy, goal-rational 
legitimacy, to explain the legitimation of the Soviet Union. According to Rigby, a number of 
goals and tasks needed to be undertaken by the Soviet states in order achieve the ultimate 
goal of the communist states: full communism. Thus, the regime could gain legitimacy and 
the compliance of the people through its capacity to achieve those tasks and goals under the 
appeal of communism. In this process, the state sets and transmits targets to people and makes 
announcements about whether targets have been met or not. The state control of information 
is essential in this process of enhancing legitimacy. The regime needs to disseminate the 
information received by people through its control of propaganda and other forms of media. 
In addition to goal-rational legitimacy, socioeconomic performance legitimacy is another 
notable legitimacy formula, as I will discuss below.   
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There is no doubt that the legitimation of the communist states more or less includes 
elements of traditional, charismatic, and rational-legal legitimacy, although academia has 
different understandings of Weber’s framework. In some cases  Weber’s concepts of 
legitimacy are illuminating for understanding the CCP’s legitimacy. For example  Weber’s 
traditional legitimacy provides a good basis for understanding what is referred to in this thesis 
as ideological legitimacy. The term “traditional legitimacy” is particularly helpful in 
explaining the importance of historical-cultural traditions – such as the Chinese philosophy of 
legitimacy including Confucianism, Daoism, and Legalism as discussed above – in 
maintaining political legitimacy. However, traditional legitimacy is only part of the 
ideological basis of legitimacy in China because historical-cultural traditions are only parts of 
the CCP’s ideological discourses. As I will discuss in Chapter 5  in addition to the discourse 
of the uniqueness of Chinese culture and history, the (in)stability discourses and the discourse 
of national condition, for example, also play important roles in legitimating the CCP. In order 
to explain the impacts of ideology on political legitimacy in China, this thesis uses the term 
“ideological legitimacy”  as I will explain below  
As Weber’s formulation encounters many difficulties in explaining the impacts of 
ideological factors and government performance on political legitimacy, a modified 
legitimacy framework is necessary.  
 
3.2.3 A New Legitimacy Framework 
Considering the problems with Weber’s legitimacy framework  Zhao  ingxin (2000; 
2001; 2009; Zhao, 2012) modifies it into ideological legitimacy, performance legitimacy and 
legal-electoral legitimacy. According to Zhao (2009:418), ideological legitimacy refers to the 
fact that “a state’s right to rule is justified by a certain value system in the forms of tradition, 
religion and political philosophy”  performance legitimacy refers to the fact that “a state’s 
right to rule is justified by its economic and/or moral performance and by the state’s 
capability of territorial defence”  and the regime is based on legal-electoral legitimacy “when 
it takes laws as binding principles for all social groups, including the state elites themselves, 
and when top leaders are popularly elected on a regular basis”. Zhao’s classifications of 
legitimacy contain both empirical and normative elements of legitimacy.   
Based on Zhao’s legitimacy framework  this thesis proposes a new framework – 
ideological legitimacy, performance legitimacy, and procedural legitimacy – and redefines 
these terms in order better to explain regime legitimacy in China.  
 
3.2.3.1 Ideological Legitimacy 
As mentioned  ideological legitimacy includes Weber’s notion of traditional legitimacy.  
This thesis also endorses Zhao’s argument that charismatic legitimacy is a type of ideological 
legitimacy. However  Zhao’s definition of ideological legitimacy has two problems. Zhao’s 
definition that “a state’s right to rule is justified by a certain value system in the forms of 
tradition, religion and political philosophy” implies that ideological legitimacy is based on 
certain coherent value systems. As Chapter 5 will show, the ideological legitimacy of the 
CCP is generated by informal ideologies that consist of a set of incoherent and relatively 
fleeting values.  
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Second, as discussed in the Introduction Chapter, ideology is better considered as a 
discourse rather than a belief system. Thus  my thesis redefines the term “ideological 
legitimacy” as a state’s right to rule is justified by certain discourses in the forms of tradition, 
religion and political philosophy. 
 
3.2.3.2 Performance Legitimacy 
Zhao’s definition of performance legitimacy focuses on three narrow dimensions of 
government performance: economic performance, moral performance, and territorial defence. 
It pays insufficient attention to other crucial aspects of performance legitimacy. In the case of 
China, social stability, crisis management, and the provision of public goods are certainly 
important parts of performance legitimacy, as I will discuss below. Thus, my thesis redefines 
the term “performance legitimacy” as a state’s right to rule is justified by its performance of 
all government functions. 
 ome argue that the term “performance legitimacy” is flawed  although it is frequently 
used in academic discussions. Bruce Gilley (2009:5), for example, argues that legitimacy is 
“a particular type of political support that is grounded in common good or shared moral 
evaluation ” and thus the concept “performance legitimacy” is “either oxymoron or 
redundant.” However  this thesis still uses this term  because the alternatives offered are 
worse and this term is particularly useful when explaining China. 
 
3.2.3.3. Procedural Legitimacy  
This thesis replaces Zhao’s “legal-electoral legitimacy” with procedural legitimacy. 
Zhao’s “legal-electoral legitimacy” misguidedly argues that the state is based on procedural 
legitimacy when its “top leaders are popularly elected on a regular basis”. It problematically 
implies that democratic elections are a necessary condition for the state to enjoy legitimacy 
from compliance with the law and procedures. Democratic elections provide procedural 
legitimacy for the political system and leaders; however, it is not a necessary condition for the 
state to be legitimate  as discussed above. My thesis defines the term “procedural legitimacy” 
as a state’s right to rule is justified by its compliance with the law and procedures. 
Notably  the term “procedural legitimacy” is similar to Weber’s “rational-legal 
legitimacy”  and both of them can be used to explain legitimacy generated by the CCP’s 
institutionalization in some ways. However, these two terms are slightly different. As I 
discussed earlier  Weber’s “rational-legal legitimacy” rests on a belief in the “legality of 
patterns of normative rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to 
issue commands”. This concept includes the elements of “normative rules”  however  
“procedural legitimacy” purely refers to procedures and laws. In this thesis, the impacts of 
normative rules on legitimacy are considered as a kind of ideological legitimacy.  
 
 
3.3 Legitimacy Sources in Contemporary China 
 After examining concepts and theories of legitimacy, this section reviews the English 
language literature on the subject of regime legitimacy in China, including the performance 
legitimacy approach (economic performance, stability, the provision of public goods, and 
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crisis management), nationalism, cultural-historical traditions, and institutional change. As it 
will show, ideological factors play a crucial role in all those aspects.  
 
3.3.1 Performance Legitimacy Approach 
In the English language literature, performance legitimacy is the mainstream approach 
to explain legitimacy in China. It enlightens our understanding of legitimacy in non-
democratic countries and explains the existence and collapse of most communist states. With 
the declining influence of communist ideology and inadequate procedural legitimacy in 
China, many argue that popular legitimacy in China primarily (if not solely) relies on 
government performance (Dickson, 2011; Ho      :      alibert  and  anteigne      b  
Roskin, 2009:426; Zhao, 2009; Yang and Zhao, 2014). The following section reviews the 
major dimensions of performance legitimacy and its limits. As it shows, the exclusion of 
ideological factors is a major problem with this approach, which is why this thesis will revisit 
the issue of ideology in contemporary China.  
 
3.3.1.1 Economic Performance 
Economic performance is a principal element of performance legitimacy. The rapid 
economic growth is widely considered by Western scholars as a principal (if not the sole) 
pillar of the foundation of legitimacy in contemporary China   rugman         alibert  and 
Lanteigne, 2008b; Perry, 2008; Shambaugh, 2001; Wang, 2005a; Wang, 2005b; Zhao, 2009). 
For example, as quoted at the beginning of this Chapter,  alibert  and  anteigne (2008b:5) 
argue that “everyone agrees that economic performance represents the foundation of the 
CCP’s continued ability to assert its authority.” These kinds of arguments can be 
characterised as belonging to the socioeconomic performance legitimacy approach that 
originated from early communist studies.     
As mentioned earlier  many argue that Weber’s formulation of legitimacy cannot 
explain the essence of legitimacy of communist states and thus turned to a new approach: 
socioeconomic performance legitimacy. This approach argues that socioeconomic 
performance is the foundation of legitimacy in communist states  Feh r, et al., 1983; Kusin, 
1978; Lowenthal, 1976). The legitimacy claims of communist regimes rest on the state’s role 
of providing socioeconomic benefits to people. It is argued that the communist regimes 
provided a package of welfare benefits – such as education, health care, and rising living 
standards – to their citizens, while strictly controlling civil liberties – such as freedom of 
speech. This is often described as a “social contract”  Feh r, et al., 1983; Kusin, 1978), 
suggesting people’s primacy of socioeconomic over political rights. 
This approach also pointed out that no regime can “guarantee a continuously successful 
performance”(Lowenthal, 1976). For example, Lowenthal (1976) argues that the mechanism 
of using good performance to acquire legitimacy in communist states is not sustainable in the 
long run, and the regime will fall if they fail to transform into a pluralistic democracy. 
 imilarly  many predict that the slowing down of China’s economy will bring a major 
legitimacy crisis to the CCP if it fails to establish enduring legitimacy sources, such as 
Weber’s rational-legal legitimacy (Zhao, 2009). The logic of this view is that, in democratic 
countries, poor government performance will reduce the legitimacy of the rulers and thus 
might lead to the alternation of government, but the legitimacy of the democratic systems is 
maintained. However, the legitimacy of rulers and system are binding in the authoritarian 
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regime, so poor performance will not only reduce the legitimacy of the rulers but also the 
entire political system.  
Even if the government continually performs well  people’s rising expectations will 
undermine the impacts of performances on legitimacy. Thus, as Peter Burnell (2006:556) 
elaborates 
“Autocracies that draw heavily on performance legitimacy seem exceptionally 
vulnerable to whatever reduces their ability to meet people’s needs  wants and 
expectations. Perhaps more telling still, they are vulnerable to whatever causes society 
to believe that the regime cannot or soon will prove unable to meet people’s needs  
wants, and aspirations.”  
Similarly, many China scholars argue that performance legitimacy is very fragile and 
unsustainable in the long term because of people’s rising expectations and unsustainable 
growth (Wang, 2005a; Zhao, 2009; Zhao, 1997; Zhu, 2011; Lü, 2014; Yang and Zhao, 2014).  
Moreover, socioeconomic modernization promoted by economic growth will bring a 
series of value shifts, which will challenge the authoritarian regime in the long run. For 
example  the “critical citizens” theory argues that social and economic development will 
cultivate a new political culture, which is related to decreased public support for the 
government (Inglehart, 1990; Norris, 1999). Inglehart’s studies on self-expression values also 
find that socioeconomic development in the long run will lead to increased demands for 
political participation and civil liberties (Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart and Baker, 2000), and the 
same pattern of self-expression values in China was found by Wang and Tan (2006). It is 
argued that those value shifts will inevitably trigger a quest for democracy in the long term.  
As Huntington concludes (1993:46), whether authoritarian regimes do or not deliver 
their promises of the “social contract”  their legitimacy would be undermined. Huntington 
termed the problems of those efforts to rest legitimacy on performance as “performance 
dilemma” (1993:46) and the “king’s dilemma” (1968). The term  “performance dilemma”  is 
translated as “zhengji kunju” in Chinese and imported into the Chinese discourse of 
legitimacy (Long and Wang, 2005). As I will discuss in the next chapter, 21% of Chinese 
intellectuals argue that China is or will soon be facing “performance dilemma”.  
 imilarly to the view on “performance dilemma”  James  avies’ (1962:5) “J curve” 
theory of revolution also suggests that performance-based legitimacy is fragile. This theory 
argues that “revolutions are most likely to occur when a prolonged period of objective 
economic and social development is followed by a short period of sharp reversal. People then 
subjectively fear that ground gained with great effort will be quite lost; their mood becomes 
revolutionary.” In other words  the CCP’s rule is highly likely to be overthrown by 
revolutions once China’s economic growth cannot meet people’s rising expectations.   
Moreover, as mentioned in the Introduction Chapter, there is no empirical evidence to 
prove that the CCP’s legitimacy solely relied on economic success. Arguably, there are two 
major problems in the relevant literature: the exclusion of ideological factors and the narrow 
focus of government performance.  
  
3.3.1.2 Why Do Ideological Factors Matters?  
The major problem with the socioeconomic performance approach lies in its exclusion 
of ideological factors, which led to many problematic arguments and predictions. The 
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performance legitimacy approach implies a problematic relationship between economy and 
politics (White, 1986). The argument – that legitimacy of the CCP primarily relies on 
economic performance – implies that economic crisis or the slowdown of economic growth 
would lead to some kinds of legitimacy crises or big disasters in China. This is also explicitly 
warned by many who argues that economic deterioration will unavoidably lead to political 
crisis (Krugman, 2013; Zhao, 2009). This kind of arguments implies that economic factors 
are the independent or dominant variables and political factors are subordinate or dependent 
variables. It is flawed to contend that the regime is helpless in an economic crisis. This thesis 
endorses White’s assertion     6) on the primacy of politics that proper political actions can 
fill the deficit in legitimacy created by economic difficulties.  
As mentioned in the Introduction Chapter, legitimacy directly comes from neither 
economic crisis nor economic growth per se (Gilley and Holbig, 2010). Ideological factors 
will transform economic performance into people’s subjective perceptions of economic 
performance, and regime legitimacy is based on “those perceptions” rather than economic 
performance per se. As such, an economic crisis is not a direct threat to a regime – its impacts 
on political legitimacy depend on people’s perceptions of the crisis and the regime  thus  how 
the government frames this crisis is crucial (Gilley and Holbig, 2010). In other words, how 
political actors use ideological factors to frame people’s perceptions about the crisis (i.e. 
discourse) is key to deciding the impact of the crisis on legitimacy.       
Proper political actions and effective crisis management will contribute to minimizing 
legitimacy loss or even sometimes enhance legitimacy. As I will discuss below, there is much 
room to manipulate people’s dependency on the government and its irreplaceable role during 
a crisis. This is especially true in China where people’s dependency on the government is 
more obvious because of historical traditions (Tong, 2011). The CCP has abundant 
experience and the capability to market its authoritarian rule through information control and 
powerful propaganda campaigns. In the 2008 financial crisis, for example, the Chinese 
government actually won, rather than lost, legitimacy credits, as mentioned in the 
Introduction Chapter. The regime strategically manipulated this crisis as an opportunity to 
achieve its political purposes including the promotion of Scientific Outlook of Development 
(Holbig, 2011). The Chinese media highlighted the good performance in coping with the 
financial crisis domestically in contrast with the disaster that this crisis caused in other 
countries, and they also made efforts to project international recognition on to China’s crisis 
management. By using those propaganda strategies, the CCP successfully transformed its 
performance during this crisis into positive perceptions, thus legitimacy (Holbig, 2011).  
If economic crisis is not a direct threat to legitimacy, then by the same logic, economic 
growth should not be considered as a direct source of legitimacy. If we consider economic 
growth as a direct source of legitimacy, then rapid economic growth will definitely lead to 
strong popular support. However, if this growth creates a widening gap between the poor and 
the rich, and the majority of the population fails to benefit from this growth, this growth may 
even undermine popular support. This is why many societies such as Hong Kong still have 
high levels of discontent during the rapid economic growth period.  
Indeed, economic growth might cause many threats to regime legitimacy. In China, 
various socioeconomic problems caused by rapid economic growth have posed an 
unprecedented challenge to the CCP’s rule. As the next chapter will reveal, the most 
perceived threats to the CCP’s legitimacy – socioeconomic equality, changing values, and 
corruption – by Chinese intellectuals are all problems caused by economic growth.  
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Thus, it is perhaps better to understand economic growth as an indirect source of 
legitimacy. Economic growth needs to be transformed by (a) the provision of public goods in 
particular public welfare and (b) ideological discourses in conductive ways into public 
support. In other words, the impact of economic growth on popular support comes from 
whether the regime actually delivers material benefits to people and whether the society 
considers the regime to be capable of promoting economic growth.  
As I will discuss below, rapid economic growth will lead to strong popular support only 
when it is transformed into material economic benefits to the people. In addition to material 
benefits, ideology also plays a crucial role in transforming economic growth into legitimacy 
because it will frame people’s subjective perceptions about rapid economic growth. As I will 
discuss in Chapter 6, the impact of ideology on legitimacy partly comes from whether 
Chinese people believe the CCP’s discourse that the current one-party system is more capable 
of promoting economic growth than a liberal democratic system is.  
 imilarly  people’s negative perceptions on economic growth will undermine the 
positive impacts of economic success on popular support.  Environmental pollution is another 
notable example. In recent years  people’s concern about the potential pollution caused by 
some business projects has led to many local popular protests in China. Those protests have 
shaken social stability and thus delegitimized the regime. As mentioned in the Introduction 
Chapter, Beijing’s fog haze has made Chinese people seriously concerned about the negative 
effects of rapid economic growth. This negative perception of economic growth has 
undermined the positive impacts of economic success on popular support. This again suggests 
that ideology is crucial in influencing people’s perceptions of economic growth and thus 
legitimacy.   
In short, ideology matters – it does not only play a role in generating ideological 
legitimacy but also in affecting the impact of government performance on regime legitimacy.  
 
3.3.1.3. Redefine Performance Legitimacy  
Another problem in the literature of Chinese politics is the narrow focus on government 
performance – many scholars concentrate on very few (if not solely economic) aspects of 
government performance. For example, as mentioned, Zhao’s definition of performance 
legitimacy only focuses on the elements of the economy, morality, and nationalism. This kind 
of understanding misguidedly implies that the functions of government are separate 
and independent. Indeed, most functions of government are indispensable and inter-related. 
Economic performance, for instance, is based on a stable social order. Without a stable social 
order, economic prosperity cannot be achieved. As discussed in Chapter 2, mass campaigns 
such as the Cultural Revolution did not only undermine social stability but also lead to the 
stagnation of the Chinese economy. In this sense, a stable social order is a prerequisite for 
economic growth.  
Moreover, economic performance needs to be transformed by other aspects of 
government performance in order to gain legitimacy. The public provision of welfare, for 
instance, is an important channel through which to transform economic growth into material 
benefit to citizens. Without an effective provision system of public goods, economic growth 
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will not lead to popular support because the poor cannot share the benefits of economic 
prosperity. As the next chapter will discuss, some studies conducted by Chinese intellectuals 
suggest that the public provision of welfare has replaced economic growth to become the 
most important source of legitimacy. As such, the narrow focus of performance legitimacy on 
very few aspects of government performance is misguided. Thus, this thesis redefines 
performance legitimacy  as a state’s right to rule is justified by its performance of all 
government functions, as discussed above.  
The following section will examine several critical aspects of government performance, 
including social stability, provision of welfare, crisis management and moral performance. As 
we shall see, ideology plays a crucial role in all those aspects. 
  
3.3.1.3.1. Stability: External Stability and Internal Stability of the CCP 
 Unlike those who emphasize economic performance, some also consider stability 
important to the CCP’s legitimacy  Breslin         ickson         alibert  and  anteigne  
2008a; Shue, 2004; Sandby-Thomas, 2011; Sandby-Thomas, 2014). Shue (2004), for 
example  argues that the CCP “stakes” its legitimacy on its capability to maintain social 
stability. Some also argue that the central state rather than local government is a principal 
provider of social stability (Shue, 2004; Yu and Chen, 2012). Shue (2004), for example, 
argues that local governments are responsible for promoting economic growth, and the 
primary task of the central state in China is to maintain social stability.   
 In the literature on the subject of stability and legitimacy in China, there are two major 
problems. First, the existing literature in general does not pay sufficient attention to the 
interaction between social stability and ideology, although some address this issue, as Chapter 
5 will discuss. Popular beliefs about the CCP’s one-party rule play a role in affecting the 
social order in China. As Chapter 5 will discuss, the CCP’s (in)stability discourses have 
helped to enhance people’s compliance with the current social order by exploiting the 
people’s concern about instability.  
 Second, not only social stability but also political stability within the CCP is important 
to legitimacy. The existing studies usually use stability to refer to social stability – an 
unwritten “social contract” between the party and the society. According to this contract  the 
party delivers material benefits to the citizens as a trade-off for their compliance with the 
existing social order. In China  it is called “use the money to buy stability”  which suggests 
that economic success will generate social stability.
6
 As discussed, social stability is crucial, 
because it is a prerequisite for other aspects of government performance such as economic 
growth. However  the word “stability” emphasized by party leaders represents a much 
broader spectrum – it also includes the political stability of the regime. For example, 
“stability and unity” stressed by Mao in   75 mainly pointed to the unity of the CCP leaders 
(Mao, 1996).  In this thesis  “stability” not only refers to social stability (i.e. external stability 
of the regime) but also to political stability among ruling elites (i.e. internal stability).  
 The vitality of the authoritarian political system lies in the strength of the ruling party, 
and in China, the CCP is a core of the political system. Taking a step back, political stability 
                                                            
6 This is valid to a certain point; however, economic growth does not guarantee social stability. Indeed, many 
local popular protests in China are led by problems of economic growth – the grievances of social inequality 
created by the unequal distribution of economic benefits  people’s dissatisfaction with the local economic 
policies  and people’s concerns about environmental pollution  as mentioned above. 
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among ruling elites is the key prerequisite for the party to use its full power. As Chapter 2 
discussed, the inability of the CCP to quell the protest of 1989 was largely owing to the 
divisions among ruling elites. In this sense  the party’s ruling capability to maintain social 
stability is actually built on the internal stability of the party first. In other words, without the 
internal stability of the CCP, there is no external stability of the party, as the CCP is unable to 
quell social unrest and protect the personal safety of the masses. In this sense, the internal 
stability of the CCP is a prerequisite of the CCP’s ruling capacity to maintain legitimacy by 
maintaining social stability, promoting economic growth, and defending the national interests 
of China.  
 
3.3.1.3.2. Provision of Public Goods   
The provision of public goods is another important dimension of performance 
legitimacy. As mentioned, rapid economic growth will lead to popular support only when it is 
transformed into material economic benefits to the people. A strong economy is the necessary 
condition to enable the state to deliver material resources. As the distribution of economic 
benefits is very unequal in China, improving the public goods provision system is quite 
important to maintaining the CCP’s legitimacy. Currently, China still lacks a well-developed 
public welfare system that is able to deliver sufficient material benefits to the majority of the 
society. This is one of the reasons why Chinese intellectuals are so pessimistic about the 
impact of rapid economic growth on legitimacy, as I will discuss in Chapter 4. With its 
increasing concerns over social inequality, the CCP has gradually shifted its growth model 
from efficiency-oriented towards a more equal position between equity and efficiency under 
the ideological guidance of Scientific Outlook of Development and Harmonious Society, as 
Chapter 5 will discuss.  
As Chapter 4 will discuss, some Chinese intellectuals argue that the public provision of 
welfare has replaced economic growth to become the most important source of legitimacy in 
China nowadays (Ma and Wang, 2012). For example, based on their survey, Meng and Yang 
(2012) argue that economic growth is not helpful to win popular support any longer; however, 
to improve the performance of public service is still effective in generating legitimacy. 
Another study also finds that the public provision of welfare is the key to enhancing the 
legitimacy of Chinese local governments (Ma and Wang, 2012). 
The theoretical origin of the above views can be traced back to the aforementioned 
studies of communist regimes. The theory of the social contract suggests that communist 
states provided a package of welfare benefits while strictly controlling civil liberties (Kusin, 
1978). In this contract, the provision of welfare acts as an intermediary to complete this deal 
by transforming economic growth into actual material benefit and delivering to the people. 
Notably  this “social contract” is based on the assumption that human are completely rational. 
The trade between civil rights and economic benefit in this contract indicates a rational 
calculation and implies that the relationship between society and the state is based on pure 
interest (Tong, 2011).   
Yet, humans are often subjective. Under the influence of propaganda and ideology, 
people might support their leaders at the expense of their own well-being. For example, after 
the three-year famine starting in 1959, many Chinese people still firmly trusted the CCP and 
Mao Zedong, although some began to doubt the policies. On the one hand, it was because the 
control of information helped the government to hide the actual loss, and thus most Chinese 
people only knew about the tragedies that happened around them. On the other hand, official 
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propaganda combined with strong communist beliefs managed to convince many people that 
sufferings were the necessary cost of achieving full communism. In this way, the regime 
stayed in power even it failed to deliver material benefits. Therefore, ideological factors again 
play an important role in affecting the impact of public goods on legitimacy. 
  
3.3.1.3.3. Crisis Management 
Crisis management is also an important part of government performance in China. The 
control of information and the authoritarian system’s mobilization capability allow the regime 
to manipulate crises. The literal meaning of the term – crisis (weiji) – in Chinese refers to 
danger and opportunity, which implies that a crisis is also an opportunity. It is particularly 
true for the CCP’s crisis management strategies. The CCP’s overwhelming capability of 
mobilization and powerful propaganda make it capable of transforming a crisis into an 
opportunity to win popular support. As Xiao Yuefan (2013: 8) argues  “the CCP has managed 
to sustain its political hegemony to date through the manipulation of these major crises and 
through the maximum tinkering with the current political system it reigns over.”  
As discussed above, in facing the 2008 financial crisis, the CCP managed to win 
popular support through its strategic official propaganda. In the case of the Wenchuan 
earthquake in 2008, the CCP also managed to gain legitimacy (Schneider and Hwang, 2014; 
Wang, 2012a; Xiao 2013). After the earthquake, the CCP launched a series of relief, 
reconstruction, and propaganda campaigns to highlight their effective disaster management. 
A relevant study finds that, in the month after the earthquake, 53% of the news in the 
People’s Daily was about this earthquake (Wang, 2012a). 37.7% of those news stories 
reported activities of the central leaders, party and state institutions, military soldiers and 
officers, and CCP members (Wang, 2012a). In particular, 21.6% of those reports portrayed a 
positive image of the role of central leaders in the earthquake reconstruction. Thus, this study 
concludes that the CCP used all possible occasions to enhance its legitimacy through 
powerful propaganda.  
Another study finds that the governments’ disaster relief and post-disaster 
reconstruction after the Wenchuan earthquake led to an interesting double-track effect on 
political legitimacy – the legitimacy of the central government increased, whilst the 
legitimacy of the local government decreased (Chen, 2012). On the one hand, official 
propaganda managed to enhance the legitimacy of the central government after the 
earthquake. The relevant news stories focused on reporting the central government’s 
emphasis on people’s livelihoods  equality  hope  and the leaders’ charisma. The Chinese 
government also used the earthquake reconstruction as a marketing opportunity to build a 
positive national image and increase China’s soft power. The CCP spent a great amount of 
human capital and energy reconstructing Wenchuan after the earthquake. In the end, 
Wenchuan recovered from this magnitude-8 earthquake within three years; after 
reconstruction, its various material conditions – such as its infrastructure and cities’ 
appearance – are over twenty years more advanced than they were before.  
On the other hand, Chen’s study finds that the political legitimacy of local government 
somehow decreased. Chen suggests that the efforts of local government were hidden and 
ignored in the propaganda, but the flaws in their governance were magnified because people 
could observe the activities of local governments. In other words, the propaganda campaign is 
a key factor leading to the double-track effect on political legitimacy, which again suggests 
that ideological factors matter.   
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In addition to the 2008 financial crisis and the Wenchuan earthquake, a similar 
manipulation strategy was also used in managing the crisis of the 2003 SARS epidemic, the 
Sanlu milk scandal, and the 2011 Wenzhou train collision (Xiao 2013).  
  
3.3.1.3.4. Moral Performance  
 Moral performance is another important aspect of performance legitimacy. Corruption 
is a principal problem which undermines the CCP’s moral performance. As Chapter 4 will 
explain, corruption has been considered by Chinese intellectuals as one of the biggest threats 
to political legitimacy. The CCP has taken great efforts not only to strengthen anti-corruption 
institutions but also reform ideology for rebuilding the moral basis of legitimacy. For 
example  Jiang Zemin’s ideological formula Three Represents aimed to urge the CCP to 
maintain its advanced nature – especially probity, as Chapter 5 will discuss,  
 The lifestyles of party cadres are another problem. The CCP is concerned that the 
extravagant lifestyle of party members would not only undermine its strength but also its 
popular support. A serious charge against Bo Xilai was his immoral life style as a CCP 
leader, such as inappropriate sexual relationships with many women. In order to improve the 
CCP’s moral performance  Chinese leaders attach importance to traditional cultural values 
such as “virtues”. For example  “rule of virtue” is incorporated by the CCP as a ruling 
strategy, as Chapter 5 will discuss. Thus, ideological factors are used by the CCP as attempts 
to improve its moral performance.  
 In sum, the above section examines the performance legitimacy approach that is a 
mainstream approach to explaining regime legitimacy in China. The above discussion shows 
that ideological factors play a crucial role in affecting people’s perceptions of almost every 
aspect of government performance.    
 
3.3.2. Cultural-historical Traditions Approach 
Instead of underscoring the economic component, the cultural-historical traditions 
approach highlights the importance of Chinese cultural, historical and political traditions. It 
adopts an interpretive approach to search for explanations of political legitimacy in 
contemporary China from the past, especially cultural-historical traditions. Nowadays, China 
scholars have been increasingly focusing on the search for Chinese philosophies to underpin a 
new polity (Guo, 2003; Shue, 2002; Shue, 2004; Tong, 2011; Zhao, 2009). For example, 
some argue that Chinese cultural-historical traditions are the foundation of the CCP’s 
legitimacy in contemporary China (Tong, 2011). The cultural traditions and historical 
experience of Chinese society underlined by this approach develops our understanding of 
legitimacy in China. Moral values, in particular, help to understand why Chinese leaders and 
intellectuals are highly concerned about rampant corruptions. 
The importance of cultural-historical traditions is clearly evidenced by various studies 
(e.g. Chu, 2013). For example, the East Asia Barometer Survey finds that fewer respondents 
in all three culturally Chinese societies – Mainland China (67%), Hong Kong (66.8%) and 
Taiwan (59%) – considered democracy suitable, compared with at least 75% of respondents 
in the other East Asian societies  suggesting “the lingering influence of the Chinese culture  
which privilege order and harmony” (Chu, et al., 2008). Shi and Lu (2010) find that Chinese 
understandings of democracy are largely affected by Confucianism, which is very different 
from liberal democracy, as discussed above.   
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Cultural-historical traditions certainly matters in contemporary China, however, 
political culture is dynamic rather than static. During Mao Zedong’s rule  those cultural-
historical traditions were considered feudal dross that needed to be destroyed. In 
contemporary China the CCP has adopted a completely different approach to dealing with 
those traditions – the CCP’s ideology has incorporated various traditional cultural values into 
the socialist agenda for legitimizing its authoritarian rule, as mentioned and as Chapter 5 will 
discuss. The impacts of cultural-historical traditions are certainly different in those two 
periods. As such, how Chinese history is recreated to justify the present and how traditional 
Chinese cultural values are incorporated by the CCP’s ideology are crucial to exploring their 
impacts in contemporary China. 
 
3.3.2.1. Important Work of Cultural-historical Traditions Approach 
As mentioned, China scholars have been increasingly focusing on using Chinese 
philosophies to explain contemporary politics (Guo, 2003; Shue, 2002; Shue, 2004; Tong, 
2011; Zhao, 2009). This section reviews the most notable and latest relevant work on the 
subject.  
 
3.3.2.1.1 Vivienne Shue: truth, benevolence, and glory 
One of the most notable pieces of work on this issue is contributed by Vivienne Shue. 
Shue (2004) argues that the CCP’s capability to preserve stability – constructed by truth, 
benevolence, and glory – provides the foundation for the regime’s legitimacy in China. Truth 
refers to knowledge of the universe, such as Confucianism and modern scientific rationalism; 
benevolence means the state’s responsibility to ensure and promote popular welfare  such as 
post-disaster reconstruction; and glory is related to the pride in Sinic culture and civilization, 
such as cultural superiority and the vision of a rising China (Shue, 2004). In other words, 
regime legitimacy in China relies on ideological (truth), moral (benevolence), and 
nationalistic (glory) factors instead of primarily economic factors.  
 hue’s study largely advanced the culturalist arguments and inspired many relevant 
studies such as Tong (2011). Considering the significance of  hue’s study  it is worth 
discussing this study in details.  hue’s study provides valuable insights in to understanding 
legitimacy in contemporary China; however, it is vague about the origins of these traditional 
philosophies and based on problematic evidence. Benevolence, for example, is the ruling 
traditional philosophy in ancient China that was promoted by Confucius as early as 156 BC, 
as discussed before.  hue’s article pays insufficient attention to the origins of her concepts, 
which also caused another problem of her article: the validity of her evidence. 
 hue’s arguments about Chinese traditions are based on the evidence of late-imperial 
times – most are from the Qing dynasty. That evidence might not be typical of Chinese 
culture and history because the Qing dynasty had its own ruling philosophy, which was less 
influenced by Confucianism. The Qing dynasty was the last dynasty in China’s 5     year’ 
feudal history and it was founded by Manchus. Manchus is an ethnic minority group from 
north-eastern China with its own language and culture, which is different to the majority of 
Chinese people – Han. Although Confucian culture also influenced Manchus to some extent, 
Manchus repressed many Han cultures and forced Han people to adopt many of their 
traditions during the Qing dynasty. Take Queue Order (ti fa ling) as an example. The 
traditional Manchus male had a specific hairstyle called Queue (bian zi), in which they would 
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shave their foreheads and leave a long ponytail. However, hair has a special meaning in Han 
culture, and traditionally cutting hair is taboo to a Han Chinese adult. After the Manchus 
came to power, they commanded all men to adopt their hairstyle in China, which was called 
Queue Order. Many of those who refused to obey were killed. 
The Qing dynasty was also regarded by many Han as an alien regime at that time. Many 
problems with the Qing dynasty were related to ethnic issues – mostly between Han and 
Manchus. This made the Qing dynasty very different from the conventional Chinese 
dynasties. As an ethnic minority regime  many of the Qing dynasty’s policies were designed 
to deal with conflicts of culture and race – mostly between Manchus and Han. Their 
sophisticated system of food supply – an example used by Shue to support her argument – 
could involve some concerns about ethnical issues and the rule of Manchus. Qing’s policy of 
territorial expansion – another example used by Shue – might be problematic to consider as a 
typical glory of Sinic culture and civilization. It might be true that the invasion of the West in 
the late Qing period harmed the national pride of some Chinese including Han; however, it 
might be problematic to assume that Qing’s prosperity would lead to the rise of nationalism 
among Han people, especially in the early and mid of Qing period. 
Moreover, a key reason that Shue (2004) disagrees with performance legitimacy 
approach is that the market power and local governments hold more responsibility for 
economic development in China nowadays. Thus, Shue (2004) argues that the central 
government is “ill positioned to claim direct credit for whatever economic advances are in 
fact taking place”. Although the central government has decentralized economic power to 
lower levels, it still won much credit for economic growth in China. The job of the central 
government is to monitor the Chinese economy at the macro level. For example, if the central 
government did not take the direct credit for overcoming the 2008 financial crisis and 
ensuring China’s G P growth in such a hard time, who should? Although this thesis does not 
consider economic performance to be the sole, let alone source of legitimacy of the CCP, it 
still endorses the importance of economic growth in China. At the very least, sources of 
legitimacy are inter-related, as discussed.  
 
3.3.2.1.2.Tong Yanqi: morality/responsibility-based legitimacy 
Building on  hue’s work  Tong (2011) argues that the legitimacy of the CCP rests on 
the moral bond between state and society. This moral bond is created by three overlapping 
layers: the morality of officials  benevolent governance  and the state’s responsibility for the 
well-being of the people. According to Tong (2011), morality/responsibility-based legitimacy 
is based on a moral commitment and implies a bonded relationship between the society and 
the state; however, performance legitimacy indicates rational calculation and implies the 
relationship between the society and the state based on pure interest.  
  
3.3.2.1.3. Guo Baogang: moral/original and utilitarian justifications 
Guo (2003) argues that moral/original justifications and utilitarian justifications are the 
key components of regime legitimacy in China. Guo (2003) also argues that the legitimacy of 
the CCP is “being seriously challenged” because the transition of the Chinese market 
economy has “redefined the meanings of the century-old cognitive model.” According to 
Guo, moral/original justification includes four Chinese concepts: Mandate of Heaven, rule by 
virtue, minben, and legality; utilitarian justification consists of the Chinese political thought 
of benefiting the people (li min), and equality (jun fu).  
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3.3.2.2. Limits of the Cultural-historical Traditions Approach 
Cultural-historical traditions do matter in contemporary China; however, they also have 
some limits. First of all, political culture is a dynamic rather than a static given, and thus it is 
difficult to use traditional values to explain the present. Although contemporary Chinese 
culture is fundamentally different from Western culture, it is also far different from traditional 
Chinese culture. Political culture is changing, as many studies show (Inglehart, 1990; 
Inglehart, 1997; Norris, 1999). Political values in China have gone through dramatic changes 
with socioeconomic development. 
Nowadays, not only political traditions but the entire Chinese political system have 
been based on modern political products, and Chinese political culture has been moving away 
from – rather than moving toward – the past. In the early twentieth century, the Chinese elites 
intended to reproduce Chinese culture by deliberately destroying many traditional values and 
advocating Western political thought. The May Fourth Movement, for instance, led to a 
nationwide wave of efforts to challenge traditional Chinese values – particularly 
Confucianism – and to promote modern political terms – such as democracy, science, human 
rights and freedom, etc. Those traditional values included the mandate of Heaven, 
benevolence, and benevolent governance, which are highlighted by the cultural-historical 
traditions approach. Leading scholars of modern China, such as Chen Duxiu, Lu Xun, and Hu 
Shi, tended to create a new Chinese culture through the May Fourth movement, and therefore 
this movement was also called the New Culture Movement. It is worth mentioning that this 
movement also contributed to the spread of communism and the establishment of the CCP. 
Later, both the Kuomingdang (KMT) and the CCP continued to break Chinese traditions by 
launching repeated campaigns, such as anti-superstition campaign. 
The current political system in China is established on modern political products – such 
as rule of law and the party system – rather than traditional thoughts. Thus, traditions 
certainly are not the key factors to explain regime legitimacy in contemporary China. Western 
political ideas, such as political accountability and transparency, are gradually taking root in 
Chinese political discourses under globalization, marketization and perhaps democratization. 
Both contemporary Chinese leaders and intellectuals are more and more interested in and 
willing to accept Western norms (Li, 2008b; Weatherley, 2008). For instance, Yu Keping 
(2008), the deputy director of the Central Translation and Compilation Bureau and a 
prominent party intellectual, argues that Western concepts – such as human rights, private 
property, the rule of law, civil society, and political civilization – have now become 
“mainstream” values in China.  ome sensitive topics such as human rights have also received 
increasing attention from Chinese scholars (Weatherley, 2000; Weatherley, 2001; 
Weatherley, 2008). It is notable that the term “legitimacy” itself is a Western political term. It 
translates as “he fa xing” in Chinese, which was only used to refer to a term of law, meaning 
“legality”  before being imported into the discourse of Chinese political science in the     s.   
As political culture is dynamic, a crucial problem with this approach is how the political 
discourse of Confucianism can be incompatible with modern civilization. The relevant studies 
selectively pick certain components of Chinese culture, such as benevolence, to support their 
arguments without mentioning other indivisible components. In fact, many parts of 
Confucianism are incompatible with modern civilization – which is why the Chinese 
discourse of legitimacy is based on Western theories instead of Chinese traditional 
philosophies, as Chapter 4 will discuss.  
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Some Chinese scholars attempt to modernize Confucianism. For example, Kang 
Xiaoguang (2004), a leading Chinese scholar promoting Confucianism, argues that the 
“modern” benevolent governance of Confucianism provides the political legitimacy for the 
CCP. In  ang’s “modern” benevolent governance  the authoritarian regime’s value 
orientation is based on people-oriented principle (min ben zhuyi); its basic responsibility is to 
make civilians rich (fumin) and to teach civilians (jiaomin); its power succession is based on 
an abdication system; and in this system, the social ideal is a stateless world (or great society 
of harmony) (datong shijie). Even though he admits that benevolent governance is ideal, 
Kang insists that it does not necessarily prevent benevolent governance from providing 
legitimacy for the CCP. Kang also suggests that the power succession system of 
Confucianism – the abdication system – can be a good choice for China to solve authoritarian 
problems of power succession. However, even in ancient China, the abdication system is only 
a symbolic deal rather than a practical way of leadership transition, as Chapter 5 will discuss.   
 Moreover, traditional Chinese ruling philosophies approach legitimacy from a 
normative view, and thus they suffer from the problems of normativists. As discussed above, 
a weakness in this normative legitimacy is its ignorance of empirical elements. Chinese 
traditional philosophies’ normative standards, such as the mandate of Heaven and 
benevolence, are the state’s claims to legitimacy – which are not the same as its entire 
foundation of legitimacy. Other aspects of state legitimacy are certainly important. For 
example, the performance of the ancient regime played a crucial role in maintaining 
legitimacy (Zhao, 2009). This is related to the separation of moral performance and moral 
standards, as I will discuss as follows.  
 
3.3.2.3. Separation of Moral Standards and Moral Performance  
Obviously, there are many overlaps between the approaches through cultural-historical 
tradition and through performance legitimacy. Some proponents of performance legitimacy 
also use historical and cultural components of China to support their arguments (e.g. Zhao, 
2009). The moral commitment or responsibility of the government, such as benevolence, is 
closely related to performance. However, these two approaches have different interpretations 
about the relationship between responsibility/morality and the performance of the 
government. It raises an question: should the government’s morality/responsibility include or 
be a part of its performance? The cultural-historical tradition approach argues that 
morality/responsibility includes performance (e.g. Tong, 2011), whilst the performance 
legitimacy approach argues that performance legitimacy includes moral performance (e.g. 
Zhao, 2009). The above cleavage is owing to the confusion between moral standards and 
moral performance. The performance approach ignored the ideological factors of morality 
and the cultural-historical tradition approach neglected the practical aspect of morality.  
Moral standards and moral performance are better understood as two inter-related but 
different things. When it comes to legitimacy, moral standards are about traditional values 
and thus ideological legitimacy; however, moral performance is more about empirical 
performance and thus performance legitimacy. How the CCP should act (i.e. moral standards) 
is not equal to how it actually performs (i.e. moral performance). Moral standards are very 
ideological. In ancient China, Confucianism had been the official ideology of Chinese 
dynasties since the Western Han Dynasty.  Confucianism, in fact, is a sort of moral 
philosophy which justifies the rightness of a state or emperor by a set of standards, such as 
“rule by virtue” and “benevolence”  as discussed above. In this sense  moral standards 
provide a normative foundation for regime legitimacy. Unlike moral standards, moral 
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performance involves more empirical elements. The regime’s actual moral performance will 
be reflected in a part of its performance legitimacy. In modern states, there is always a gap 
between ideal moral standards and actual moral performance, which partly reflects the 
difference between ideology and social reality.  
In China, corruption is actually a governance-based performance failure, whilst 
declining moral standards are a problem of ideology. In this sense, effective anti-corruption is 
a way to strengthen government performance and thus performance legitimacy, and the 
reconstruction of moral standards should be understood as an attempt to enhance ideological 
legitimacy. In this regard, the CCP focuses on two aspects: moral performance and moral 
standards. On the one hand, the CCP has made efforts to make various rules and regulations 
to reduce corruption for its moral performance. On the other hand, it employs ideology to 
improve the ethical requirements of the party cadres. For example, the CCP’s “Eight Dos and 
 on’ts” and the Socialist Concept of Honour and Disgrace are proposed as an important 
dimension of ideological construction of the Socialist Core Values System. 
In sum, traditional Chinese cultural-historical values play a significant role in affecting 
political legitimacy in contemporary China. However, political culture is dynamic rather than 
static. Thus, their impacts on regime legitimacy need to be examined in the framework of 
contemporary ideological discourses.  
  
3.3.3. Nationalism 
In addition to economic growth and social stability emphasized by the performance 
legitimacy approach, nationalism is also widely considered as a crucial source of legitimacy 
in China, as mentioned in the Introduction Chapter (Breslin, 2009; Darr, 2011; Fang, 1997; 
Lam, 2003; Li, 2001b; Lieberthal, 2004:334-335; Lin and Hu, 2003; Ostergaard, 2004; 
Shambaugh, 2001; Zhao, 1998; Zheng, 2004). For example, Zhao Suisheng (1998:297) 
argues:      
“The leadership of the CCP was claimed because of the CCP’s patriotism in China’s 
long struggle for national independence and prosperity not because of its Communist 
ideals. Patriotism rather than communism, thus, became the basis of the CCP’s rule of 
legitimacy.” 
Kenneth Lieberthal also (2004:334-335) argues: 
“By 2020, China may become an authoritarian, one-party system that is closely linked 
to domestic business elites and attempts to keep the lower classes quiescent by 
promoting ardent nationalism .... The most likely way to maintain social peace in a 
system that basically serves the interests of the wealthy political and economic elite is 
to encourage nationalism”.   
There is little doubt that nationalism is an important source of legitimacy in China; 
however, no empirical evidence shows that it is a superior source, as mentioned in the 
Introduction Chapter. Notably  patriotism and nationalism in China are “empirically distinct” 
(Gries, et al., 2011). The official propaganda adopts the word “patriotism” (i.e. love of the 
country) rather than “nationalism” to avoid the negative connotations of nationalism.   
 It is argued that Chinese nationalism has gradually replaced the marginalized 
communist ideals and thus become the new ideological basis of the CCP (Christensen, 1996; 
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Gries and Rosen, 2004; He, 2007; Link, 2008; Metzger and Myers, 1998; Zhao, 1997; Zhao, 
1998; Zhong, 1996). For example, Cabestan (2005) argues that   
“There was first of all the irruption of a state nationalism which some dubbed 
‘nationalism of substitution’  because to a large extent it replaced a communist ideology 
which had shown its futility and above all its inadequacy in the face of the economic 
and social realities which the Communist Party was allowing to take root in China.” 
This view suggests that Chinese nationalism is an ideology. As mentioned in the 
Introduction Chapter, Chinese nationalism is not an ideology because it is not formed by a set 
of coherent values. This thesis considers Chinese nationalism as an informal ideology that 
supplements rather than replaces the CCP’s value system. As Chapter 5 will discuss  the 
CCP’s discourse of national rejuvenation interacts with its (in)stability discourse to suggest 
that the CCP’s one-party rule is for the greater good of China – restoring China to its rightful 
position of pre-eminence.  
Although the significance of nationalism to China’s political development has been 
widely recognized, no consensus on its exact political meanings has been reached yet, as the 
following sections will discuss.  
  
3.3.3.1. The Debate over the Causes of Rising Nationalism in China 
Scholarship offers contrary understandings on the impact of state propaganda on 
nationalism. The mainstream approach – the government manipulation perspective – 
considers the rising Chinese nationalism as a product of state propaganda (e.g. Christensen, 
1996; Gilley and Holbig, 2010; Metzger and Myers, 1998; Zhao, 1997; Zhao, 1998). It is 
argued that the Chinese government has been manipulating nationalism to fill the ideological 
vacuum and re-legitimize the regime by pushing patriotic education campaigns. The political 
manipulation of Chinese history is considered to be an important factor in the rise of 
nationalism. For example, Gilley and Holbig (2010) argue that the CCP embedded national 
myths into the collective memory of Chinese people. Yinan He (2007) argues that the state 
also strategically recreated the official war history to highlight the victimhood of China. In 
addition to manipulating history, some argue that using external threats to unite internal 
society is another strategy of the CCP. Callahan (2005), for example, argues that the CCP and 
public intellectuals have made use of the “anti-China” view  such as the “China Threat 
Theory”  to consolidate the national identity of the Chinese people.  
The CCP definitely plays a role in the rise of Chinese nationalism. As Chapter 5 will 
discuss, the CCP has made great efforts to present a version of history in order to justify the 
present; and it has also used the discourse of national rejuvenation to resist pro-liberal 
democracy values. However, political manipulation is not the only reason for the rising 
nationalism in China. Other factors, such as the impacts of economic success on national 
moods in China, also matter.  
Unlike the mainstream view, some doubt the impact of official propaganda on the rising 
nationalism (Wang, 2004; Zhang, 1997). It is argued that there was no clear relationship 
between rising nationalism and patriotic education campaigns in China. For example, Wang 
(2004) argues that many nationalists – such as well-educated students who can access the 
Internet, scholars, and students who had studied in Western countries – are hardly influenced 
by the CCP’s propaganda. In addition  some argue that official propaganda is not always 
effective. According to Wang (2004) and Rose (2000), the patriotic education campaign in 
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the 1980s and 1990s had a limited influence on nationalism, although the CCP made great 
efforts to promote this campaign. Thus, some did not consider the rise of Chinese nationalism 
as a product of official propaganda. As Zhang Ming (1997:122) argues  the “nationalist wave 
in China is a broad-based public reaction to a series of international events, not a government 
propaganda”. 
It is true that the CCP’s state propaganda has many limits. Indeed  many argue that the 
marketization and the diversification of the media and the development of the Internet would 
definitely undermine the authoritarian rule. However, state propaganda in general has positive 
impacts on the authoritarian rule in China. As evidenced by various empirical studies, the 
CCP’s propaganda helps to generate popular support (Bernstein and Lü, 2000; King, et al., 
2013; Li, 2004b; Stockmann and Gallagher, 2011; Lü, 2014). The above debate on the 
interaction between state propaganda and nationalism is relevant to the following debate 
about different types of nationalism.  
 
3.3.3.2. The Debate over the Interaction between State-lead and Popular Nationalism 
The relevant literature distinguishes between two different but intertwined types of 
Chinese nationalism: state-led/state-centred and popular nationalism (Breslin, 2009; Gries, 
2004; He, 2007; Link, 2008; Seckington, 2005; Wang, 2008; Zhao, 2004), which are inter-
connected mechanisms of top-down and bottom-up mobilization. State-led nationalism refers 
to “a state-sponsored ideology with a set of coherent ideas intended to influence the populace, 
legitimate the authoritarian political system  and provide a theoretical guide to action”  
popular nationalism refers to “a catch-call term for a wide range of popular sentiments that 
lack internal coherence, but share basic assumptions about the hostile nature of the 
international environment and the goal of restoring China to a perceived rightful position of a, 
if not the  global power” (Breslin, 2009). Tang and Darr (2012) find that popular nationalism 
in China is at one of the highest levels in the world.  
State nationalism and popular nationalism interact with each other. However, there is 
some cleavage in terms of the extent of their interactions. On the one hand, some argue that 
the impact of public opinion on the authoritarian system is very limited, and therefore popular 
nationalism is incapable of shaping government policies. Rose (2000), for example, argues 
that the rising nationalism in both China and Japan in the     s and     s “is not necessarily 
translated into an aggressive foreign policy.” On the other hand  some argue that popular 
nationalism plays an important role in affecting China’s foreign policies.  eckington (2005) 
argues that “popular nationalism can be critical of official policy.” Yinan He (2007) argues 
that popular nationalism has tied Beijing’s hand to deal with Japan. According to Yinan He 
(2007), popular nationalism aggravated the bilateral economic friction between Japan and 
China  and student nationalism has directly affected China’s position in negotiating trade 
friction.   
 
3.3.3.3. The Debate over the Impacts of Rising Nationalism on Democratization 
 cholars also have different opinions about the impact of rising nationalism on China’s 
democratic development. Many argue that the rising nationalism in China will inevitably 
harm the development of China’s democracy (Xu, 2001). As Chapter 5 will discuss, the 
CCP’s discourse of national rejuvenation discredits liberal democracy in order to maintain the 
legitimacy of the authoritarian rule in China. The empirical study of Tang and Darr (2012) 
finds that Chinese nationalism shows a strong tendency towards anti-democratic and pro-
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authoritarian values, and concludes that nationalism has a negative effect on the demand for 
liberal political change and democracy. On the contrary, some argue that nationalism 
promotes democracy. Wang Shaoguang (2004), for example, argues that Chinese nationalism 
might positively contribute to democratic development. According to Wang (2004), the 
current Chinese nationalism is “reactive nationalism” – which is “inclusive  passive  
pragmatic  defensive  and moderate”.   
Indeed, the relationship between rising nationalism and democracy has caused a striking 
debate in China’s paper media and on the Internet. Generally speaking, the Liberals tend to 
endorse the first view and express their deep concern about the negative effects of nationalism 
on China’s liberalization. The New  eftists  however  tend to defend the rise of nationalism. 
Their positions are elaborated in one of the most popular books, China Can Say No, that has 
now attracted widely public and academic attention.    
 
3.3.3.4. The Debate over How to Deal with China 
Western scholarship has different views on dealing with China. On the one hand, some 
China observers suggest that Western governments should act more rigorously in supporting 
democracy in China. Link (2008), for example, blames the US government for being too 
weak to support China’s liberal changes. In his words  “the United  tates  which is widely 
viewed in China as the world’s strongest democracy  could do much more good than it is now 
doing by using dignified  clear  and strong public statements.” This view misguidedly implies 
a “saviour” role of the West and a “suffering” China. Although democratic states and 
authoritarian states are very different, we should respect both equally. Otherwise, it might 
easily cause anger of Chinese nationalists because of national memory.  
On the other hand, others argue that the West should not be eager to promote 
democracy in China. For example, Tang and Darr (2012) argue that outside calls for China to 
change will “further fuel nationalism  which ironically serves the CCP by diverting the public 
demand for democratization”.  
Empirical studies find that Chinese nationalism has largely been shaped by historical 
belief (Gries, et al., 2008). In the 19
th
 century, the West colonized many parts of China 
through wars  and this “‘century of humiliation’ is central to Chinese nationalism today” 
(Gries, et al., 2011). Chinese people might interpret the West’s support for separatist 
movements as another attempt to divide China as the West did to their Chinese ancestors in 
the 19
th
 century. In China  nationalists frequently criticize the Chinese government’s position 
as too weak to confront the diplomatic disputes. They request much tougher actions than 
Beijing may be willing to take. Thus, the Western government should be cautiously to avoid 
the sensitive national zeal.   
 
3.3.3.5. Nationalism: a Double-edged Sword 
How could the CCP benefit from the rising nationalism? As mentioned, some argue that 
nationalism replaced the weakening communist ideology and provided a renewed ideological 
claim for the CCP to influence and guide the populace (He, 2007; Link, 2008; Rose, 2000). 
The legitimacy of the regime is enhanced by turning “support China” into “support the 
Chinese government.” By claiming to be the defender of China’s national interests  the CCP 
won popular support from the Chinese nationalism. Nationalism also serves to draw people’s 
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attention away from popular complaints (Link, 2008) and is used to mobilize Chinese society 
for political purposes. In addition, nationalism sometimes can be used as a diplomatic tactic.  
Yet  nationalism can also easily be out of a government’s control  thus  both Western 
scholars and Chinese intellectuals recognized nationalism as a “double-edged sword”. As 
White (2005:16) points out:  
“The patriotic genie is hard to keep in a bottle. It never completely  but only 
ambiguously  legitimates a regime”.  
As such, nationalism has tied the CCP’s hands on foreign diplomacy.  ometimes  the 
CCP has to play a hard-line foreign policy under the pressure of public opinion, which might 
lead to the deterioration of foreign relations. The events of the anti-Japan protests frequently 
demonstrated that unleashed national sentiments were difficult to contain and put the 
government into a dilemma. To contain nationalism might lead to nationalists’ doubt over the 
CCP’s determination and capability to defend national interests  while to tolerate the fire of 
nationalism would consolidate US-Japan alliance to contain China. In September 2012, one 
month before the once-in-a-decade leadership transition of the CCP  Japan’s nationalization 
of Diaoyu Island once again put the CCP in an awkward position. The CCP needed a stable 
social order to perform a leadership transition smoothly, but the rising national sentiment 
certainly did not allow the government to keep a low profile in this case. 
In addition, this aggressive nationalism might lead to the antipathy of foreign countries 
and violates the official  declared principle of “peaceful development”. An aggressive 
nationalism might hurt foreign relations, which would be very harmful to the Chinese 
economy. Rising nationalism might systematically discourage direct foreign investment and 
the export of China’s products. Moreover  the PRC is a multi-ethnic country with a majority 
of Han and most Chinese culture in general is from Han. The Chinese language is often called 
hanyu in Chinese, which means the language of Han. The Chinese language test is called the 
test of Han language (hanyu shuiping kaoshi). In Taiwan, many called Han language the 
national language (guo yu).  
The rising nationalism might not be appealing to other ethnic minorities and could 
deconstruct their national identity. As Chapter 4 will discuss, some Chinese intellectuals are 
concerned that nationalism might contribute to the rise of separatism in China, because the 
ethnic minorities do not identify with nationalism of Han. In short, nationalism is a double-
edged sword.   
 
3.3.4. Institutional Changes 
Institutional changes are closely related to legitimacy. Legitimacy theories suggest that 
institutional change is both a cause and consequence of legitimacy (Gilley, 2008; White, 
2005). While the mainstream literature focuses on economic, socio-political, and historical 
factors to explain institutional changes, Gilley (2008) develops a legitimacy-based approach 
based on the case of China. Other than a few studies which focus on institutional change 
(Heberer and Schubert, 2006; Heberer and Schubert, 2008; Lee, 2010; Schubert, 2008; 
Schubert, 2014), the general Chinese studies literature still pays insufficient attention to this 
topic, as mentioned in the Introduction Chapter. The issue of institutional change involves 
several debates, as follows.  
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3.3.4.1. The Collapsing China School  
After 1989, many (or the so-called “Collapsing China School”) predicted the downfall 
of the CCP after the failure of the Eastern European communist states and the protests of 
1989 in China. For example, MacFarquhar (1991) argued that the collapse of the CCP would 
come “in the not-too-distant future.” Although most of those predictions were proven wrong, 
this school still has a few loyal supporters nowadays. For example, Gordon G. Chang (2002) 
predicted that the CCP would fall by 2011 in his controversial book, The Coming Collapse of 
China. After this prediction proved to be wrong, Chang (2011) again predicted that “so  yes  
my prediction was wrong. Instead of 2011, the mighty Communist Party of China will fall in 
    . Bet on it.”  
Chang’s updated prediction is based on his pessimistic view about the CCP’s once-in-a-
decade leadership transition in 2012. As Chang (2011) writes:  
 “ o will China collapse? Weak governments can remain in place a long time. Political 
scientists, who like to bring order to the inexplicable, say that a host of factors are 
required for regime collapse and that China is missing the two most important of them: 
a divided government and a strong opposition. At a time when crucial challenges 
mount, the Communist Party is beginning a multi-year political transition and therefore 
ill-prepared for the problems it faces. There are already visible splits among Party 
elites  and the leadership’s sluggish response in recent months – in marked contrast to 
its lightning-fast reaction in 2008 to economic troubles abroad – indicates that the 
decision-making process in Beijing is deteriorating. So, check the box on divided 
government.” 
It is true that for an authoritarian regime, power succession has always led to the 
division among ruling elites and thus the downfall of the regime. Thus, Chang predicted that 
cruel power struggles within the CCP during the power transfer in 2012 would lead to the fall 
of the CCP. However  Chang’s view fails to notice the importance of the CCP’s 
institutionalization. As Chapter 6 will discuss, this institutionalization has managed to 
undermine the negative effects of cruel power struggles and thus maintain regime stability 
during the leadership transition of 2012.  
  
3.3.4.2. The Debate on Authoritarian Resilience 
After misguidedly predicting the CCP’s fall in the early     s  some scholars began to 
reassess the authoritarian system in China – especially its vitality. As mentioned in the 
Introduction Chapter, the term “authoritarian resilience” is pioneered by Andrew Nathan who 
used to belong to the “Collapsing China  chool” after the CCP’s first smooth transition in 
2002.  According to Nathan (2003), authoritarian resilience in China was largely owing to the 
CCP’s institutionalization.  
Afterwards  “authoritarian resilience” received wide-ranging interest among the 
academic community. On the one hand, its proponents argue that institutional change/ 
institutionalization in China explains the resilience of the authoritarian system, which has 
consolidated the CCP’s rule in China (Brown, 2009; Dickson, 2003a; Fewsmith, 2006; 
Heberer and Schubert, 2006; Schubert, 2008; Tsai, 2007; Yang, 2004). In addition to 
institutionalization  the CCP’s adaptive capability is also considered as a reason to explain its 
resilience. Shambaugh (2008a) argues that China has systematically learned from the 
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experiences, including the failure and success of other political systems, in order to reinvent 
itself.  
On the other hand, the opponents of “authoritarian resilience” argue that there is no 
such thing like “authoritarian resilience”  and they contend that the CCP is able to stay in 
power because of its coercive repression and weak democratic awareness. In the same volume 
of Nathan’s “authoritarian resilience” article  Bruce Gilley (2003) argues that the CCP’s 
levels of institutionalization could not sustain its rule, and the CCP stayed in power because 
of the coercive repression and weak civil society in China. Dickson (2003b) argues the CCP 
largely relied on its twin strategies of corporatism and co-optation. 
 The above debate is still on-going; however, its focus seems largely to shift from the 
existence of “authoritarian resilience” to the limits or durability of this “authoritarian 
resilience”. Gilley, a strong opponent of “authoritarian resilience”  began to use the word 
“authoritarian durability” when referring to the CCP’s rule (Gilley and Holbig, 2009:358). Li 
Cheng’s (2012a) recent article argues that the CCP’s resilient authoritarianism might meet an 
end. It, at least, implies that this resilience used to exist.  
  
3.3.4.3. Is There Any Political Reform in China?  
Another relevant debate is whether there were substantial political reforms launched by 
the CCP or not in the past three decades. Conventional wisdom holds that China has gone 
through dramatic socioeconomic transformations, while little progress in political reforms has 
been achieved in the past three decades (Li, 2012c:3). As such, political reform in China has 
been under-researched. Many argue that Chinese leaders know that the party needs political 
reform, but they either are unsure what political reform should be or are nervous about 
moving ahead with it. On the contrary, a few scholars argue that the CCP has made much 
progress in political reforms (Heberer and Schubert, 2006; Lee, 2010; Schubert, 2008). The 
above two contrary views are mainly owing to the cleavage in the different conceptualizations 
of political reforms.  
 The first view tends to use a dichotomy to “identify political reform with the 
approximation of Western democracy” (Dittmer, 2003:347). In this sense, only reforms 
moving towards liberal democracy counted as political reforms. This understanding struggles 
to reconcile political transformation in China, because almost no reform launched by the CCP 
has been for the purpose of liberal democracy since 1989. Although some might eventually 
weaken the authoritarian system, their goals were designed to strengthen rather than 
democratize the one-party rule. However, can we thus contend that the Chinese political 
system has not changed in the past three decades? An undeniable fact is that both the Chinese 
political system and elite politics nowadays are fundamentally different from the way they 
were in the 1980s.  
 In the Chinese context, political reform represents a much broader spectrum – it refers 
to any kind of political system reform, including administrative reforms and the 
institutionalization of elite politics. This understanding suggests that democratic reforms are 
not the only solution to building a better bureaucracy. As Gilley and Holbig (2009) find, 
institution-building has become a leading strategy proposed by Chinese intellectuals to 
maintain the CCP’s legitimacy. Hu Angang (2003), a leading policy adviser of the Chinese 
government and the head of China Studies at the Qinghua University, pointed out that the 
CCP has been going through a second transition, which should focus more on political 
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reforms in order to confront the challenges. Hu and Zeng argue that local institutional reforms 
helped to contain social conflicts and thus generate regime legitimacy.  
 The importance of political reform on regime legitimacy is also recognized by analysts 
outside China. Zheng and Lye (2005) argue that the CCP leadership attempted to expand their 
sources of legitimacy in three experiments: social democracy (the establishment of a village 
election system and the emergence of NGOs and other civil organizations), constitutionalism 
 strengthening the role of People’s Congress at both national and local level and emphasizing 
the rule of law) and intra-party democracy (greater political participation). As mentioned 
above, Schubert (2008) argues that political reforms have legitimized the CCP’s rule. Unlike 
 chubert’s (2008) research agenda that focuses on low-level administrative reforms, my 
thesis provides a critical analysis of political reform at the top (i.e. the institutional 
development of power succession). 
 
3.4. Summary  
Above all, ideology plays a role in deciding legitimacy in contemporary China. 
However, as this chapter shows, Western scholars largely focus on performance legitimacy 
and many argue that ideology is meaningless nowadays. Unlike Western scholarship, Chinese 
intellectuals have quite a different research agenda and emphasis on the subject of regime 
legitimacy in China. As the next chapter will discuss, changing values is considered by 
Chinese intellectuals as the most perceived threat to legitimacy, and thus ideology is proposed 
as a leading strategy to maintain the CCP’s legitimacy.   
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Chapter Four  
Understanding Popular Legitimacy from a Chinese Perspective 
 
“This performance-based political legitimacy has made socioeconomic development more 
and more imbalanced. Social development is seriously lagging behind economic development, 
and thus leads to a series of social problems. … if those problems are not solved  it may lead 
to ‘growth without development’”. 
– Excerpt from one of the 125 Chinese articles studied in this chapter (Jing, 2011:29) 
  
“To strengthen the ideological education of the people is an important way to maintain 
political legitimacy.”  
– Excerpt from one of the 125 Chinese articles studied in this chapter (Dong, 2010:148) 
  
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter studies popular legitimacy in contemporary China from a Western 
perspective. This chapter approaches this issue from a Chinese perspective in order to 
juxtapose the Chinese literature with the English literature on this subject. Chinese 
intellectuals may have valuable insights unavailable to those outside and perhaps better 
understand how China is ruled. However, no systematic study has been conducted to link 
Chinese intellectuals’ opinions with the English literature – except for Gilley’s and Holbig’s 
(2009) work. Building on the previous work, this study identifies continuities, new trends and 
shifts in emphasis in the Chinese elite debate about political legitimacy by analysing 125 
Chinese articles with “legitimacy” in the title published between      and     . As we shall 
see in this chapter, Chinese intellectuals have very different views on political legitimacy in 
China from Western scholars.   
This study departs from the previous research in several important ways. First, this 
study comprehensively analyses the influence of both Western theories and traditional 
Chinese philosophies in contemporary Chinese discourse of legitimacy. To date, there has 
been no systematic attempt to study this issue. This issue is important, because it is closely 
related to the theoretical foundations of the “China Model” and “Chinese exceptionalism”. In 
addition, in order to understand better the debate and distinct patterns in the Chinese 
literature, I have also conducted several email interviews with key contributors of this debate. 
Second, instead of focusing on the debate alone, this study also examines how the party 
intellectuals’ views are shaped by their research backgrounds. As this article reveals, 
institutions, research locations, and funding sources have differentiated Chinese intellectuals’ 
legitimacy concerns and policy suggestions. Third, as this study covers a more recent period 
of time, it is able to include critical events such as the 2008 financial crisis.   
Several key findings can be highlighted. First, Western scholars emphasize performance 
legitimacy especially economic performance, as Chapter 3 discussed, whilst Chinese 
intellectual express serious concern about performance legitimacy. This concern led to a 
fundamental shift in emphasis around political legitimacy. The top perceived legitimacy 
threats between 2003 and 2007 – changing interests and the exhaustion of revolutionary-
historical legitimacy – have now been replaced by socioeconomic inequality, corruption, and 
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incapability of bureaucratic system, while changing values remains a leading item in both of 
this study and the previous study. In addition, While there is now a growing school of thought 
that China might be heading towards a financial crisis (Naughton, 2009; Ross, 2012), Chinese 
analysts tended to be more pessimistic earlier than their Western counterparts. It again 
indicates that Chinese intellectuals are concerned that economic performance alone cannot 
sustain the CCP’s rule. Now more than ever before, the CCP has been concerned that 
economic performance might not be enough to provide sufficient legitimacy. 
Second, while many Western scholars argue that ideology is meaningless nowadays, 
Chinese intellectuals still consider ideology a leading strategy to maintain the CCP’s 
legitimacy. Arguably, ideology is considered by many Chinese intellectuals to be helpful 
when facing almost all of the most perceived legitimacy threats including changing value 
towards liberal democracy, socioeconomic inequality, corruption, and the inability of the 
bureaucratic system. For example, some argue that ideological education – especially moral 
education – for government officials is crucial to enhancing bureaucratic efficiency and 
reducing corruption (Shen and Zhang, 2010; Xia, 2008b).  ome argue that Hu Jintao’s 
Harmonious Society and Scientific Outlook of Development helped to gain support from 
under-privileged groups in the context of widening socioeconomic inequality (Wang, 2011c). 
In addition, ideology is obviously crucial when facing changing values towards liberal 
democracy. The Chinese intellectuals’ strong emphasis on ideology again indicates the 
importance of ideology. As Chapter 4 will show, ideology plays a crucial role in maintaining 
the internal stability of the CCP and legitimizing its authoritarian rule in contemporary China.  
Third, while many overseas China observers are focusing on the search for Chinese 
philosophies to underpin a new polity, as Chapter 3 discussed, the Chinese intellectuals are 
looking to the West instead. Fourthly, there is a distinct rising appeal of social autonomy that 
runs counter to the dominant official line in this debate. Lastly, this study finds a correlation 
between authors’ backgrounds  institutions  research locations  and funding sources) and their 
dominant arguments about legitimacy.  
As mentioned in the Introduction Chapter, the Chinese debate on legitimacy was mainly 
inspired by the party resolution on strengthening the CCP’s ruling capacity in    4 – there 
were several articles concerning legitimacy published before 2004, however, most of them 
were published after the resolution was released. Thus, the debate on legitimacy between 
2002 and 2012 presents the academic discourse of legitimacy in contemporary China. This 
chapter will compare my dataset (2007-2012) with that of Gilley and Holbig (2002-2007) in 
order to reflect the entire debate on regime legitimacy.  
 
4.2 Research Method and Data 
4.2.1 Method 
In order to understand the legitimacy debate in China, this chapter developed a coding 
manual and coded 125 Chinese articles on legitimacy (Appendix A). The coding manual is 
redesigned from Gilley’s and Holbig’s (2009) work, which studies a similar legitimacy debate 
between 2002 and 2007. More information about my coding manual, please see Appendix A. 
The coding of each article starts with the following questions.   
 How does the author evaluate political legitimacy in China?  
 What are the perceived threats to legitimacy? 
 What are the suggested strategies for maintaining legitimacy? 
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 Whose studies have they cited?  
125 articles were selected from the China Academic Journals Full-text Database 
http://www.cnki.net/ – the largest academic journal full-text database in the world. Its 
humanities and social science database covers 3,300 official social and humanities journals, 
papers from 9,964 significant conferences, and 515 important newspapers (CNKI, 2012). All 
articles with “legitimacy” in the title and which include discussions about the legitimacy of 
the Chinese state and the CCP (published between 1 January 2008 and 1 September 2012) in 
this database have been selected. Articles which studied the legitimacy of public policies, 
ideologies, civil organizations and political parties (other than the CCP) were filtered out. 
In addition to the content analysis, I also contacted several key contributors of this 
debate to understand some distinct patterns of Chinese literature. 
 
4.2.2 Limitations 
Owing to the nature of the database and the limitations on what is published in Chinese 
journals, the selection does not include the opinions of dissidents or confidential discussions 
about the state. In addition, the database does not include books; however, no cutting-edge 
Chinese book on state legitimacy was published in the period, and what has been published is 
typically discussed in articles and thus captured by this analysis (albeit in a secondary 
manner).  
While proposing the dissolution of CCP rule or the move to a competitive multi-party 
democracy remains taboo, this analysis reveals a remarkably open and plural debate. If the 
focus is on how to maintain and strengthen CCP rule (rather than replace it), then the debate 
over legitimacy is an open and public one. This includes ideas that run counter to the 
dominant official line.  
Notably, policies do not always originate from academic debate in China; it can be the 
other way around, in that academic discussions are sometimes used to test and promote the 
preferred policies of individual leaders. Either way, this debate about political legitimacy is 
closely related to the survival strategies of the CCP.  
 
4.2.3 Compositions of the Selected Articles and the Contributors 
Among the selected articles, 17% are based on government-funded projects.
7
 I find that 
those funded projects are more likely to advocate improvement in public welfare provision 
[X
2
 (1, N = 125) = 6.395, p < .05] (see Appendix B). This finding mirrors the way that the 
regime has shifted its emphasis towards improving people’s livelihood. Interestingly  I also 
find correlations between authors’ research locations and their arguments.8 Intellectuals based 
in richer regions are less likely to worry about socioeconomic inequality [r = -0.345, n=123, 
                                                            
7 The funding came from various governmental institutions, such as the Ministry of Education, and some large 
national foundations, such as the National Natural Science Scientific Foundation of China, which is an 
institution controlled directly by the State Council. The funding source (if there is any) is usually listed on the 
first page of each Chinese article.   
8 I would like to thank Shaun Breslin for suggesting that I study this relationship. The independent variable is 
coded according to the G P per capita of the province where the authors’ institutions were located in     . 
N=123 because two articles are filtered: one is anonymous and the other is translated from English articles. In 
cases where there are two authors, the first author has priority. 
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p=0.000],
 9
 the sustainability of China’s economy [r = -0.245, n = 123, p= 0.006], corruption 
[r = -0.200, n = 123, p= 0.027], and inadequate political participation [r = -0.213, n = 123, p= 
0.018]. One possible reason for this is that richer regions have benefited more from China’s 
economic growth than poorer regions; therefore, they are more capable of solving problems 
caused by economic growth.  
Authors based in poorer regions showed a significant inclination towards suggesting 
that the government should increase bureaucratic efficiency and transparency [r = -0.179, n = 
123, p= 0.047], increase citizen participation [r = -0.228, n = 123, p= 0.011], and encourage 
the development of civil society [r = -0.194, n = 123, p= 0.031]. Those in richer regions are 
more likely to propose that the government should improve its ability to guide public opinion 
[r = 0.255, n = 123, p= 0.004]. These findings indicate very diverse demands and interests 
among Chinese provinces.  
In this debate, 17 authors are from different party schools, including the Central Party 
School in Beijing and various provincial and municipal party schools. It is notable that the 
party school system is the key think tank and the “incubator of reform ideas and polices” of 
the CCP(Shambaugh, 2008b) The authors from the party school system and the government 
were more interested in party democracy [X
2
 (1, N = 125) = 7.995, p < .01]. 
Selected articles are written by university professors/researchers (81.7%), party school 
professors/researchers (13.4%), government officials (2.4%), and military officers (1.6%). 
Some authors hold positions in both universities and party schools. This needs to be noted, as 
there is no clear line between officials and scholars in China. For instance, Yu Keping, an 
author in this debate and one of the most influential party intellectuals, is both the deputy 
director of the Central Compilation & Translation Bureau and a professor at Peking 
University. Another author Cao Yanzhong is a senior colonel and also a researcher who 
works for the Chinese military.  
 
4.3.Overview 
4.3.1 Citation Rates of Scholars 
The results of the reference rates are shown in Figure 2.
10
 Only 2% of articles in the 
debate considered Chinese philosophies concerning legitimacy compared with 19% of articles 
which mentioned the ancient Western philosopher Aristotle. This is interesting because it 
seems to go against the grain of thinking of China as in some way exceptional and built on 
different philosophies to Western states. On the one hand, many Chinese officials and 
scholars have frequently reminded the Western scholars about the uniqueness of China and 
the move towards the concept of “harmony” built on China’s specific historical traditions. 
Indeed, the criticism that Westen scholars failed to pay enough attention to Chinese culture 
and misused Western theories in their study of China rose in the very early stages of China 
Studies (Harding, 1984:297). To a certain extent  the rise of “Chinese exceptionalism”  is a 
response to this kind of criticism. As Chapter 3 discussed, many analysts outside China have 
been increasingly interested in using China’s past to explain the present. On the other hand, 
                                                            
9 They are more likely to mention regional inequality. 
10 Instead of importing the bibliography into Endnote as the previous study did, this study manually coded the 
citation and provides specific rates for comparison. This is because sometimes when those Chinese authors 
simply mention the names of the scholars or their books in the text, this is not reflected in the bibliography. In 
addition  problems can easily be caused by different Chinese translations of scholars’ names.    
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the Chinese debate is much more influenced by Western theories than traditional Chinese 
philosophies.  
 
Figure 2: Reference rates of scholars in the Chinese discourse of legitimacy 
 
 ource: the author’s own database  
 
This finding indicates that the advocates of the “China Model” have not convinced 
party intellectuals yet. Indeed, Western theories currently dominate the Chinese literature of 
modern politics. A major reason for this is that traditional Chinese political philosophies have 
not been sufficiently adapted into modern civilization. Although great efforts are made to 
modernize Chinese philosophies, they have not yet reproduced a more convincing system to 
compete with the well-established Western theories. To a certain point, it is true to say that 
Western theories cannot necessarily easily explain China, and that Western analysts cannot 
understand China because of its unique historical and cultural traditions(Pan, 2011; Zheng, 
2012), but the alternatives offered (if there are any) tend to be worse. In the words of Ma 
Deyong (2012), an influential author in the legitimacy debate:  
“Currently, none of the Chinese scholars can create a widely accepted academic 
system. All we can do is to develop new concepts and theories based on the current 
academic system in order to explain the present.”  
As indicated in Figure 2, western scholars dominate not only in ancient but also in 
modern and contemporary Chinese discourses of legitimacy. The most popular scholars in the 
debate are all from the West: Max Weber (49%), Jurgen Habermas (40%), Samuel P. 
Huntington (39%) and Seymour M. Lipset (39%). Interestingly, Karl Marx, the founder of 
communist ideology, has only been mentioned in 33% of articles – not many in comparison 
with other Western thinkers. In the debate, the empirical school of legitimacy is more 
influential than the critical school and the normative school. This is not only because of the 
higher reference rate of the empiricists such as Weber and Lipset, but also owing to the fact 
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that the empirical school has been adopted more frequently to approach the issue of 
legitimacy in a practical way. Weber’s framework of legitimacy in particular and the 
subsequent modified versions are widely endorsed in the debate.   
During the coding, I find that almost no author in the debate directly challenged or 
responded to others although all of them were discussing the same topic and presenting 
different opinions. A similar pattern was also found in the previous study, in which Chinese 
elites do not only rarely give a direct response but also avoid citing others.  Gilley and Holbig 
(2009:342) argue that this might be because of “a latent fear among scholars of being grouped 
with each other, categories as holding as a partisan view and ending up as representing the 
‘wrong line’”. However  there seems to be less fear now than before. Yu  eping  one of the 
key authors and also the most cited Chinese scholar in the debate, has been cited by 16% of 
articles. Yu’s “good governance” is one of the most popular terms used in this debate.    
Indeed, it is a common phenomenon that Chinese literature of political studies has 
relatively short reviews of other Chinese colleagues’ work. This is partly because of the 
current Chinese academic norms and standards (Ma 2012; Huang 2012; Yu 2012). Chinese 
intellectuals are reluctant to judge others’ articles  especially in term of giving critical 
comments  because of “ their) academic culture” (Yu 2012). 
 
4.3.2 Evaluations of political legitimacy 
As discussed in Chapter 3, many intellectuals outside China argue that the CCP has 
enjoyed strong popular support or political trust; and this view is strongly supported by 
various cross-national surveys including the Asian barometer and the World Values Survey. 
According to a professor at Chinese University of Hong Kong Wang Shaoguang (2010b:139; 
2012b) and a professor at National Taiwan University Chu Yunhan (2013:4)  the CCP’s 
strong legitimacy is a “consensus” of “scholars familiar with the field”. Chinese intellectuals  
however, seem to be much more pessimistic than this “consensus”.  
 
Figure 3: Evaluation of Chinese intellectuals on different levels of regime legitimacy  
 
 
 ource: the author’s own database  
 
As indicated in Figure 3, only two articles argue that regime legitimacy is high or 
relatively high. Nearly 20% of authors argue that the regime was experiencing a legitimacy 
crisis and 21% of authors, including Yu Keping, hold that the party-state is facing some forms 
Crisis 
19.81% 
Challenge  
20.57% 
High legitimacy 
1.52% 
No mention  
58.10% 
Crisis Challenge High legitimacy Not mention
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of challenges or threats to its legitimacy. Possible interpretations of the pessimistic view held 
by Chinese intellectuals are: party intellectuals have insights unavailable to the outside; those 
whose job it is to look for challenges to legitimacy tend to see problems everywhere; or, most 
persuasively, both of the above. 
 
4.3.3.Legitimacy Threats 
Various domestic (mainly social and political) factors rather than international factors 
are considered to be the main source of perceived threats in the debate. Only 14% of authors 
mentioned globalization as a reason why legitimacy has declined and 5% blamed this on the 
West – the so-called “foreign or Western hostile forces”. Moreover    % of authors expressed 
their concern that the current pace of economic growth is unsustainable, while 21% were 
concerned about the on-going or imminent “performance dilemma”.  
As indicated in Figure 4, anxieties about the economy and performance dilemma 
largely increased after 2008. It suggests that the 2008 financial crisis led to serious concerns 
about China’s economy. As mentioned  in the West  there is now a growing school of thought 
that China might be heading towards a financial crisis (Naughton, 2009; Ross, 2012). The 
IMF(2010) called Chinese response to the financial crisis “quick, determined, and effective”. 
However, Chinese analysts tended to be more pessimistic earlier than their Western 
counterparts.  
 
Figure 4: Frequency of performance dilemma and anxieties about the economy between 
2008 and 2012 
 
 ource: The author’s own database  
 
Table 2: Threats to political legitimacy in Chinese intellectuals’ opinions 
Variables Frequency Note 
Socioeconomic inequality 
49% e.g. the gap between the rich and the poor, social 
inequality, regional inequality, the gap between 
the rural and urban areas   
Changing values 49% e.g. weakening of communist ideology, increasing 
0%
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civic awareness and promoting Western political 
values  
Corruption 43% e.g. corruption  
Bureaucracy (threat) 
39% e.g. inefficiency, opacity, incapability of 
bureaucracy 
Inadequate political 
participation 
30% e.g. inadequate political participation of citizens or 
NGOs 
Interest 
21% e.g. conflicting interests of different social groups, 
classes, or interest groups  
Environmental degradation 
14% e.g. environmental pollution, pressures of large 
population   
Inadequate public provision 
of welfare 
13% e.g. health, education, social security, housing, 
and pensions 
Inadequate rule of law 
13% e.g. poor legislative quality and inadequate 
judiciary, and implementation of law  
Development of technology  5% e.g.  Internet, new mass media, social network 
  ource: The author’s own database  
 
As indicated in Table 2, almost half of the authors consider socioeconomic inequality 
(49%) and changing values (49%) to be the major threats to legitimacy, followed by 
corruption (43%) and bureaucracy (39%). This finding is strikingly concordant with the 
insights of Chinese leading cadres who considered inequality and corruption to be the most 
serious social problems, according to a report of the Chinese Social Science Academy(Ru, et 
al., 2008). Whyte’s survey study is worth mentioning to make some interesting comparisons 
here. Whyte (2010) finds that most Chinese are not bothered by socioeconomic inequality and 
consider the current system fair. These two seemingly contradictory findings present an 
interesting phenomenon – that Chinese leaders believe that the masses to be worrying about 
an issue when, in fact, they are not.    
Regarding the issue of corruption, two contradictory opinions exist in Chinese mass 
media. Many argue that the government should immediately promote strong reforms and 
democratic development to curb corruption(Cao, 2012). Others hold that corruption will 
decline in line with socioeconomic development, because the widespread corruption is an 
issue associated with the modernization of developing countries. Thus, removing corruption 
from the system is a long process and China should guard against undue haste(Times, 2012). 
Ramirez’s optimistic study about corruption in China is worth mentioning here. By 
comparing China’s level of corruption with that of the U  at a similar state of development  
Ramirez argues that corruption levels in China will gradually decline with further 
modernization, as was the case with US(Ramirez, 2012)  . However, no article provides an in-
depth analysis of the latter view in the legitimacy debate, although corruption is frequently 
mentioned. It indicates that Chinese intellectuals have not examined this issue comparatively 
and so perhaps miss the “normalcy” of the Chinese situation.   
The finding about technology development is notable. While many contend that the 
development of the Internet, in particular social networks, has tremendously changed China 
in many aspects(Baum, 2008; Liu and Chen, 2012), only 5% of authors mentioned it in the 
legitimacy debate. Most authors do not perceive the development of technology to be a direct 
threat to legitimacy. Rather, the Internet is regarded as an intermediary that would enlarge 
various socioeconomic problems. The authors either argue that strict control over the Internet 
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is not feasible in the long run, or they tend to emphasize solving the root problems over 
increasing Internet censorship.  
 
4.3.4. Policy Options for Maintaining Legitimacy 
While China watchers tend to explain political legitimacy in terms of economic 
prosperity, Chinese intellectuals have already realized that economic growth alone will not 
guarantee the CCP’s ruling position. As mentioned  a number of intellectuals expressed 
anxieties about economic and “performance dilemma”. Moreover  in the legitimacy debate 
between 2002 and 2007, 50% of intellectuals suggested promoting better, faster and more 
sustainable economic growth to maintain legitimacy(Gilley and Holbig, 2009), but only 21% 
still insist on doing so now. Many articles continuously warned about the fleeting nature of 
performance legitimacy and the necessity of establishing more solid legitimacy foundations, 
especially rational-legal legitimacy. Arguably, in China, it is a near consensus that the state 
should find sources of legitimacy other than economic performance.   
In order to address the threats to legitimacy mentioned above, public intellectuals have 
suggested a set of diverse solutions. In the debate between 2008 and 2012, the most 
frequently mentioned strategies are: the improvement of bureaucracy (46%, 25% in the 
previous study)
11
, propaganda (38%), citizen participation (37%) and civil society (27%, 10% 
previously) compared with rule of law (64%), economic growth (50%), democracy (50%) and 
propaganda (48%) in the debate between 2003 and 2007(Gilley and Holbig, 2009). 
Among those legitimacy strategies, some might serve as competing alternatives to one 
another, whilst others – such as citizen participation and civil society – might work to 
complement each other. To understand better how those strategies knit together and identity 
specific forms of strategies, I performed a principal component factor analysis on the 29 
variables in my coding book. This study labels the top components as ideology, social justice, 
and governance, as indicated in Figure 5. The dispersion of all variables along with ideology 
(component 1) and governance (component 3) are shown in Figure 6. 
As indicated in Figures 5 and 6, bureaucracy, citizen participation and civil society are 
more likely to be proposed together as ways to address threats to legitimacy. Therefore, they 
are not only some of the most frequently mentioned strategies, but also more united in their 
prescriptions for the party-state, which indicates a clear rising appeal of social autonomy. The 
next section examines proposed strategies through a qualitative analysis. 
 
                                                            
11 It generally refers to creation of a more responsive, transparent, and predictable bureaucratic structure that is 
efficient and effective.  
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Figure 5: Three dimensions of proposed strategies for maintaining legitimacy (factor 
correlations r)
 12
 
 
 
Figure 6: Correlations (r) of variables along ideology and governance 
 
                                                            
12 No author in the debate advices the separation of the party and the government and the promotion of Maoism; 
therefore, those two variables are filtered. For more information, please see Appendix C 
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4.3.4.1 Ideology 
As discussed in Chapter 3, many Western scholars considered ideology obsolete. 
Chinese leaders and intellectuals, however, have always taken it seriously. Various 
ideological discourses have been produced to justify the CCP’s rule. When new ideological 
formula is launched, previous ideologies have been “discarded” to a certain extent. Mao 
Zedong Thought, the bible of China’s rising New  eftists, is completely discarded in the 
debate, although many observed similar problems – socioeconomic inequality in particular – 
with the New Leftists. In addition, only three articles mentioned Deng Xiaoping Theory 
compared with four articles on Jiang Zemin’s Three Represents. Almost all relevant articles 
symbolically mentioned those previous ideologies by name without giving any detail. This 
result is completely different from the debate five years ago, in which all major ideologies 
were mentioned: Marxism (34%), Mao Zedong Thought (13%), Deng Xiaoping Theory 
(24%), Three Represents (39%), and Harmonious Society (18%).  
The new fashionable proposition is the Socialist Core Values System. This system is 
proposed in the new rounds of ideological adaptation in order to strengthen the attractiveness 
and cohesiveness of socialist ideology. Much of the relevant discourse in the debate is about 
this adaptation. As proposed in a party report that has been frequently cited in the debate, the 
construction of a Socialist Core Values System is the foundation of the harmonious culture. 
This system consists of Marxism (its guiding ideology), socialism with Chinese 
characteristics, patriotism, and the  ocialist Concept of Honour and  isgrace” (CCP, 2006).  
As Chang Sumei (2009) put it, “the diversification and differentiation of values have 
increased the disorder of social values and have thus reduced party legitimacy” . Thus, some 
suggest that the state should use the Socialist Core Values System to integrate various social 
values and form an ideological structure – in which Marxism is the leading ideology 
coexisting with other diversified thoughts. Indeed, this system includes elements of both 
formal and informal ideologies, as Chapter 5 will discuss. 
 
4.3.4.1.1 Marxism  
Marxism (16%) is proposed as a guiding ideology of the Socialist Core Values System 
in the debate. As Chapter 5 will discuss, Marxism in the Chinese context refers to Marxism 
with Chinese characteristics instead of orthodox Marxism. Nowadays, the primary task of 
“ inification of Marxism” is to “combine Marxism with Chinese national condition”  makesi 
zhuyi he zhongguo guoqing xiang jiehe). The CCP has spent a great amount of human capital 
to reinvest Marxism. For example  the project of “Marxist Theory Research and Construction 
Engineering Project” alone has over       Chinese scholars to participate in (Holbig, 2013: 
Footnote 20).  
In the legitimacy debate, many authors used the party reports and Hu Jintao’s report on 
the 17
th
 Party Congress to highlight the significance of Marxism. For example, Sun Yong and 
Liu Qingfeng (2009) argue that “the Socialist Core Values System is the very foundation of 
China’s common ideals  which is the premise underlying the party-state. The party-state 
might be at risk of splitting and collapsing without this foundation”. 
Marxism has an irreplaceable role in the past  present and the future of the CCP’s ruling 
according to many in the debate. For instance, Xu Jialing, the visiting scholar of the Central 
Compilation & Translation Bureau  argues that “Marxism has been a key legitimacy pillar of 
the CCP, revolution, and reforms in the past decades, and only Marxism, rather than any other 
88 
 
theory, can provide the legitimacy to combine socialism with Chinese characteristics” (Xu, 
2009).  
 
4.3.4.1.2. Patriotism and Nationalism 
Nationalism has been discussed in 12% of articles in the debate compared with 15% in 
the previous study. Similar to the previous study, nationalist positions distributed evenly over 
the legitimacy debate analysed here. In the debate, nationalism is discussed as a part of the 
Socialist Core Values System. It is generally considered as a helpful tool to increase Chinese 
people’s national identity. Whilst most relevant articles actually refer to patriotism  aiguo 
zhuyi) rather than nationalism（minzu zhuyi） , there are two articles published in the 
Guangxi Journal of Ethnology which do refer to nationalism. Zhang Wenjing and Du Jun 
(2010b) argue that nationalism is a double-edged sword that can split China because 
nationalism helps to provide legitimacy and effective political mobilization on the one hand, 
and promotes separatism and intensifies the contradiction between Han and ethnic minorities 
on the other hand. They suggested launching patriotic education campaigns and suggested 
highlighting the fact that China is a united political entity in order to improve ethnic 
minorities’ national identity. It is very important to prevent the ideological infiltration and 
political propaganda of dissenters from overseas, so they argue that information control is 
necessary. In another article, they argue that the government should reduce ethnic 
consciousness and construct a common Chinese culture  (Zhang and Du, 2010a).   
Another article argues that the demonstration of military power can enhance legitimacy 
by increasing national pride. Wang Haizhou (2010a) contends that China’s National  ay 
Military Parade has enhanced legitimacy by serving as a political ceremony. 
 
4.3.4.2 Governance 
Further market reform and rapid economic growth have created many problems in 
China, which are shaking the legitimacy of the party-state. As mentioned, various social 
problems – inequality in particular – are considered as the top threats nowadays. Various 
plans regarding social reforms and the improvement of bureaucratic system are proposed to 
help the party-state.  
 
4.3.4.2.1 Citizen Participation 
As Li Liang warns, if people’s desire for political participation cannot be satisfied  they 
will be easily disappointed with the political system, which will further shake the legitimacy 
(Li, 2010b). The problems with citizen participation in China are analysed in the debate in 
two ways: excessive informal participation and inadequate channels of formal participation. 
Informal participation refers to illegal and inappropriate ways – such as popular protests and 
bribes – to influence policy making, and formal participation refers to the institutionalized 
ways to influence policy making – such as public hearings. Increased informal participation 
causes either corruption or social instability, both of which are destructive to political 
legitimacy. Some in the debate consider the inadequate institutionalized channels of citizen 
participation to be an important factor in the increasing popular protests in China (Yang, 
2010b).  
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The benefits expected from citizen participation are numerous. Liu Dongjie (2009) 
argues that citizen participation in policy making will help to make better policies and 
strengthen the supervision over policy implementations and evaluations. Xia Jingmei (2008a) 
argues that citizen participation will help to maintain stability by “solving conflicting interests 
of different social classes  protecting people’s rights  increasing bureaucratic efficiency, and 
enhancing national identity”.  Notably, citizen participation is considered by some as a way to 
unite social forces and to restrict state power. For example, Wang and Li (2011) argue that 
“dispersed citizens cannot confront the strong administrative power” and thus citizen 
participation is necessary to help citizens to balance state power. 
In order to promote more orderly citizen participation, many urge the state to play a role 
in nurturing civic spirits. As Yang Xuedong (2007), an associate researcher of the Central 
Compilation & Translation Bureau pointed out, the government should cultivate the public 
spirit of participation rather than “buying citizens’ compliances”. Yao Jingjing (2009) argues 
that traditional civic awareness is “too passive” and the state should cultivate people’s 
willingness to participate through education and official propaganda. 
 
4.3.4.2.2 Civil Society, Limited Government, and Social Autonomy 
Civil society (27%) has been much more frequently proposed in the legitimacy debate 
now compared with five years ago (10%). Modern theories of public administration – limited 
government and citizen participation in particular – are frequently cited to support relevant 
arguments. Reasons for supporting civil society and social autonomy in this debate are 
manifold: changing values, the rise of the third sector, the inability of the traditional 
bureaucracy, and corruption.   
Consequently, many in the debate suggest a new governance model that is co-managed 
by the society, the state, and the market. For instance, Huang Jianrong (2010) argues that “the 
current management model of the state has becomes a barrier to political and economic 
developments”  and the state should “face the fact that both social and public affairs cannot be 
well managed by the government alone”. In Huang’s opinion  civil society and NGOs are the 
main forces to harness in order to supervise and restrict state power, which eventually can 
prevent and reduce corruption. Civil society is also suggested in order to consolidate the 
CCP’s ruling in ethnic minority areas. Deng Mei (2009) argues that civil organizations will 
increase interactive communications between the political system and the citizens, strengthen 
the uptake rate of social resources, and maintain social order.  
The rising recognition of civil society is partly because of civil organizations’ 
constructive roles in the 2008 Sichuan Earthquake. Various NGOs have helped the 
government through the entire process of disaster relief and reconstruction. They have been 
considered by many as a helping hand rather than a threat. For instance, Chun Yumiaoling 
and Liang Xiao (2009) argue that the government should promote the development of NGOs 
as complementary to the state in order to maintain legitimacy and to overcome future crisis. 
 
4.3.4.2.2.1 Pitfall of Civil Society (gongmin shehui xianjing) vs. Cooperated Governance  
Clearly, the government might be reluctant to share power with the social forces. 
According to Xue Tao (2008)  “some party cadres regarded civil society as alien to resisting 
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or confronting the state power; some even argued that the development of civil society would 
reduce the party’s capability of leading and managing society”. 
The “pitfall of civil society” is a notable and controversial idea which serves to resist 
the development of civil society; it is proposed by the Secretary-General of the Central 
Commission for Politics and Law and the deputy director of the Central Commission for 
Comprehensive Management of Social Security  Zhou Benshun. Considering its significance, 
it is necessary to introduce briefly the cleavage over civil society, although it is not a part of 
the legitimacy debate. Zhou (2011) argues that the current mode of social management is an 
“advantage”  thus  the regime should not promote civil society – “a pitfall designed by some 
Western countries” – to govern the society. Zhou (2011) also argues that the state and party 
committees should “put social management and public services in place rather than let society 
be in charge”. 
Partly because of Zhou’s official capacity  this article published in the party’s primary 
mouthpiece Seeking Truth reflected the official position of civil society to a certain extent and 
thus received wide attention. However, no author in the legitimacy debate openly endorses 
this position. All relevant articles mentioning civil society endorse the development of civil 
society. Although a few articles pointed out negative impacts of civil society on legitimacy, 
the relevant discourse appears as a comparison with positive impacts and ends with the 
conclusion that the government should promote rather than repress it. For example, Xue Tao 
(2008) from the Shandong Provincial Party School pointed out four positive impacts and 
three negative impacts of civil society on the CCP’s legitimacy. First  a rising number of civil 
organizations can lead to diversified demands and groups of interests, which makes it more 
difficult for the ruling party to manage the society. Second, civil society can challenge the 
party’s control over ideology. Third  the development of civil society can lead to an increased 
change in value, which has been eroding the relationship between the party (and its cadres) 
and the people. The positive impacts include pushing the party’s values from absolute rule 
towards governance, accelerating the reform of the party-state’s governing style  increasing 
bureaucratic efficiency, and reforming the party system.  
 
4.3.4.2.2.2 Limited Government (youxian zhengfu) 
“ imited government” is another popular term in the debate.   % of authors suggested 
that the government should retreat from social areas and return power to society. For 
example, Yu (2010) argues that the state withdrawal/retreat can help to avoid bureaucratic 
inefficiency and thus can help to increase the effectiveness of governance. According to Yu 
(2010), state withdrawal/retreat is an important step towards good governance. Zhang Jian 
(2008) argues that the rising civil society and the ideas of limited government are “historical 
tendencies” that are unavoidable in a market economy  for this reason, the state should follow 
those tendencies.  
Many argue that traditional political totalism and the “big government  small society” 
mode should be abandoned in order to face up to the legitimacy crisis (Li, 2011). Some argue 
that corruptions will be reduced if the state restricts its field of activities (Zheng and Tu, 
2008). The state is offered as an option that can allow the market to provide more public 
services(Shen and Zhang, 2010).  
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4. .4. . .  “ trong  tate and Weak  ociety  da zhengfu, xiao shehui)” vs. “Weak state and 
Strong society （xiao zhengfu, da shehui）” = “ trong  tate and  trong  ociety（da 
zhengfu, da shehui）”? 
In the debate  some criticized the state’s strict control over social affairs and the “strong 
state and weak society” model. For example  Xu Chengyu (2011) argues that the state’s 
monopoly on power and information has made its relationship with the citizens more intense. 
In addition, it also leads to inefficient resource allocation and unfair competition.   
Even though Chinese intellectuals recognized the problems of the “strong state and 
weak society ” none openly advised a “weak state and strong society” model in the debate. 
Zhou Benshun’s “pitfall of civil society” article partly explains why. Zhou (2011) was 
directly critical of those “who do not understand the social management model in foreign 
countries” and argues that “not all the developed countries adopt the ‘weak government and 
strong society’ model and many of them have ‘strong states  many social organizations have 
government backgrounds and are under the control of their governments”. In Zhou’s opinions 
(2011), China must tighten its control over social organizations and prevent the multiplication 
of those organizations with “ulterior motives”.   
Interestingly, “strong society and strong state” is proposed as an alternative in order to 
balance “strong state and weak society” and “weak state and strong society”. Ma Xiaoni and 
Cheng Weijie (2011), for example, argue that only “big society and big government” can help 
the state to win more support. It seems that this alternative could solve the problems of “weak 
society” by promoting a “strong society” and avoid conflicting with the state by maintaining a 
“strong state”.  
  
4.3.4.2.3 Bureaucracy (solution) 
Under the guidance of the Scientific Outlook of Development, the idea of People-
Oriented (yi ren wei ben) has been promoted as a basic value of the entire state. It attempts to 
change the ruling philosophies and functions of the state from growth-oriented to public 
service-oriented. In the legitimacy debate, this idea is frequently used to highlight the 
importance of rebuilding bureaucracy. Many argue that the state should change its main 
priority from economic growth to social management in order to build a public service-
oriented government and to strengthen the provision of public service (Shong and Wang, 
2009; Zhu, 2008). 
Chinese intellectuals propose both external and internal ways to restrict state power and 
officials. Externally, they suggest public supervision and transparency. For instance, Chen 
Bohui (2008) argues that public overseeing is the most effective way to restrict state power. 
According to Chen (2008)  “Chinese mass media does not dare and is not willing to 
investigate corruption because of the government interventions”  therefore  China should 
enact laws to protect mass media. The establishment of internal institutions and regulations 
are also advised for the purposes of preventing corruption and increasing performance (Wang 
and Li, 2011).  
Promoting transparency of information is considered to be a way to maintain stability 
and legitimacy. For example, Li Chuxue and Luo Zhang (2012) argue that the development of 
the Internet and mass media provide channels for rumours and inaccurate information. 
Therefore, local governments should objectively publicize rather than attempt to hide the 
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relevant information. In Yu’s (2010)  “good governance”  transparency is a basic component 
of modern states and it is popular with supporters of “good governance”.   
The rapidly changing circumstances have led to concern about the state’s decision-
making capabilities. By listing past problematic policies, Huang Jianrong (2010) argues that 
the government should strengthen its decision-making ability by changing its ruling 
philosophies from economic efficiency–oriented to people-oriented. Ren Hongjie (2011), a 
professor of the People’s University of Public  ecurity  warns that the information explosion 
led by the Internet’s development has made it more difficult for the state to make scientific 
decisions. “Once the inappropriate policies and their consequences were exposed on the 
Internet  legitimacy would be significantly reduced”. Therefore  Ren (2011) suggests that the 
government should “establish special mechanisms to collect and filter internet information for 
decision-making, build channels to communicate with the public about important policies, 
and increase the leaders’ decision-making abilities by providing sufficient training”. 
Moral education is also suggested as complementary to bureaucratic rebuilding. For 
example, Xia Lei (2008b) argues that “the entire moral image of the party-state is reflected in 
each civil servant or party cadre”  as such  strengthening moral education for civil servants is 
essential. In addition, Shen Jingchen and Zhang Dawei (2010) argue that “the political 
education of civil servants should move from general, ideological education to a more 
specific education of administrative accountability”. 
  
4.3.4.3 Social Justice 
The promotion of social justice is the most direct way to respond to rising legitimacy 
concerns with regard to social problems. Inadequate social justice is considered both a direct 
and an indirect threat to party legitimacy: it leads to decreased support from disadvantaged 
groups and the poor, and also shakes social stability. As Yang Songlu (2010a) warns, if the 
state fails to improve people’s livelihood  “it will not only slow down economic growth and 
damage social stability  but also threaten the regime’s legitimacy”. Peng Hua (2012), writing 
in house journal of the Beijing Youth Politics College, finds that social inequality and 
inadequate public provision of welfare have led to low political identities of the rural youth – 
a dangerous sign of social instability. Peng (2012) further argues that market reform in China 
has led to many socioeconomic problems and the government should take responsibility to 
improve people’s livelihood and promote equality.   
 
4. .4. .  People’s  ivelihood  min sheng) 
With widening social inequality  focusing on people’s livelihood is very critical to 
winning support from the poor. Jing Haixin argues that the issue of people’s livelihood has 
become the root cause of social conflict in China (Jing, 2011). Notably  the term “people’s 
livelihood” is not new to China as it used to be a part of Sun Yat-sen’s “Three Principles of 
the People”. The exact definition of “people’s livelihood” is never settled because Sun never 
clearly or fully explains it, but the equal ownership of land is fairly clear as it is based on 
Henry George’s Georgism(Sun, 1930). In the current context  people’s livelihood represents a 
much broader spectrum. Both the ideas of “people-oriented” and people’s livelihood imply a 
similar message: that economic means alone cannot sustain the CCP’s ruling  but being 
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“people-oriented” focuses more on ideological values and the latter is more like a direct 
policy responding to the inadequate provision of public welfare.   
Nowadays  an improvement in people’s livelihood is regarded by many as the new 
source of legitimacy in China (Lu and Shen, 2011). Based on two influential government 
funded survey projects in 2012, some even argue that the provision of public goods has 
replaced economic performance to become the most important legitimacy source. Ma Deyong 
and Wang Zhengxu (2012), for example, argue that the public provision of welfare and the 
fairness of institutional arrangements are the keys for local governments to overcome a 
legitimacy crisis. In another survey  Peking University’s Meng Tianguan and Yang Ming 
(2012) find that “economic growth can no longer help to maintain political trust  yet the 
increasing provision of public services – such as reducing the unemployment rate and Gini 
coefficient – and public welfare expenditure are still effective”.13    
 
4.3.4.3.2 Equality  
 As mentioned above, socioeconomic inequality has become the top legitimacy threat. 
Recognizing the widening of social inequality, the Scientific Outlook of Development 
intended to move the state’s priority from efficiency-oriented to a more balanced position of 
equity and efficiency.  
In the debate, some argue that the government should play a role in compensating for 
market deficiencies and promoting equality. For example, Qu Wanhong (2011) argues that 
the government should compensate for market deficiencies, provide fairer competition in the 
market, and promote social justice – in particular regional equality. Specific economic 
policies to reduce inequality are also proposed. For example, Fu Jingtao and Li Ming (2009) 
suggest adjusting the structures of income tax and financial expenditure. 
 
4.3.4.3.3 Grassroots Democracy/ Basic Level Democracy (jiceng minzhu) 
As noted above, intellectuals have been looking for more solid legitimacy sources other 
than economic performance  democracy is clearly a key way of establishing Weber’s rational-
legal legitimacy. In Hu Jintao’s speech at the  7th Party Congress, socialist democracy – 
grassroots democracy in particular – has been proposed as a way to promote social justice. In 
the debate, grassroots democracy is considered by 13% of the articles as an effective way of 
promoting social justice and satisfying people’s rising demands to participate in the political 
process. Grassroots democracy is also considered an effective way of increasing the political 
legitimacy of local governments. For example  Ma and Wang’s (2012) study finds that the 
effective implementation of direct elections in villages and towns can enhance the legitimacy 
of the local states. Therefore, they suggest that the implementation of electoral democracy at 
local levels is worth trying.  
                                                            
13 Interestingly, their articles specifically point out that effective provision of welfare, rather than elections and 
citizen participation, is the main source of legitimacy in contemporary China. They also mention that this 
finding has confirmed the previous studies published in another legitimacy article in 2007. As mentioned, most 
articles did not directly challenge or respond to other competing views; however, this is the only exception. This 
is also the only article that mentioned citizen participation and elections but did not support them.  
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Interestingly, the debate seems to be systematically refraining from any 
conceptualization of the term “grassroots democracy”. Although it is mentioned frequently in 
the debate  no author has an interest in defining what “basic”（jiceng) is. Also, no author 
mentions what should follow after the success of basic democracy. Li Meiling (2009) argues 
that “democratic development has to be gradual because of the inadequate democratic 
traditions and values in Chinese history” and emphasizes that both high-level democracy and 
grassroots democracy are important. However, Li does not explain this so-called “high-level” 
in details.  
Elections are, of course, an essential component of grassroots democracy. In the debate, 
only an article written by a senior colonel of the Chinese military openly opposes electoral 
democracy. It argues that the benefits of electoral democracy – such as increased political 
identity and stability – cannot compensate for the cost – such as decreased national identity, 
increased ethnic separatism, and low efficiency (Cao, 2010). According to this article  “the 
West attempts to use electoral democracy to bring disorder and chaos to China under the 
guise of protecting human rights”. The article considers party democracy as an alternative to 
electoral democracy.   
Elections are also suggested in order to strengthen the Party’s ruling capabilities and 
subsequently its legitimacy. The Central Party  chool’s Zhao Yao (2011) argues that the 
party’s personnel system should make efforts to increase elections and gradually reduce 
appointments from the top. Zhao (2011) considers the electoral system to be a revolution of 
the appointment system and advices the implementation of gradual reforms, although he 
clearly recognizes that the electoral system might have risks associated.  
 
4.4. Summary 
This chapter studies Chinese literature on the subject of regime legitimacy in China. It 
shows Chinese intellectuals and Western scholars have very different views on this subject. 
Unlike the Western scholarship that places strong emphasis on performance legitimacy and 
consider ideology to be meaningless, Chinese intellectuals are seriously concerned that 
performance legitimacy might not be sufficient to maintain the CCP’s rule. Accordingly  
ideology is proposed by Chinese intellectuals as a leading strategy to maintain the CCP’s 
legitimacy. As the next chapter will examine, ideology plays a crucial role in (a) legitimizing 
the CCP’s authoritarian rule by delegitimizing liberal democracy and (b) maintaining party 
cohesion by justifying the communist rule in contemporary China. 
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Chapter Five Ideological and Political Education in Contemporary China: 
Formal Ideology and Informal Ideology 
  
“Getting to grips with the leadership of thought control is the first priority in maintaining 
overall leadership.” 
– Mao Zedong, excerpt from his talk in 1942(Mao, 1991:435).  
 
“During the last ten years, our biggest mistake was made in the field of education, primarily 
in ideological and political education – not just of students but of the people in general.” 
– Deng Xiaoping (1989), excerpt from his speech to high-level cadres of the martial law 
units five days after the CCP used military force to end the protest of 1989. 
 
“The first thing for strengthening the party is to grasp ideological and political work, because 
solving ideological and political problems is the premise and foundation for other works.” 
– Jiang Zemin, excerpt from a talk in a conference on ideological and political work in 
2000 (Jiang, 2005).  
 
 “Ideology is an important front that we fiercely fight against hostile forces; if this front has 
some problems, it might lead to social turmoil and even the fall of our regime”. 
– Hu Jintao, excerpt from a talk in the sixth plenary session of the 14th Central 
Committee of the CCP (Literature, 2006:318).  
 
“Ideological work is extremely important.” 
– Xi Jinping, excerpt from a talk in the national conference of propaganda and 
ideological work, 19 August, 2013 (Ni, 2013)    
   
5.1.Introduction 
This chapter examines various discourses of formal and informal ideologies, the 
mechanisms of ideological promotion, and their effectiveness. As established in the 
Introduction Chapter, a core argument in this thesis is that ideology plays a crucial role in 
maintaining party cohesion and the popular legitimacy of the CCP. The CCP has made great 
efforts in reinventing its ideologies; however, Western scholars argue that ideology is 
obsolete, as Chapter 3 discussed. Unlike in Western scholarship, ideological reform has been 
considered by Chinese intellectuals as a leading strategy for maintaining legitimacy, as 
Chapter 4 discussed. Chinese leaders also considered ideology crucial to their rule. All top 
leaders including Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and Xi Jinping, 
attached great importance to ideological work, as I quoted at the beginning of this chapter.  
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5.2. Understanding the Role of Ideology in Post-Deng China from a Western Perspective 
As discussed in the Introduction Chapter, the existing literature suffers two conceptual 
weaknesses about ideology: (1) Chinese ideology is solely referred to communism and (2) 
ideology is considered as a belief system. Based on this understanding, it is reasonable for 
conventional wisdom of Western scholars to argue that ideology is meaningless in the context 
of declining communist beliefs among Chinese people. As mentioned in the Introduction 
Chapter, this thesis considered ideology as a form of discourse, which is capable of 
constraining words and deeds of the party elites even if they do not believe in it. 
In addition to the mainstream view that ideology is obsolete, a few Western scholars 
still attach importance to ideology. As discussed in the Introduction Chapter, there are two 
different opinions on the role of ideology in contemporary China. While some argue that the 
CCP adapted its ideologies in order to legitimize its rule, others argue that contemporary 
Chinese leaders used ideology to struggle for power. These two views involve different types 
and functions of ideologies. The theoretical distinction between formal ideology and informal 
ideology provides a more comprehensive framework for understanding the role of ideology. 
As mentioned, formal ideology – that is produced for the internal consumption of the CCP – 
involves establishing personal authority of top leaders, and thus it has a function of asserting 
power, and informal ideology – that is propagated to the entire society –plays the role of 
legitimating the authoritarian rule in China.     
 
5.3. Understanding the Role of Ideology in Post-Deng China from a Chinese Perspective 
Unlike Western scholars, Chinese intellectuals are highly concernly about ideology. As 
Chapter 4 discussed, changing values is considered as a chief threat to the CCP’s legitimacy. 
This issue leads to serious concern about the CCP’s rule because the rise of pro-liberal 
democracy values in the 1980s was a key factor leading to the protest of 1989. In order to 
face the challenge of changing values, ideological innovation has been proposed as a leading 
strategy for maintaining the CCP’s legitimacy  as Chapter 4 discussed. The Chinese 
intellectuals’ articles about ideology focus on the new round of ideological reforms in    4. 
In this round of ideological changes, the CCP (2006) proposed building a Socialist Core 
Values System, which is considered by the Chinese intellectuals to be crucial in strengthening 
the attractiveness and cohesion of the socialist ideology. This system includes elements of 
both formal and informal ideologies, as this chapter will examine.   
  
5.4. Formal Ideological Discourses from Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao to Xi Jinping 
As the Introduction Chapter establishes, the CCP has used a formal type of ideology to 
revise the definition of socialism and thus explain why its policies are not incompatible with 
socialism. In this way, formal ideology helps to maintain consensus between reform-minded 
leaders and less reform-mind leaders. However, as formal ideology reflects the personal 
authority of top leaders, it may also intensify intra-party conflicts when it is used for factional 
purposes. This section will examine these aspects of formal ideology in contemporary China 
(2000-2013).  
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5.4.1. Jiang Zemin and Three Represents（san ge dai biao）  
Three Represents was first proposed by Jiang Zemin in 2000, which received wide 
domestic and international attention. Three Represents refers to “the importance of the 
communist party in modernizing the nation – representing the demands for the development 
of advanced social productive forces, the direction of advanced culture, and the fundamental 
interest of the greatest majority of the people” (English translation: Holbig, 2009). It used 
these “represents” to redefine the CCP’s commitment to socialism. In this regard, Three 
Represents followed some respects of Zhao Ziyang’s Primary  tage of  ocialism  which 
provided more space for reformists to make quasi-capitalist economic policies, as discussed 
in Chapter 2. Although Three Represents was also propagated to the society, its major 
audience was clearly the party because its principal subject was the CCP and it mainly 
elaborated where the party should go. This is why some small controversies were caused 
when Three Represents was incorporated into the PRC constitution. Some scholars argue that 
Three Represents was just about a political party and thus it was inappropriate for it to be 
included in the national constitution (Li, 2004a). 
To a certain extent, Three Represents’s ideological turn was driven by the changing 
political-socioeconomic landscapes. The context in which Three Represents was proposed 
was one in which corruption was encouraged by and grew out of economic growth; the 
corruption has become increasingly threatening to the party’s rule  as Chapter   mentioned. In 
order to fight against corruption, Jiang Zemin attempted to use Three Represents to stress the 
importance of the party’s discipline.  pecifically  the second represent of Three Represents 
urged the party to maintain its advanced nature – especially its probity.   
More importantly, the growing influence of private entrepreneurs led by the rapidly 
growing private economy in China could no longer be ignored by the CCP. As a ruling party, 
the CCP felt that it was more and more urgent and important to form some kinds of alliances 
with business elites. Three Represents’s first represent – that the party should represent the 
demands for the development of advanced socially productive forces – provided a theoretical 
foundation for the party to co-opt those business elites. Under this ideological guidance, the 
CCP officially expanded the party membership to include private entrepreneurs. It marked the 
CCP’s transition from a proletarian party towards an elite-governed party. This transition 
helped to win support from business elites; however, it also got away from the very 
ideological basis of a communist party – communism and proletariat. It suggested the party’s 
official acknowledgement of entrepreneurs and managers, so-called “capitalists”  as the new 
social “strata” if not “class” (Holbig, 2009).  uring Mao Zedong’s rule  both “capitalists” and 
social “strata/class” were major targets that the CCP were keen to destroy  as Chapter   
discussed. As such, Three Represents also caused great controversy within the party.   
As Chapter 2 discussed, some party members criticized the fact that “allowing the 
capitalists to join the proletariat party” contravened the CCP’s commitment to 
socialism/communism. For example, Zhang Dejiang  (2000b; 2000a)  argued that the CCP 
should not allow private entrepreneurs to join  otherwise  it would “blur the party’s nature and 
the standard of the working class vanguard”, estrange the relations between the party and the 
masses, and undermine the party’s popular support. In order to settle intra-party conflicts 
about the ideological turn of Three Represents, Hu Jintao had to reinterpret Three Represents 
as Three for People. This new interpretation of Three Represents emphasized the third 
“represent” of Three Represents (the interests of most Chinese people) instead of the first 
“represent”  the most advanced socially productive forces). In this way  Hu’s emphasis of 
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Three Represents moves back to the populist approach of the party without openly going 
against Jiang Zemin’s legacy.    
The above resistance to Three Represents was closely related to the second function of 
formal ideology: the personal authority of top leaders. As some suggest, Three Represents 
was an attempt by Jiang Zemin to put his stamp on history and on the party by proposing his 
own version of party theory (Fewsmith, 2003b; Zheng and Lye, 2003). In this sense, Three 
Represents is Jiang’s political legacy. At the beginning, Jiang also attempted to insert his 
name into the Three Represents discourse – following the traditions of previous formal 
ideologies such as Mao Zedong Thought and Deng Xiaoping Theory. Thus, some party 
documents also referred to it as “Jiang Zemin’s Three Represents”  but this seemed to violate 
the norm against cults of personality that was formed after Mao Zedong died. This attempt 
was resisted by Jiang’s opponents and failed in the end.  
In addition to political legacy, Three Represents was also closely related to Jiang’s 
strategies to consolidate power and maintain influence after his retirement. As Bo Zhiyue 
(2004:35) argues  “Jiang saw ideology more a shortcut to frame and power than as a vision 
for the country.” As such, it led to different responses within the party. On the one hand, 
Three Represents received strong opposition from Jiang’s political rivals such as Wan  i and 
Yang Baibing and small groups of communist believers. As mentioned, many criticized the 
fact that Three Represents betrayed the CCP’s socialist commitment and that Jiang’s attempt 
to build personal authority violated the norm against the cult of personality – from either real 
conviction or more pragmatic power motivation. On the other hand, Three Represents was 
highly praised by Jiang Zemin’s followers. For example  the then vice-party secretary of 
Hubei, Yang Yongliang (2000), argued that  
“Comrade Jiang Zemin’s thought concerning the ‘Three Represents’ is like a giant 
building that overlooks the whole situation and contains rich content and deep meanings. 
It is a creative usage and development of Marxist theory and is strongly theoretical, 
scientific, creative, and practical” (English Translation: Shih, 2008).  
 hih’s study (2008) finds that Jiang Zemin’s prot g s are more likely to echo the campaign of 
Three Represents.   
 In this context, the ideological campaign of Three Represents became an arena to 
identify supporters and opponents of Jiang Zemin.  uring the campaigns  Jiang’s supporters 
paid social and political costs to pander to Jiang (Shih, 2008). Political actors who 
shamelessly praised a senior leader and thus violated the norm against cults of personality 
might be despised as a boot-licker (i.e. social cost). In addition, junior leaders who pander 
through public grovelling to a senior leader suffer politically, because they are unlikely to be 
recruited by another rival coalition if their patron falls from power (i.e. political cost). By 
bearing the cost of being despised by others and closing the door to alternative factions, 
public grovelling through ideological campaigns sends creditable signals to senior leaders 
about political actors’ loyalties (Shih, 2008). In this way, senior leaders can identify which 
followers are truly loyal. Thus, the ideological campaign of Three Represents was a chance 
for Jiang to obtain knowledge about his followers so that he could promote his true, loyal 
followers into powerful positions and thus maintain his influence after he retired. It again 
suggests that the principal audience of Three Represents was the party rather than the society.  
 The above power motivation of Jiang Zemin had no doubt undermined Three 
Represents’s positive effects in maintaining party cohesion. On the one hand  Three 
Represents justified the CCP’s quasi-capitalist economic policies and reforms, and thus 
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undermined the resistance of less reform-minded leaders. On the other hand  Jiang’s power 
motivation through Three Represents also intensified factionalism within the party. In order 
to pull the unity of ruling elites back  Jiang’s successor Hu Jintao launched a new formal 
ideology to justify the CCP’s rule. 
  
5.4.2. Hu Jintao and Scientific Outlook of Development (kexue fazhan guan) 
Right after Jiang Zemin handed over the last official position – the head of People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA) – to Hu Jintao in 2004, Hu announced his own formulation of party 
ideology, Scientific Outlook of Development. It carried out a new vision of party ideology 
and served as an attempt by Hu to step out of the shadow of Jiang Zemin. Unlike the previous 
formal ideology such as the Primary Stage of Socialism and Three Represents that were 
narrowly concerned with self-justification, Scientific Outlook of Development involved more 
popular elements. As discussed in Chapter    the party’s ideological focus gradually shifted 
from justifying the CCP’s rule towards addressing the negative consequences of rapid 
economic growth. The discourse of Scientific Outlook of Development clearly indicated such 
a shift. Rapid economic growth in China has caused a series of problems – socioeconomic 
inequality and environmental pollution in particular – which led to the party’s concern about 
the sustainability of economic development. As discussed in Chapter 4, socioeconomic 
inequality is considered by Chinese intellectuals as the most perceived threat to the CCP’s 
legitimacy nowadays. In this context, Scientific Outlook of Development attempted to adjust 
the party’s ruling philosophies from being efficiency-oriented towards being equality-oriented 
in order to promote more sustainable development. As such, unlike the previous ideology that 
was narrowly concerned with the justification of communist rule, Scientific Outlook of 
Development is based on the logic of a ruling party over how to improve governance.    
 Moreover, unlike Three Represents that focuses on the party, Scientific Outlook of 
Development is about China as a whole. To a certain extent, Scientific Outlook of 
Development is also a continuation of the Primary Stage of Socialism. The latter justifies 
where China was now and the Scientific Outlook of Development sends a strong signal to the 
society about where China is going in the future. Or, to put it another way, Scientific Outlook 
of Development presents a vision in which the party notices the problems caused by the 
current development model and will lead China to develop in a better way. In these aspects, 
Scientific Outlook of Development also turns towards society and indicates the quest for 
popular legitimacy.  
Yet, the major audience of Scientific Outlook of Development was still the party. It was 
an attempt for the then new leadership of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao to appease those party 
elites who were dissatisfied with policies and the ideological turn of Hu’s predecessor Jiang 
Zemin. In other words, Scientific Outlook of Development was proposed to maintain party 
cohesion. As discussed in Chapter 2, various socioeconomic problems led to a widening 
cleavage within the CCP during Hu Jintao’s term. For example  some conservatives criticized 
the fact that the widening inequality under the CCP’s rule betrayed its commitment to 
communism (i.e. an equal society), and new Leftists considered the widening inequality to be 
a result of over-marketization. The power of those dissatisfied forces was clearly evidenced 
by the case of Bo Xilai.  
As discussed in Chapter 2, in order to compete for an 18
th
 PSC seat, Bo Xilai took 
advantage of the intra-party cleavage to hold high the flag of the New Leftists. In Chongqing, 
Bo Xilai launched a series of campaigns and policies – the “Chongqing Model” – to echo the 
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conservative forces. This Chongqing Model represented a distinct development model that 
relied on the role of the government in socioeconomic affairs – such as providing welfare and 
redistributing economic resources (Ji, 2009; Su, et al., 2011; Wang, 2011b). By promoting the 
campaign of “sing red song”  Bo Xilai showed his Chongqing Model was legitimate by 
following the ideological orthodox doctrines of Marxism and Maoism. At that time, Bo 
Xilai’s new deal received nationwide support from the conservative forces – especially the 
New Leftists.    
Harmonious Society is another notable ideological reformulation of Hu Jintao; however, 
it is not a formal type of ideology because it is less about asserting power than Scientific 
Outlook of Development is, as I will discuss below. 
  
5.4.3. Xi Jinping and China Dream (zhongguo meng) 
 The concept of “China  ream” was first proposed by Xi Jinping during his visit to an 
exhibition on 29 November, 2012 – only 20 days after he was appointed as the new leader. In 
Xi’s report to the National Congress when he was appointed as the President of the PRC, 
China  ream was mentioned nine times. In this respect  similar to Hu Jintao’s Scientific 
Outlook of Development, China Dream was an attempt to assert the power of Xi Jinping as 
the new top leader and to carry out a new vision. It took Hu Jintao two years but Xi Jinping 
only several months officially to propose new formulations of party theories after becoming 
party heads. Xi’s immediate ideological turn suggests that Xi took control of power and 
seemed to be a stronger leader than Hu Jintao – and perhaps Jiang Zemin. It is still unclear 
whether China Dream is a formal type of ideology or not because its content is still 
developing. Qian Gang (2014) argues that China  ream is not “a banner term or legacy term” 
(i.e. a type of formal ideology), because the CCP has a process to introduce banner terms, and 
“these are not things leaders simply toss out as soon as they take the stage”.  
According to Xi’s report to the National Congress  China  ream is mainly an aspiration 
for China’s national renaissance as well as the personal achievement of the Chinese people. 
This interpretation has been strongly under-pinned by nationalist sentiment. In this sense, 
China  ream justifies the CCP’s rule by being a vehicle to lead China’s rejuvenation. This is 
related to the discourse of national rejuvenation that attempts to justify the one-party rule by 
promoting the idea about the greater good of China, which I will discuss in more details later. 
As such, China  ream involves much more populist elements than Hu Jintao’s Scientific 
Outlook of Development and Jiang Zemin’s Three Represents. It might indicate an interesting 
development of the public use of communist language moving from the Party doctrine 
towards populist slogans. Deng Xiaoping also used a similar populist construction of 
communist language, as evidenced by, for example   eng’s famous quote that has been 
widely popular in Chinese society: “it doesn't matter whether the cat is black or white, as long 
as it catches mice”. More details about popular slogans will be discussed below.  
 
5.5. Protect Yourselves by Attacking Your Enemy? Informal Ideological Discourses:  
marketing the authoritarian rule by discrediting liberal democracy 
After exploring formal ideological discourse, this section studies informal ideological 
discourse in China, which supplements formal ideology. Unlike formal ideologies that are 
narrowly concerned with the party, the audience of informal ideologies is all the Chinese 
people including the party members. This is closely related to official propaganda or the so-
called “the work of guiding public opinion”  yulun yindao gongzuo).  
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As the Introduction Chapter establishes, the CCP has employed informal ideological 
discourses to legitimize its one-party system by delegitimizing liberal democracy. As 
mentioned in Chapter 2, Deng Xiaoping considered the failure to maintain popular beliefs to 
be the “biggest mistake” of his reform. Learning from the protest of 1989, the CCP has 
strengthened its ideological and political education for the masses in resisting the “invasion” 
of liberal political values. In this context, various informal ideological discourses are 
produced and embedded into the CCP’s official propaganda in order to discredit liberal 
democracy.  
  
5.5.1 The Discourse of (in)stability: the necessity of stability contrasts with a scenario of 
chaos 
 In)stability discourse is one of the CCP’s most notable informal ideologies. It involves 
two intertwined discourses: stability discourse and instability discourse. Stability discourse 
refers to a popular ideation that China’s development needs a stable social order. This 
discourse has two key implications: (a) stability – as a public good – needs to be provided by 
a strong centralized state power and (b) the current status quo including the one-party system 
should be maintained or at least not overthrown, otherwise a stable order cannot be 
maintained. It is explicitly elaborated by the white paper of China’s state council:  
“The CCP’s leadership and rule is needed for making the statepower stable. China is a 
vast country with a large population. There are great disparities in terms of development 
between urban and rural areas, and between different regions. It is of unusual 
significance for China to have a stable state power. Only then can China concentrate on 
construction and development  and only then can the country’s development strategy 
and goal of modernization be pursued for a long time and through to the end” (Council, 
2005).  
Like two sides of a coin, the above stability discourse is intertwined with the instability 
discourse that portrays a potential scenario in which China might fall into civil unrest, 
national turmoil, economic stagnation, etc. The construction and dissemination of this 
scenario is closely and carefully linked with the modern history of China that has been deeply 
rooted in Chinese people’s memories – the national humiliation during the late Qing dynasty 
and the invasion of Japan, decades of civil wars among the warlords and between the CCP 
and the KMT, social turbulence and economic stagnation during the Cultural Revolution, etc. 
It is argued that the failure of practising liberal democracy in China (e.g. Sun Yat-sen’s 
democratic experiments) was a root cause of civil strife in the early 20th century. This is 
closely related to the discourse of national rejuvenation, which asserts that one-party rule is 
necessary to lead the rise of China, as I will discuss below.  
The instability discourse suggests that if China does not have a strong centralized state 
power to provide stability, China might repeat its horrible past. As the then chairman of the 
People’s Congress Wu Bangguo warned (2011), China should maintain the current one-party 
rule; otherwise, it might fall into “the abyss of civil strife”. Xie Chuntao  a professor of the 
CCP Central Party School, warned that if China adopts the multi-party system and separation 
of power  China will definitely be in chaos and it will also be a “disaster to the world” (Lei 
and Hou, 2013). 
Indeed, top Chinese leaders have frequently warned about the potential consequences of 
social disorder when they emphasized the crucial importance of social stability. During his 
talk with the then US President George H. W. Bush, Deng Xiaoping(1994:284) said “in China  
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the overriding need is for stability. Without a stable environment, we can accomplish nothing 
and may even lose what we have gained.” In his speech at the 15th Party Congress, Jiang 
Zemin(1997a) clearly elaborated that “without stability  nothing can be achieved”. Hu Jintao 
(2005) also warned that “we should always keep in mind that there is nothing we can achieve 
without social stability; we should properly handle the relationship among reform, 
development  and stability  and maintain the overall social stability”. 
As Chapter 3 discussed, the relevant literature considers social stability to be important 
to the CCP’s legitimacy  however  it does not pay sufficient attention to the interaction 
between stability and ideology. This chapter argues that the CCP’s capability to maintain the 
social order interacts with its (in)stability discourse. In other words, ideology plays a crucial 
role in maintaining social stability in China. The regime’s  in)stability discourse generated 
popular support for the current political system, which indirectly contributes to a stable social 
order; this stability in return reinforces this discourse that the current political system is more 
capable of maintaining stability. If we use the words of my theoretical framework of 
legitimacy  the regime’s performance in maintaining social order (i.e. performance legitimacy) 
is enhanced by the popular support for the current political system (i.e. ideological 
legitimacy). As such  it again shows that ideology plays a crucial role in the CCP’s legitimacy.  
Several studies on the subject of stability in China touch upon ideology (Breslin, 2012; 
Feng, 2013b; Marinelli, 2013; Shue, 2004; Sandby-Thomas, 2011). For example, as Chapter 
  discussed   hue’s stability (2004) is constructed by “truth”  “benevolence”  and “glory” that 
involves ideological, moral, and nationalistic factors. This work makes a notable contribution 
to explain contemporary Chinese politics by using Chinese historical traditions; however, 
Chinese traditions mentioned by Shue are primarily based on the ruling logic of late-imperial 
times – most are from the Qing dynasty and not from typical Chinese traditions, because the 
Qing dynasty is less influenced by Confucianism. This chapter will trace back to the typical 
Confucian traditions to explore how the CCP incorporated traditional cultural values into its 
socialist agenda.  
Another notable contribution is given by Peter Sandby-Thomas. Sandby-Thomas (2011) 
critically examined the CCP’s  in)stability discourse by analysing the articles of the People’s 
Daily between 1989 and 2007. By focusing on three major events – the protest of 1989, the 
anti-Falun Gong campaign in 1999, and the anti-Japan demonstrations in 2005 –, Thomas 
demonstrates how the CCP deliberately exploited the people’s concern about an unstable and 
fracturing China in order to gain legitimacy. As Weatherley (2011:383) noted, the choices 
made in the stability discourse of Sandby-Thomas’ book (2011)  is not up-to-date, partly 
because of the long publication process  and recently  the regime has “very audibly re-
doubled its efforts to present itself as a stabilising force” in reporting democratization in the 
Middle East and the Jasmine Revolution. This chapter will show the CCP frames the events 
of democratization to strengthen its (in)stability discourse.  
 While the above studies examined the CCP’s discourse of domestic events  this thesis 
focuses on the CCP’s efforts to reframe foreign events in order to delegitimize liberal 
democracy. As I argued, a key marketing strategy of the authoritarian rule in the (in)stability 
discourse is to link liberal democracy with national chaos on the one hand and to stress the 
necessity of a strong ruling party to maintain a stable social order and public safety on the 
other hand. In this way, the CCP wins credit by contrasting the stable social order in China 
with chaos in democratic countries.  
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On the one hand, the CCP has been taking great efforts to propagate its instability 
discourse  i.e. “liberal democracy brings chaos”). Arguably  this discourse has been deeply 
rooted in China as evidenced by various surveys. For example,  hi’s survey of “ ocial 
Change and  ocial Value” in      shows that 45% of respondents were concerned that 
“introducing more democracy might cause instability or a loss of social order” and over 6 % 
agreed that “if there were too many political parties  this would bring chaos to national 
politics” (Wang, 2007:568). It suggests that the official propaganda succeeded in associating 
liberal democracy with chaos.  
On the other hand  the CCP’s marketing strategy has painted itself as the only force 
capable of providing social stability and the safety of the masses. The survey by Nathan and 
Shi (1996:544) finds that over 76% of respondents agreed that developing democracy in 
China should be dependent on the leadership of the CCP, and 95% of respondents agreed or 
strongly agreed the same in another survey (Wang, 2007:572). Arguably, it is widely 
accepted by Chinese people that stability is a precondition of economic growth, and only a 
strong ruling party (i.e. one-party rule without checks and balances) can provide stability. 
After exploring the overall impacts of the (in)stability discourse, the following section 
will focus on three cases of democratization – the Soviet Union, Taiwan, and the Arab Spring 
– to analyze the specific content of the discourse. The marketing strategy of the (in)stability 
discourse is particularly and obviously reflected in these cases – although Thailand and 
Ukraine are also notable cases, however, this thesis will not explore them in details because 
of limited space. These small case studies updates the existing studies of the regime’s 
(in)stability discourse and – more importantly – provide a new perspective for understanding 
how the official propaganda deliberately presents a version of democratic failure for 
delegitimizing liberal democracy. 
 
5.5.1.1. The Soviet Union 
The Soviet Union used to be a role model for the CCP. The disintegration of the Soviet 
Unions has been frequently used by the CCP as a negative example of the dangers of 
democratization (Zhong, 1996). Official propaganda has been keen to market the idea that if 
China copies the democratization of the Soviet Union, China will split as the Soviet Union 
did. Take a controversial article – “An unstable China will only be worse than the  oviet 
Union”– as an example (Wang, 2013b). This article was the headline on many big news 
websites for several days in July, 2013. According to some unverified sources, it was the 
Information Office of the  tate Council’s order to ask various media to reproduce this article 
as the headline on their websites (Hai, 2013; Wu, 2013a). This article presents a version of a 
poor Russia after democratization to contrast with China’s prosperity under the CCP’s rule. It 
argues that liberal democracy – a “pitfall of the West” – will only bring endless instability to 
China. This article also harshly criticized that the advocates of liberal democracy in China 
were the “lackeys of the West”. 
The case of the Soviet Union is also used by many articles in the People’s Daily as a 
negative example of the constitutionalism (e.g.Ma, 2013b; Ma, 2013c; Ma, 2013d). For 
example, an article published on the cover page of the People’s Daily argues that “the rise of 
constitutionalism in China is funded by various foundations that are supported by U.S. 
intelligence agencies – such as the project of ‘Comparative Constitutional History in the 
contemporary world’ funded by the Ford Foundation”  and a significant reason why the 
Soviet Union collapsed is that the Soviet Union adopted various theories of socialist 
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constitutionalism which were actually invested with money from U.S. intelligence (Ma, 
2013b).  
 
5.5.1.2. The Arab Spring 
At the beginning of the Arab Spring, the CCP reacted nervously to any possible threats. 
Internet censors exaggerated the crackdown on information about the “Jasmine Revolution” 
for weeks (Breslin, 2012; Dickson, 2011). Yet, the official propaganda became very active 
after the political turmoil in the Middle East in 2013. Immediately after the military coup in 
Egypt on 4 July, 2013, official media launched full media coverage which served to mock 
liberal democracy and the Arab Spring. An article in the People’s Daily argued that Egyptian 
democratization proves that democracy was a source of chaos rather than stability, and 
therefore simply transplanting Western democracy will not help (Wu, 2013b). On 5 July, 
2013, another article published on the front cover of the People’s Daily argues that 
“democracy is not a panacea. Especially to developing countries, economic prosperity, social 
stability  and national security are much more important than Western democracy’s ‘one 
person one vote’” (Lin, 2013). This view is related to the CCP’s discourse of national 
conditions, which asserts that democracy should not be a priority of developing countries, as I 
will discuss below.  
Moreover, the cost of instability that was led by Middle East democratization is closely 
linked with the well-being of individuals. It strengthens the CCP’s instability discourse by 
exploiting people’s concern for their personal safety in an unstable social order. For example  
an article published on the cover of the People’s Daily entitled with “Populace paid a huge 
price for Arab  pring” argued that  
“Ordinary people are the biggest victim of the chaos. Since the unrest, bloodshed has 
led to thousands of Syrian people dying and many ordinary people becoming refugees. 
According to the UN statistics, the number of Syrian refugees currently registered is 
nearly 100,000, and the actual number may be much higher than this. Syria's political 
transformation opened a ‘Pandora's Box’  of which the cost is much higher than the 
benefits” (Tian, 2012).  
This suggests that Chinese people should not pursue liberal democracy as those in the Middle 
East did, otherwise, they will pay the similarly huge price or even lose their lives. By 
emphasizing the losses of Middle Eastern people during democratization, the relevant 
propaganda has been marketing an image of democratic failure and the necessity to maintain 
one-party rule to Chinese people.  
 
5.5.1.3. Taiwan 
Unlike the Soviet Union and Arab countries, Taiwan shared cultural traditions with 
mainland China. Taiwan’s democracy shows strong evidence against the relevant discourse of 
Chinese uniqueness that asserts that liberal democracy is incompatible with China’s historical 
cultural traditions  as I will explain below. As such  the CCP’s propaganda has made great 
efforts to discredit Taiwan’s democracy. In particular, when Chen Shuibian – a Taiwan 
independence advocate – was in office  China’s news coverage of Taiwan’s politics was 
frequently associated with the corruption scandals of Chen Shuibian, the fights among 
legislators in the Taiwanese Legislative Council, and the economic difficulties of Taiwan.  
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The official media in China is also keen on inviting Taiwanese people to criticize 
Taiwan’s democracy. For example  an article in the People’s Daily written by a Taiwanese 
person described Taiwan’s democracy as pure “populist politics” (Ma, 2013a). This article 
describes how meetings of Taiwan’s  egislative Council are filled with fights  splashing 
water, cries, or even rape among legislators. Another article in the People’s Daily written by 
the same Taiwanese author called Taiwan’s legislature “a big tree that is decayed from its 
root (Ma, 2012).
14
   
Arguably  the negative propaganda about Taiwan’s democracy has been successful so 
far. According to my conversations with many ordinary Chinese people who have not been to 
Taiwan, their images of Taiwan are full of the corruption scandals of Chen Shuibian and the 
fight and brawl in the Taiwan Legislative Council.
15
 This strategy might not work in the long 
run with increasing communication between Taiwan and mainland China.  
 
 
5.5.2.The Discourse of the Chinese National Condition   
The discourse of the Chinese national condition is another notable informal ideology. It 
holds that liberal democracy – and perhaps the universal values – is not suitable for China 
because of the national condition. As the report of the then chairman of the People’s Congress  
Wu Bangguo (2011)  elaborates: “based on Chinese national conditions, we seriously declare 
that we will not adapt the multiparty system, ideological pluralism, separation of three powers 
and bicameral, federalism  and privatization”. Arguably, this discourse of the national 
condition has become a widely accepted ideation of the Chinese people. According to the 
     Asian Barometer  over   % of respondents agreed that “although our political system 
has various kinds of problems, it is still the best that fits our national condition” (Wang, 
2010e).  
 The discourse of the national condition is closely related to the (in)stability discourse 
and China’s uniqueness. In contemporary ideological discourses  the national condition 
mainly includes two elements: China’s uniqueness and the developmental stage. First, the 
uniqueness of China suggests that China is unique because of its unique historical and 
cultural traditions; and thus, liberal democracy is not suitable for China, as I will discuss in 
more detailed below. Second, the developmental stage suggests that China is still a 
developing country. As mentioned  the CCP’s discourse of the Arab  pring argues that 
economic prosperity, social stability, and national security are much more important than 
liberal democracy to a developing country, and thus liberal democracy should not be a 
priority for a developing country. In this regard, this discourse of the national condition 
complements the (in)stability discourse which states that liberal democracy might undermine 
social stability – without which economic growth cannot be achieved.  
 In addition, rule of law is also considered by many Chinese elites to have precedence 
over democracy in developing countries such as China. For example, the Law School Dean of 
Qinghua University, Wang Zhenmin(2013d)  argues that “democratic states might end up 
with corruption” without rule of law  as demonstrated by Taiwan’s Chen  huibian and many 
Philippine Presidents who were arrested after they stepped down. Thus, Wang concludes that 
China should never adopt democracy before rule of law, and a democracy without rule of law 
is a “disaster”. This view justifies why the CCP’s reforms concentrates on practising rule of 
                                                            
14 For other articles about the fight and brawl in the Taiwan Legislative Council published in the People’s  aily  
please see  (Wang 2013a)  
15 These talks took place in 2007 
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law rather than democracy. It also links to the China Model that values rule of law but not 
liberal democracy, as I will discuss below. The feasibility of this model and the relationship 
between democracy and rule of law inspired a hot debate within and without China (e.g. Zhao, 
2006). 
 Yet, as mentioned, informal discourse is a kind of short-term solution for legitimizing 
the CCP’s rule – in the long run  it may be used against the CCP’s rule. The discourse of the 
national condition implies that democracy is important for developed countries but not for 
developing countries. In this sense, should China abandon authoritarian rule in the future 
when China become developed? This discourse can only legitimize one-party rule in the short 
term (i.e. when China is still a developing country), and would delegitimize one-party rule in 
the long term (i.e. when China becomes a developed country).  
 Notably  the discourse of the national condition is an essential element of “socialism 
with Chinese characteristics” that supplements the CCP’s value system. According to the 
CCP’s discourses  all formal ideologies including Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping 
Theory, Three Represents, Scientific Outlook of Development, and China Dream are great 
theories that “combine Marxism with the Chinese national condition”.  ince revolutionary 
times, communist ideology in China has been established as a distinctive Chinese form of 
socialism, separate from the Soviet Union and orthodox Marxism.  
 As mentioned in Chapter 4, China has Sinicized Marxism i.e. the “ inification of 
Marxism” since revolutionary times. In 1938, Mao Zedong began to urge that the CCP 
needed to “learn how to apply theories of Marxism- eninism to China’s specific national 
conditions” and “to apply them [Marxist-Leninist theories] according to Chinese 
characteristics”  which was considered by Mao as a “problem that the entire CCP needs to 
understand and solve” (Mao, 1991:534). In revolutionary times, the emphasis on the national 
condition was perhaps an attempt by the CCP to claim the legitimacy of an independent 
China as not part of the Soviet Union (Schurmann, 1966) and to undermine the attacks from 
culturalists who considered communist ideology to be alien.  
 The “national condition” in Mao’s times was of course quite different from now. As 
discussed, nowadays the discourse of the national condition that refers to China’s uniqueness 
and the developmental stage is used to justify why liberal democracy is not suitable in China. 
Indeed, the CCP has made a great effort in reinvesting in Marxism. For example, schools of 
Marxism spread all over Chinese universities, especially in top universities such as Beijing 
University and Qinghua University.  Indeed, a research centre in the China University of 
Political  cience and  aw is named the “Research centre of Marxism and Chinese national 
conditions”. According to Hu Jintao’s (2007) 17th Party Congress report  Marxism “can only 
glow with great vitality, creativity and appeal” when “combined with China’s national 
conditions”. 
 
5.5.3 The Discourse of National Rejuvenation and the Rise of Patriotism  
  As discussed in Chapter 3, the Western scholars widely agree with the important role of 
nationalism in legitimizing the CCP’s rule. Many argue that Chinese nationalism has replaced 
communist beliefs and gradually become the CCP’s new the ideological basis. However, 
nationalism alone is not an ideology – it should be examined as an element of a value system 
rather than a self-contained value system. As mentioned in the Introduction Chapter, this 
thesis considers nationalism as an informal ideology that legitimizes the CCP’s rule by 
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supplementing and surpassing – rather than replacing – the CCP’s formal ideological 
discourse.  
 The discourse of national rejuvenation argues that the current one-party rule exists for 
the greater good of China. Or, to put it in another way, it is there to restore China to its 
rightful position of pre-eminence. It suggests that what the CCP has been doing now is a kind 
of continuation of the revival campaigns of the past – as early as the self-strengthening 
movement in the Qing dynasty in the late     s. This is why the CCP’s propaganda often 
refers to the rejuvenation of China as a century-old dream of Chinese people – it relates to 
“China  ream”  as mentioned above.  
 The greater good of China is not only about collective national pride but also individual 
well-being. The CCP has been keen to link “strengthening the country”  qiang guo) with 
“enriching the people”  fu min), which suggests that a prosperous nation will enrich its people. 
For example, an article in the People’s Daily argues that “‘strengthening the country’ is a 
prerequisites for ‘enriching the people’  if the country is not strong, it is hard to enrich the 
people” (Wang, 2010c). The relevant discourse can be traced back to the propaganda in Mao 
Zedong’s China. A popular slogan of the CCP – “the small streams rise when the main stream 
is high  when the main stream is low  the small streams run dry” – was used to promote the 
people’s commune in rural areas. It suggests that only if the people’s commune ran well 
could the members of the people’s commune become rich. In contemporary China  the idea 
that national interests and individual interests are inseparable has been indoctrinated through 
school education. For example  the standard text book “Thoughts and Politics” –required 
reading at high school in China – clearly declares that “to protect national interests is to 
protect the fundamental interests of the broad masses” (Vickers, 2009:529). As such, the 
discourse of national rejuvenation also carries Chinese people’s individual expectations for 
better lives.    
 The elements of the national rejuvenation discourse has been carefully embedded into 
various big events – such as the Beijing Olympics, Asian Games, the Shanghai Expo, and the 
Shenzhou Space Project – as part of the CCP’s national political marketing for both 
international and domestic audiences, as I will discuss below. In addition, official propaganda 
also explicitly and implicitly contrasts the old China that was humiliated by Western powers 
in the late 1880s and the early 1990s with contemporary China – the second largest world 
economy and a rising international power that can say “no” to the West. In this way  it 
portrays the CCP as a legitimate heir apparent of the Qing dynasty that does not only save 
China but also leads China to revive. For example, a People’s Daily editorial argues that the 
current prosperous China is “a relentless pursuit of countless people with lofty ideals since 
the Opium War” in the mid-1800s and achieving the century-old dream of national 
rejuvenation has never been as close as it is now (Editorial, 2013). It concludes that all 
Chinese people should make persistent efforts and work hard in unity under the CCP’s 
leadership to fulfill this dream.  
 It is important to distinguish the term “national rejuvenation” with that of 
“modernization” here. Modernization usually stands for a Western version of society, 
suggesting that Western civilization is superior to Eastern civilization. In this sense, Western 
liberal democracy is a role model of a political system that China should follow. On the 
contrary, the term national rejuvenation suggests that China should restore itself to its rightful 
position of pre-eminence – the superiority of Chinese civilization. In this sense, the Chinese 
political system should build on its own civilization rather than move towards Western liberal 
democracy. 
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5.5.3.1.Universal Values: Non-Chinese and Anti-Chinese? 
As I argued earlier, the strategy of informal ideology is a sort of negative approach to 
delegitimize liberal democracy. Chinese nationalism has similar effects in discrediting liberal 
democracy. Based on the 2008 China Survey, Tang and Darr (2012) found that Chinese 
nationalism “serves as a powerful instrument in impeding public demand for democratic 
changes”. To link liberal democracy with Western imperialism is a central concern in the 
discourse of national rejuvenation, especially as it serves to discredit democracy. First of all, 
the CCP’s propaganda emphasizes that liberal democracy is a Western product  which is not 
suitable for China. This relates to the discourse on China’s uniqueness  which asserts that 
universalism is actually a purely European phenomenon that is built on a narrow set of 
experiences and histories in a very small part of the world, as I will discuss below. It suggests 
that Western democracy is an inappropriate form of political system for China.  
 econd  the CCP’s propaganda also portrays China’s success under authoritarian rule as 
a strong enemy of the West in order to gain national identity domestically. As an article in the 
People’s Daily argues that, the rise of China poses a strong challenge to universal values – a 
synonym of the hegemony of Western values– and thus the China Model becomes a threat to 
the West (Wang, 2013c). As Callahan (2005) argues, the CCP has been making use of the 
“anti-China” view – such as the “China Threat Theory” – to consolidate the national identity 
of the Chinese people.  
More importantly, liberal democracy is portrayed as a Western effort to contain the rise 
of China – a kind of contemporary Western imperialism. Specifically, those Western efforts 
in promoting democracy in China have been frequently linked to Western imperialism in the 
19
th
 century. This is closely related to a version of the past that the CCP recreated in order to 
justify the present, as I will discuss below. In the 19
th
 century, the West colonized many parts 
of China through wars  and this “‘century of humiliation’ is central to Chinese nationalism 
today” (Gries, et al., 2011). The CCP has kept reminding Chinese people about this “century 
of humiliation” to contrast with a strong and prosperous China under the CCP’s rule. For 
example  the legacy of Beijing’s Old  ummer Palace has been kept alive – as a part of the 
Patriotic Education Campaign – to remind Chinese people about the military crimes that 
British and French troops committed in China during the Opium Wars (Weatherley and 
Rosen, 2013). In this context, Western attempts to promote universal values in China can be 
easily portrayed as having an “ulterior” motive. Thus  the West’s support for separatist 
movements and separatists, such as the Dalai Lama, is widely interpreted by many Chinese 
people as a similar attempt to divide China as the West did to Chinese ancestors in the 19
th
 
century.  
 In addition to national sentiment about the memory of “national humiliation”  the 
discourse of national rejuvenation also involves realistic concerns about individual wellbeing. 
As mentioned, the discourse of national rejuvenation carries not only national pride but also 
individual well-being. If “strengthening the country” is a prerequisite for “enriching the 
people”  then the fading of China would undermine the quality of life for individuals. Thus, 
Western interventions are not only about the collective (i.e. the PRC and the CCP regime) but 
also individuals (i.e. Chinese people). In other words, those interventions can damage not 
only the collective national pride of China but also the personal lives of Chinese people. Thus, 
Western states’ deliberate efforts to promote democracy can be portrayed as threats not only 
to the one-party system  i.e. the CCP’s rule) but also to Chinese people.    
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Ironically, some advocates for Western democracy help the CCP to resist liberal 
democracy. As discussed in Chapter 3, many Western scholars suggest that Western 
governments should be tougher in supporting democracy in China. Unfortunately, this kind of 
policies will arouse Chinese people’s memory about “national humiliation” and anti-West 
sentiment, which is not helpful to China’s democratization.  
 
5.5.3. . “ iberal  emocracy is not  uitable for  eading the Rejuvenation of China” 
In addition to linking liberal democracy with Western imperialism, state propaganda 
also emphasizes that liberal democracy cannot serve the greater good of China and 
accomplish the grand mission of national rejuvenation. For example, an article in the Red 
Flag – a leading theory journal of the CCP – that was also reproduced by the People’s Daily 
argued that Western democracy only focuses on short-term interests rather than long-term 
goals, and it protects small groups rather than the national interest (Cao, 2013). It suggests 
that liberal democracy cannot be used to accomplish national rejuvenation, which is a long-
term project and highly emphasizes the overall national interest of China. As such, this article 
concludes that the current one-party system is necessary for restoring China’s great power 
status.  
Another article in the People’s Daily written by the CA  ’ research centre of socialism 
with Chinese characteristics also argues that “Western theories  no matter whether they be 
neo-liberalism or democratic socialism, neither line up with Chinese national conditions nor 
represent the fundamental interests of China. They could not help China to find a scientific, 
correct development path” (CASS, 2013). Thus, it concludes that national rejuvenation can 
only be accomplished by relying on China’s own system. This is closely linked with the 
(in)stability discourse. As I discussed above, the  in)stability discourse portrayed China’s 
democratic experiments in the early 20th century (e.g. Sun Yat-sen’s democratic experiments) 
as a root cause of China’s civil strife.  
The discourse of national rejuvenation is strongly backed up by economic success in 
China. This economic success has made China a rising power on the international stage that 
increase Chinese people’s national pride. This success has been frequently linked with 
national pride to create an image of revival in the CCP’s propaganda (Cong, 2013). In 
addition, by contrasting specular economic performance in China with economic difficulties 
in democratic countries, the regime has been implicitly and explicitly marketing the idea that 
the current political system is more effective and efficient at promoting economic growth and 
increasing people’s livelihood than any other alternative political system – especially liberal 
democracy.  
Economic development has also led to China’s rising military strength. The regime has 
been keen to contrast China’s capability to defend itself under the CCP’s rule with the 
humiliation of the 20th century. For example, the National Day Military Parade has always 
borne symbolic meanings, such as those representing an increasingly successful China 
(Hwang and Schneider, 2011).  
  
5.5.3.3. Nationalism: a double-edged sword 
As mentioned above, the CCP won a great deal of credit for its success by creating an 
image of a strong China under its rule. However, the problem is that the rising nationalism 
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also constrains the regime’s ability to deal with international affairs. If the regime fails to 
meet people’s rising expectation when dealing with international conflicts, nationalism will 
become a problem. This is clearly evidenced in the failure of the Beiyang government in the 
early 1900s. As a member of the First World War allies, Chinese people considered China a 
victorious power which led to nationwide discontent and the May Fourth movement when the 
Beiyang government failed to gain the expected benefits from the Treaty of Versailles. Thus, 
when the CCP deals with Japan about Diaoyu/Senkaku Island and the Philippines in the 
South China Sea, many of its actions are enforced by domestic expectations.  
 imilarly  when the CCP’s propaganda has embedded patriotic elements into various 
national projects as part of its political marketing, it also stakes its legitimacy on the success 
of those projects. For example  the CCP’s propaganda has taken great effort to link the 
Shenzhou Space Project with national pride and to portray this project as a symbol of China’s 
rejuvenation. The CCP will gain legitimacy when these space exploration projects succeed. 
However, once those projects meet some big problems or even fail, the linkage between the 
symbol of China’s rejuvenation and those space projects may be harmful to the CCP’s rule. 
The negative national sentiment may easily work against the CCP’s rule. In short, nationalism 
is a double-edged sword, which again suggests that informal ideology is a short-term solution.   
 
5.5.4. The Uniqueness of China: Establishing the Cultural Basis of the CCP 
The above discourses of national rejuvenation, (in)stability, and the national condition 
are closely related to the discourse of China’s uniqueness. The discourse of China’s 
uniqueness emphasizes that China should have its own political system rather than embrace 
liberal democracy. It suggests that there should be no expectation whatsoever of convergence 
with some forms of supposed “universal endpoint” (i.e. Western democracy), as this 
“universalism” is actually purely a European phenomenon built on a narrow set of 
experiences and histories in a very small part of the world. By highlighting Chinese 
differences, the relevant discourses justify why China does not have to adopt Western 
political system, which in reverse legitimizes the current “socialism with Chinese 
characteristics”.   
This uniqueness involves two different logics. The first is a kind of “anti-universalism” 
– which assumes that every country is different as they all have a different culture and history; 
therefore, every country should define their own human rights, freedom, and democracy. In 
this sense  there is no such thing as “universal values”. On the contrary  the second logic 
argues that China is uniquely unique. In other words, only China is unique because of its 
unique history, culture, and national conditions.  
The proponents of the “China model” and “Chinese exceptionalism”  for example  
argue that China does not have to follow Western path to achieve modernization because 
China can find its own because of its unique cultural heritage (Kang, 2004; Pan, 2003; Pan, 
2009; Pan, 2011; Wang, 2012b; Yao, 2011; Zhang, 2010; Zheng, 2010). Many empirical 
studies lend strong support to these kinds of claims, pushing toward thinking of China as in 
some way exceptional and built on different philosophies to Western states (Shi and Lu, 2010; 
Shin, 2011). As mentioned in Chapter 3, the Chinese understanding of democracy has been 
strongly shaped by Confucian culture, which makes it distinct from the liberal traditions of 
democracy. 
The academic community is still debating whether the “China model” and “Chinese 
exceptionalism” exist or not; however, these academic uncertainties have not obstructed the 
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CCP’s propaganda. The key utility of the relevant discourses does not lie in what China’s 
own path to modernization is but why China should not adopt liberal democracy. As such, the 
relevant discourses have been embedded into the CCP’s propaganda strategy. As Xi Jinping 
elaborated in a national conference on propaganda and ideological work, propaganda and 
ideological work should clearly elaborate that – China should have its own path of 
development because of its unique culture, historical traditions, and national condition (Ni, 
2013).  
 Notably, the CCP used to be a pioneer in removing the influence of Chinese traditions 
in revolutionary times and Mao’s era. The CCP’s “anti-Confucianism” campaign  for 
example, reached its peak during the Cultural Revolution, and many Confucian sites were 
destroyed by the Red Guards. After Mao died   eng’s less ideology-focused approach has 
allowed for the resurgence of traditions. In contemporary China, driven by the quest for 
legitimacy, the CCP has been taking a very different approach to deal with Chinese traditions 
and culture. Nowadays  the CCP claims to be a “defender” of Chinese Confucian traditions 
(Buckley, 2014); Confucianism has been pragmatically promoted by the CCP in order to 
secure the CCP’s cultural leadership (Wu, 2014) and – more importantly – supplement its 
formal ideologies. In this context  the CCP’s various discourses have been moving towards 
Chinese traditions in order to co-opt and integrate them into its own agenda.  
 On the one hand, various informal ideological discourses have been produced to replace 
the gaps left in establishing a cultural basis of Chinese society that was lost when revolution 
was abandoned. In order to do so, informal ideology has refurbished Chinese traditions with 
socialist elements. On the other hand, the relevant discourses have recreated a version of 
Chinese history. This entails a sort of blurring of different philosophical trends into a single 
version of the Chinese past – even when there were at the time contending world views 
during the Warring States period. This version of Chinese history and tradition is mainly built 
from the perspective of Confucianism that preserves order and harmony – which was often 
used by Chinese dynasties to maintain their rules. 
 
  
5.5.4.1. Refurbishing Chinese Traditions with Socialist Elements 
This section examines how the CCP have refurbished Chinese traditions with socialist 
elements to incorporate traditional cultural values into the CCP’s socialist agenda. 
 
5.5.4.1.1. Rule by Virtue (yide zhiguo) 
Rule by virtue is a notable example of the CCP’s ideological shift towards Chinese 
traditions. As discussed in Chapter 2, rule by virtue is a traditional ruling philosophy of 
Confucianism. A core element of wang dao – a Confucian doctrine – is to use the ruler’s 
virtues to make people obey and follow. Virtue here refers to benevolence, and benevolent 
governance is a basic criterion of rule by virtue. According to the normative values of 
Confucianism, a regime is legitimate if it practises benevolent governance. 
In 2001, Jiang Zemin (2001) officially proposed combining “rule by law” with “rule by 
virtue” as the CCP’s governing strategy. However, this “rule by virtue” is very different from 
the traditional Confucian doctrine – it is refurbished with socialist elements. According to 
Jiang (2001), this “rule by virtue” is guided by Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, 
and Deng Xiaoping Theory. The CCP aimed to use “rule by virtue” to establish a “socialist 
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ideological and ethical system” that would employ certain norms that would be widely 
accepted and followed by people (Jiang, 2001).  
This ideological transition towards virtue is also a response to the rampant corruption in 
China. As Chapter 3 discussed, 43% of Chinese intellectuals considered corruption a threat to 
legitimacy, which is the third most frequently mentioned threat. The emphasis on virtue is an 
attempt to establish moral guidelines for civil servants and party cadres and to improve the 
moral performance of the party-state. According to Jiang Zemin (2001)  “rule by virtue” can 
use its “persuasiveness” to increase “ideological understanding and moral consciousness of 
social members”  which complements rule by law. In other words  the promotion of “virtue” 
as a kind of moral education was an attempt to gain regime legitimacy by combating 
corruption.  
 
5.5.4.1.2. Socialist Harmonious Society（hexie shehui） 
The proposition of a Socialist Harmonious Society is a clearer ideological move 
towards Chinese traditions. Harmony is a traditional Confucian value that highly preserves a 
stable social order and has been deeply rooted in Chinese culture. The result of the East Asian 
Barometer suggests persistent influence of Chinese cultural values – which privileges a 
harmonious social order –still common exists in Chinese societies including Mainland China, 
Hong Kong, and Taiwan (Chu, et al., 2008:21). This harmony is reinterpreted by the 
CCP(2006) as an “essential attribute” of socialism with Chinese characteristics. In this way, it 
refurbishes the traditional Confucian doctrine of harmony into a socialist version of harmony 
(i.e. Socialist Harmonious Society).  
The primary purpose of Socialist Harmonious Society is to maintain a stable social 
order in the context of a disparate Chinese society that suffers from various socioeconomic 
problems – especially worsening social tensions. Harmonious Society implicitly appeals to 
society to tolerate greater inequality in the current socioeconomic standings. Its key message 
is that Chinese people should not “rock the boat” by complaining about tensions  because the 
greater good of society is more important than any feelings that an individual may have about 
inequality.  
It is worth mentioning  eng Xiaoping’s “Xiaokang  ociety” – means moderately 
prosperous – here.  ike “harmony”  “Xiaokang” is also a Confucian concept that means 
“moderately prosperous”. Both Harmonious Society and Xiaokang Society signal a future 
vision of what China will look like by absorbing elements of traditional cultural ideals. In 
addition, in terms of development stages, Harmonious Society is a kind of continuation of 
“Xiaokang  ociety”. It suggests the progress of Chinese society under the CCP’s leadership – 
the primary task of the CCP shifted from delivering economic growth emphasized by 
“Xiaokang  ociety” into socioeconomic equality emphasized by Harmonious Society. In 
other words, since the CCP succeeded in establishing a moderately prosperous (i.e. Xiaokang) 
society, the party is now leading China toward becoming a harmonious society. In these 
respects, Harmonious Society was an attempt to gain popular legitimacy. 
As mentioned earlier, Harmonious Society spans informal and formal ideologies. 
Although both Scientific Outlook of Development and Harmonious Society were Hu Jintao’s 
contributions to party theories, the former involves much more personal authority than the 
latter. It is evidenced by the fact that Scientific Outlook of Development has been 
incorporated into the party constitution while Harmonious Society is not. My recent study 
also finds that factional ties with top leaders have a statistically significant correlation with 
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the variation of provincial leaders’ willingness to echo Scientific Outlook of Development 
and Three Represents campaigns; however, those ties have no statistically significant impact 
on the leaders’ willingness to echo Harmonious Society campaigns (Zeng, 2014). It suggests 
that Harmonious Society is focused on asserting the power of the top leader than the other 
two.   
In addition, the discourse of Harmonious Society consists of much more populist 
language than that of Scientific Outlook of Development and Three Represents. This is 
perhaps because the latter two are formal ideologies that were mainly for the consumption of 
the party, whilst Harmonious Society is not only produced for the party but also for society 
(i.e. appeal the society to tolerate socioeconomic inequality).  
 
5.5.4.1.3. The Mandate of Heaven? The transition from a communist party to a ruling party 
The CCP’s rule is also linked to traditional ruling philosophies  in particular the 
Mandate of Heaven. As discussed in Chapter 2, Chinese emperors claimed that they were the 
sons of Heaven and their rights to rule were granted by Heaven, and therefore, this legitimacy 
claim is called the Mandate of Heaven. The Mandate of Heaven was a clear and deliberate 
state strategy designed to legitimize regime transition without throwing away all the other 
legitimizing tools of the previous regimes. Thus, this concept is widely used by subsequent 
Chinese dynasties to justify regime transition.    
Various studies suggest that the Mandate of Heaven has been embedded in Chinese 
culture and history and thus it still plays an important role in maintaining the CCP’s 
legitimacy (Guo, 2003; Schneider and Hwang, 2014; Tong, 2011; Zhao, 2009; Zhu, 2011). 
However, their stance is ambiguous because the CCP is neither willing to reject nor able to 
associate themselves openly with this term through their official propaganda – as it claims to 
be atheist and officially against feudal superstition.  
In order to get rid of the above ambivalence, some intellectuals have attempted to 
legitimize the CCP’s rule by creating a new mandate – the rise of China or, perhaps more 
correctly, national revival. For example, an article published on the Red Flag links the CCP’s 
rule with the Mandate of Heaven (Cao and Ma, 2013). This article reinterprets the Mandate of 
Heaven as a sacred mission – national unity, social stability, and economic growth – that the 
CCP is required to complete. In other words  the CCP’s mandate is to lead the revival of 
China, and China needs a strong party to lead for its national prosperity. This idea of the 
Mandate of Heaven is implicitly embedded into the CCP’s propaganda. For example  in the 
celebration of the PRC’s sixtieth anniversary, the grand musical epic Road to Revival 
portrayed the CCP as a legitimate heir apparent that took over the Mandate of Heaven from 
the Qing dynasty and as a chosen regime that led the rise of China (Cong, 2013).  
Yet, similar to other informal ideologies that are short-term solution, the discourse of 
the CCP’s mandate has two serious flaws. The above discourse uses the Mandate of Heaven 
to redefine the CCP as a ruling party – that is dedicated to producing national unity, social 
stability  and economic growth. This might be a response to people’s needs  because these 
three items are considered by Chinese people as the top three national priorities according to a 
World Value Survey, as mentioned. However, it also legitimizes – perhaps even demands that 
– the CCP to be overthrown if it loses the mandate. In other words, it suggests that people 
should overthrow the CCP if it fails to promote economic growth, maintain stability and 
national unity. Will Chinese economy always perform well? As discussed in Chapter 4, 
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Chinese intellectuals are seriously concerned about whether the economy will continue to do 
well.  
More importantly, the discourse of the CCP’s mandate also challenges the meaning of 
the CCP’s existence. As discussed, a communist party should justify its rule by delivering 
class struggle and a communist society instead of maintaining social stability, promoting 
economic growth, and defending national interests.   
 
5.5.4.2.The Recreation of the History: The Use of the Past (gu wei jin yong) 
In addition to refurbishing Chinese traditions with socialist elements, the use of the past 
is another notable ideological strategy of the CCP. “The use of the past” is a famous Chinese 
idiom, which means to use the past for the present. In China, historical writings are always 
virtually political, and they are often re-created for political purposes. In ancient China, the 
histories of past dynasties written by official historians were often related to corruption, moral 
turpitude, and the suffering of people – a sign of losing the Mandate of Heaven.  
In contemporary China, the CCP has taken great efforts to present a version of history 
that can then be used to justify the present (Lary, 2008; Zhang and Weatherley, 2013b). For 
example  the history of Qing has great implications for proving the glorification of China’s 
past and the CCP’s legitimate role as an heir of a late imperial dynasty and the ruler of 
Xinjiang, Tibet, and Taiwan; thus, the CCP has heavily sponsored relevant projects (Lary, 
2008). As another example, the history of modern China – the May Fourth Movement, 
Japan’s invasion  civil war – is written very differently by the CCP and the KMT because of 
their different political stances.  
Yet, the strategy of creating history is not always successful – sometimes, it may 
delegitimize the CCP (Zhang and Weatherley, 2013a; Zhang and Weatherley, 2013b). For 
example, the CCP has beautified its contributions during the war against Japan to legitimize 
its rule at the expense of the  MT’s contribution. However  this legitimacy claim has been 
challenged by the increasing communication between the CCP and the KMT. As Zhang and 
Weatherley observes (2013a)  the CCP’s recognition of the role of the  MT during the war 
led to a public debate over the contribution of the KMT, which has delegitimized the CCP’s 
contribution during the war. Similarly, when the CCP attempted to acknowledge the positive 
aspects of the “republication era” for building a united front with the  MT  the increasing 
public support for the Republican era in mainland China has been eroding the CCP’s 
legitimacy (Zhang and Weatherley, 2013b). 
As this thesis emphasizes ideology and power succession, this section will explore how 
the ideological discourses legitimize and justify power succession in contemporary China by 
idealizing Chinese traditions. As Chapter 6 will explore, various institutional rules have been 
developed to maintain the internal unity of the CCP; however, these rules cannot provide as 
much procedural legitimacy for the new leadership as democratic elections did. In order to 
justify its opaque power succession, the party has turned to ideology – various informal 
discourses that link the CCP’s succession to idealized historical tradition. Two key elements 
of the relevant discourses are abdication and political meritocracy. Abdication emphasizes the 
moral process of power transfer, while political meritocracy focuses on the merit of the 
outcomes. They both suggest a distinct Chinese philosophy of producing leaders that is 
completely different from Western liberal democracy.  
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5.5.4.2.1. Legitimizing the Opaque Procedures of Power Transitions: “abdication”  shan rang)? 
Without the transparent process of democratic elections, Chinese traditions are one of 
few tools to justify the opaque procedures of Chinese succession system. A notable example 
is linking the contemporary power succession with the idealized ancient succession – the 
abdication system. Abdication is an ideal form of leadership transition in ancient China. In 
this system, top leaders voluntarily step down and hand over their power to a more sage (xian 
neng) leader. In practice, however, it was employed as a symbol to legitimize successful 
coups in ancient China. When subordinates replaced the emperor, they often followed with a 
symbolic abdication in order to avoid the criticism of disloyalty and gain legitimacy. 
Kang Xiaoguang, a leading Chinese scholar promoting Confucianism, pioneers a set of 
ideas to modernize Confucian thoughts for enhancing regime legitimacy. Kang (2004)  argues 
that the power succession system of Confucianism, i.e. the abdication system, can be a good 
option for China to solve the authoritarian system’s power succession problems. Another 
Chinese scholar goes a step further. Song Zhenglu (2013) argues that the top leadership 
transition in China “has the elements of traditional ‘abdication’”. The article was reproduced 
on Seek Truth – the party’s primary mouthpiece and an official publication of the CCP 
Central Committee. As its publication date was closely followed by the leadership transition 
in November 2012, this article caused some controversies in China. By implicitly linking Hu 
Jintao’s full retirement with an ideal version of “abdication”  it attempted to justify the 
procedures of the leadership transition in China and to cover the secretive power struggles – 
such as the fall of Bo Xilai.  
 Ideally, the power transfer of abdication is legitimate, because the old leader voluntarily 
steps down rather than being forced and this transition is recommended by other elites. As the 
leaders’ voluntary resignation is particularly important in this process. In ancient China, the 
new leaders would usually refuse twice to take power before it was finally agreed upon. It 
symbolically shows that new leaders take power not because they want to but because they 
have to. In other words, a new leader decides to take power not for his personal gain but 
because it is in the national interest. It reflects the Chinese value of “being humble”  qianbei).  
 A similar appreciation of humility can also be found when Jiang Zemin took power. 
Jiang emphasized that he did not want to take power but he had to. According to Jiang 
Zemin’s (2006:57; 1989) inaugural speech on 24 June 1989:  
“The Central Committee recommends that I become a P C member and the  ecretary 
General. I am not mentally prepared and also lack experience in central government, 
and therefore I feel very stressed and powerless. Now, the decision has been made by 
the Central Committee  I appreciate comrades’ trust  and have decided to work and 
study hard, and try my best to do my work in order not to live up to the expectations of 
the veteran revolutionaries and comrades”. 
The above words portray a moral image similar to abdication: that the then party leader Zhao 
Ziyang was incapable of solving the protest of       and thus a more “sage” leader  Jiang 
Zemin, was strongly recommended – or even forced – by veteran leaders to take power and 
manage the chaotic situation after 1989. In this way, it covered the intense, secretive power 
struggle and justified (if not legitimized) the new leadership of Jiang.  
 
5.5.4.2.2. Praising the Outcome of Chinese Succession: Political Meritocracy?  
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Political meritocracy is a key opinion about talent in China, which means the 
government should select virtuous and talented people. Unlike abdication that emphasizes the 
process of the leadership transition, political meritocracy stresses the outcome (i.e. the merit 
of leaders). Indeed, the Chinese understanding of democracy influenced by Confucian culture 
highly values government performance (i.e. the outcome), whilst liberal democracy 
emphasizes how the government take power (i.e. the procedures) (Shi and Lu, 2010). As such, 
the CCP has implicitly and explicitly linked its leaders with political meritocracy to legitimate 
its rule. Meritocracy is a principle of cadre selection according to the CCP’s constitution 
(CCP, 2013).  
The discourses of meritocracy are often linked with an idealized version of China’s 
imperial examination system. This system has been an examination mechanism of ancient 
China in selecting civil servants since the Sui Dynasty in 605. It mainly examines students’ 
philosophical knowledge and literary skills, such as the writing of eight-legged essays – a 
special writing style in the imperial examination system. Some argue that this system was an 
institutionalized way to practise political meritocracy in ancient China (Bell, 2012; Zhang, 
2012). A strong proponent of the China Model, Zhang Weiwei (2012), for example, portrayed 
the imperial examination system as an effective way of facilitating social mobility and the 
search for talents. By presenting an ideal version of the imperial examination system, Zhang 
argued that China’s meritocracy that originated from this historical tradition is better than 
Western democracy. 
Yet, this idealized understanding of the imperial examination system perhaps goes too 
far. Historians suggest that “over   %” of the Chinese population are not eligible to take the 
imperial examination system because of the unequal distribution of social and educational 
resources (Elman, 1991: 17). Elliott (2012) also argues that “family connections and material 
resources” rather than merit are the keys to political success for “a majority” of Chinese 
imperial political elites. Moreover, there is no natural link between literary skills and the 
ability to manage the country. Excellent writing skills do not necessarily mean management 
expertise. Similarly, a PhD degree indicates expertise in specific areas rather than general 
administration or management skills. The old method of writing eight-legged essays, in 
particular, is very pedantic. There is much doubt about whether those people who do well in 
the examination are capable of organizing and managing social affairs. In this sense, the 
imperial examination system is a way to co-opt educated elites and is set as a symbol of social 
mobility rather than a search for governing talent.  
 
5.6. The Mechanism of Ideological Promotion and its Effectiveness  
After exploring the messages of formal and informal ideological discourses above, this 
section discusses how those messages are transmitted to the party and society, and the 
effectiveness of ideological promotion in contemporary China. 
   
5.6.1. Promoting Formal Ideological Discourse to the Party 
As mentioned, the party has different strategies to promote its informal and formal 
ideologies. The promotion of formal ideological discourse heavily relies on various party 
newspapers and journals, especially People’s Daily and Seeking Truth, which are considered 
significant opinion fronts. The General Office of the CCP usually issues a notice about the 
promotion of party newspapers and journals each year that requires party-state organizations 
to subscribe – including party organs and governmental agencies at all levels, party branches 
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in urban areas, township-level party committees in rural areas  people’s organizations  public 
enterprises and institutions including their subordinate units, universities/colleges and their 
affiliated primary and secondary schools, grass-roots organizations of public security, 
industry and commerce, and the taxation system, etc. (Office, 2013). The mechanism of 
ideological promotion heavily relies on those party newspapers and journals. Thus, formal 
ideology was not accessible to the masses before the Internet became popular in China. In 
contemporary China, those party newspapers and journals are still mainly consumed by the 
party – partly because their content is not attractive to the masses.  
In addition to the People’s Daily and the Seeking Truth, various levels of governmental 
and party organs also have their own newspapers and journals that publish information about 
formal ideological discourses. For example, each provincial unit has its own official 
newspaper that is directly controlled by provincial propaganda departments, and their content 
is closely supervised by the provincial standing committee.  hih’s (2008) empirical study 
finds that there is statistically a significant correlation between the frequency of Three 
Represents articles published by provincial official newspapers and the factional background 
of provincial leaders.  pecifically  provinces governed by Jiang Zemin’s followers are more 
likely to publish articles about Jiang’s Three Represents. My recent study also finds a similar 
correlation between the frequency of Scientific Outlook of Development articles and the 
factional background of provincial leaders (Zeng, 2014).  
Moreover, the CCP has also institutionalized many formal channels to tighten the 
thinking of members and cultivate communist beliefs. The party cadres are required to attend 
ideological training in various party schools, cadre schools, academies of social sciences, 
universities, and theory study groups for studying party theories. Formal ideologies – 
Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, Three Represents, and 
Scientific Outlook of Development – are required courses in those training programmes. For 
example, the Central Party School holds a one-year or six-month full-time young cadre 
training class for departmental level (ting ji) or deputy departmental level local cadres. This 
young cadre training class is designed for potential local leaders who are usually promoted 
after the training, and a key goal of this young cadre training class is to cultivate communist 
beliefs and study formal party theories. The role of school training in cultivating communist 
beliefs is highly valued by Chinese leaders. For example, Xi considered various party schools, 
cadre schools, academies of social sciences, universities, and theory study groups as 
important fronts through which to study, research, and propagate Marxism (Ni, 2013).  
In addition to school training, party members are required to study various government 
instructions, articles, and textbooks. Various levels of government in China also hold a 
regular series of meetings to study party theories. Various activities have been held to review 
the party history and difficult times during the revolutions, including arranging for the party 
cadres to revisit the famous revolutionary sites such as Yanan or re-walk the roads of the 
Long March.  
 
5.6.2. Transmitting Informal Ideological Discourses to Society  
Compared to formal ideology, ideological promotion to the masses takes a looser 
approach which promotes pro-authoritarian values rather than communist beliefs. This is also 
why informal ideologies formed by populist language – rather than formal ideologies formed 
by complex communist language – are the main messages being passed to the society. The 
promotion of informal ideological discourses heavily relies on mass propaganda that is highly 
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valued by the CCP. As discussed in Chapter 4, 38% of Chinese intellectuals advised the state 
to improve its official propaganda, which is the second most frequently mentioned strategy 
for maintaining legitimacy. 
Indeed, informal ideological discourses are embedded into almost all aspects of the 
masses’ information channels  including school education  TV drama programmes  movies  
songs, literary works, and popular newspapers. In Chinese high schools and universities, 
students are required to take courses such as “Thoughts and Politics” that disseminates the 
CCP’s political messages.  ince the late     s  Chinese universities have required students to 
complete 210-314 academic hours of political education courses (Yan, 2014:9). Ideological 
and political education – in particular patriotism – is also embedded into various 
extracurricular activities such as sports events, flag-raising ceremonies, and activities of 
“young pioneers” (Vickers, 2009:526).  
In addition to school education, various culture and arts organizations, such as the 
China Federation of Literary and Art Circles, the China Writer Association, and the 
Photographic Association, are directly led by the CCP to convey relevant political messages. 
For example, the mission of the China Writer Association is to link the party-state to writers 
and become an important social force to build socialist civilization. As such, various popular 
literary and artistic works carry many messages of ideological discourses.  
For example, the CCTV Spring Festival Gala Evening – the leading TV event of the 
year – involves many ideological elements every year. Through its songs, skits, and dance, 
the CCTV Spring Festival Gala Evening implicitly and explicitly disseminates pro-
authoritarian discourses, such as the national revival of China and the wise leadership of the 
CCP. It is clearly evidenced by a longitudinal study on CCTV’s  pring Festival Gala in the 
past  6 years. This study finds that “  .7% of the (Gala) performance promoted a political 
agenda” and that “the act or intent to promote new and socially acceptable behaviors and 
morals  and reference to current social problems were identified in   .4% of all performances” 
(Wang, 2010d:402-403). This study also finds that the more recent Galas “were more likely 
to focus on national pride” than before. This is perhaps because of the CCP’s increasing 
propaganda emphasis on China’s improving living standards and because “the use of national 
pride is potentially more effective than the traditional, blatant chanting for loving and serving 
the country and the people” (Wang, 2010d:403).  In addition, the Gala also promotes cultural 
values  such as family unity  which “at the national level extends the Confucian concept of 
harmony and integration and implies the desire for national unity” (Wang, 2010d:402-403).  
The CCP has carefully embedded ideological elements into various big national events 
as part of its national political marketing to both domestic and international audiences, 
including the Beijing Olympics, the Shanghai Expo, the Asian Games, and the Shenzhou 
Space project. Domestically, those events were explicitly portrayed as a sign of the rise of 
China. They enhanced the CCP’s legitimacy by promoting patriotism. On the international 
stage  all those events sent a strong signal about “a prosperous and strong” China and thus 
highlighted the success of the one-party rule – a way for the CCP to win international 
recognition from both developing and developed countries. This international recognition 
satisfied Chinese national pride and thus further strengthened domestic support for the CCP. 
For example  by selectively reporting Western countries’ positive comments on the Beijing 
Olympics in China, the CCP won credit for its success domestically.   
Some popular newspapers also actively propagate informal ideological discourses. For 
example, the Global Times, one of the most popular newspapers in China, is famous for its 
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pro-government stance and nationalistic appeals. School education is also an important 
channel through which to promote informal ideological discourses. I learnt many popular pro-
CCP songs in my primary school  such as “if there is no CCP  there will be no new China”. 
The song lyrics were catchy: “there is no new China without the CCP  the CCP works hard 
for the nation, and the CCP wholeheartedly; it pointed out the road to liberation of the people, 
and it leads China towards the light; it insisted on fighting against Japan for more than eight 
years  and it improves people’s lives ...” 
Moreover, the CCP has been marketing its authoritarian rule through advertising 
slogans. Its propaganda units assisted by local neighbourhood party committees post 
countless catchy slogans in streets and back lanes – including gardens, park plazas, highways, 
and schools. Those slogans include a variety of content but they all carry positive information 
about the CCP’s rule such as “Why is China strong? It is because of the CCP”  zhongguo he 
yiqiang？yuan you gongchandang). It is also common to see those catchy slogans even in 
remote poverty-stricken areas. Some slogans have also reflected timely ideological discourses. 
For example, since Xi Jinping proposed the China Dream, China is now filled with various 
advertising slogans for the China  ream  such as “China  ream  My  ream”  “China  ream  
Power  ream”  zhongguo meng，qiangguo meng)  and “use wisdom and sweat to achieve 
China  ream”  yong zhihui hanshui zhujiu zhongguomeng). In addition, some slogans also 
propagate Chinese traditions and moral educations such as “filial piety is the first virtue” 
(baishan xiao weixian) and “learn from  eifeng”. As I discussed above  that cultural and 
moral education helped to maintain social stability in China. 
Notably, the development of technology has posed unprecedented challenges to 
society’s traditional channels of information. In particular  the Chinese version of Twitter  
Weibo, has become an important channel to pass on pro-liberal democracy values. In order to 
guide public opinions on Weibo, the CCP has taken a series of actions to contain the changing 
social values toward liberal democracy since Xi Jinping took power. On the one hand, various 
traditional mass media outlets such as the People’s Daily, governmental organs (especially 
propaganda units), and many high-level officials are encouraged to open Weibo accounts and 
they have become an important force through which propagate pro-government opinions on 
Weibo – the so-called positive energy of the Internet (wangluo zheng nengliang). On the 
other hand, in the name of combating rumours, the regime has been controlling arena for 
propagating pro-liberal democracy values – the so-called negative energy of the Internet 
(wangluo fu nengliang).  
A key to this battle is to undermine the influence of – or perhaps delegitimize – pro-
liberal democracy public intellectuals. Public intellectuals are significant advocates for 
democracy on Weibo, and they are a key force for promoting constitutionalism. Notably, 
there is a public debate on the Chinese Internet over the definition of “public intellectuals”. In 
this thesis  “public intellectuals” only refer to pro-liberal democracy opinion leaders. Many of 
them have won many followers on Weibo because of their harsh criticism of the government 
and praise for liberal democracy. For example, the Weibo account of Yu Jianrong (2014), a 
director of the CASS and a leading pro-liberal public intellectual, is currently followed by 
over 1.83 million Chinese fans. 
 ince       the CCP’s propaganda has strengthened its attacks on those advocates of 
liberal democracy. An article in the Seek Truth clearly criticized some public intellectuals 
who harshly criticized the government and attempted to overthrow the CCP’s rule (Shi, 2013). 
This article blamed the deliberate instigation of some public intellectuals as an important 
120 
 
reason for the emergence of the Internet’s “negative energy”  including excessive negative 
news, wide spread anti-government sentiment, and Internet violence.  
In addition, the aforementioned article  “An unstable China will only be worse than the 
 oviet Union”  called public intellectuals “the slaves of the West”. It warns that such 
intellectuals have been employing liberal democracy to weaken China’s national strength and 
to “let Chinese people become the dogs of America”. As this article has been widely 
reproduced and it explicitly criticized public intellectuals, some intellectuals openly 
responded it. For example, Yu Jianrong (2013) commented on his Weibo that “Yes  I am the 
traitor of China that you cursed. However, I love the piece of land that I was born and raised 
on, and the people who live on this land. The reason I criticized demolitions, reeducation 
through labour, child begging, and luxury military cars, and hope to put the votes of the 
constitution into practice and to transparent the officials’ property  is to wish that this country 
is not going to unstable!”  
In addition to the media offensive, the CCP also targeted several influential opinion 
leaders in order to deter others. For example, an active opinion leader, Xue Manzi, was 
arrested ostensibly for prostitution. At the end of 2013, the influence of pro-government 
opinions was seriously strengthened at the expense of that of pro-liberal democracy 
intellectuals. The CCP’s success of control over Weibo suggests that the authoritarian regime 
is able to contain the tendency of changing social values toward liberal democracy in the age 
of information. This is also evidenced by empirical studies on the censorship programme in 
China, which suggests that the Internet under the CCP’s censorship strategies has 
strengthened the CCP’s rule (King, et al., 2013; Lorentzen, 2013).  
 
5.6.3. Effectiveness of Ideological Promotion  
After exploring ideological discourses and their channels of promotion, a consequential 
question is: how effective are they? From the outset, it is important to concede that the 
answers to such a question will necessarily be tentative and incomplete, because the 
effectiveness of ideological promotion is hardly measureable. Considering its significance, it 
is still necessary to address this question. I argue that the promotion of informal ideology and 
formal ideology have been relatively effective in maintaining popular legitimacy and party 
cohesion respectively, so far. 
 
5.6.3.1. Informal Ideological Promotion: Maintaining Popular Legitimacy 
It is difficult if not impossible to prove, but there is some evidence that indicates that 
informal ideological discourses have been widely accepted in China. First of all, as mentioned 
above, socioeconomic modernization will bring a series of value shift – such as increased 
demands for political participation and civil liberties – that will inevitably trigger the quest 
for liberal democracy in the long run. However, as noted above, various studies show that 
Chinese people widely agree that the current political system is the most appropriate. For 
example, the 2008 Asian Barometer Survey finds that 74% of Chinese respondents responded 
positively to the statement that “whatever its faults may be  our current system of government 
is still the best for the country”(Chu, 2013:5). In this regard  the CCP’s political marketing 
has been effective in convincing the masses to accept one-party rule so far.  
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Second, Chinese people are ambivalent about democracy. On the one hand, they widely 
support the idea of democracy. For example, the 2002 East Asia Barometer Survey finds that 
 6% of respondents agree that “democracy is completely suitable” for China and 74% agreed 
that “democracy is always preferable”  Wang, 2007: 567).. The 2001 World Value Survey 
finds that  6% of respondents agreed that “having a democratic political system is good” and 
  % agreed that “democracy is better than other forms of government”  Wang, 2007: 567). 
Notably  this “democracy” is not the same with Western or liberal democracy.  
On the other hand, Chinese people fear democracy. The survey of Nathan and Shi 
(1996:544) finds that 54. % of respondents agree that “China needs more democracy now”  
while  7.7% are afraid that “more democracy will lead to chaos”. The survey “ ocial Change 
and  ocial Value” in      also shows that  4% respondents agree that China should “expand 
democracy now”  however  45% worry that “introducing more democracy might cause 
instability or a loss of social order”  65% think that “if there were too many political parties  
this would bring chaos to national politics”  4 % agree that “too many interest groups in 
national or local politics would harm the interests of everyone”  and 74% agree that the 
Chinese government should “decide whether a certain school or trend of thought can be 
allowed to circulate” (Wang, 2007:568). Similarly, the 2002 East Asia Barometer Survey 
finds that 76% agree that “too many interest groups in the national or local politics would 
harm the interests of everyone”  and 6 % agree that the Chinese government should “decide 
whether a certain school or trend of thought can be allowed to circulate” (Wang, 2007:568).     
A key factor contributing to the above ambivalent view about democracy might be the 
regime’s anti-liberal democracy strategy. As discussed above, the rise of liberalism in the late 
1980s almost led to the fall of the regime. After the protest of 1989, Deng Xiaoping (1989)  
clearly pointed out that the “biggest mistake” of his “reform and open up” was the inadequate 
ideological and political education for “not only young university students but Chinese people 
in general”. Afterwards  the CCP strengthened its mass propaganda to resist liberal 
democracy. The effectiveness of state propaganda on political support is clearly evidenced by 
various empirical studies, which suggests that the CCP has managed to use the media and 
state propaganda to generate popular support (Bernstein and Lü, 2000; King, et al., 2013; Li, 
2004b; Stockmann and Gallagher, 2011).  
 The regime has also successfully maintained people’s preferences for socialist 
democracy – rather than liberal democracy – and legitimized the party’s role in leading 
political development in China. The survey of Nathan and Shi (1996:544) finds that over 76% 
of respondents agree that developing democracy in China should be dependent on the 
leadership of the CCP, and 95% of respondents agree or strongly agree with this in another 
survey (Wang, 2007:572). 
Table 3 shows the effectiveness of three key informal ideological discourses in China. It 
suggests that the (in)stability discourse, the national condition discourse, and the national 
rejuvenation discourse are widely accepted in China. However, as mentioned, various 
discourses of informal ideology can only legitimize one-party rule in the short term – they 
might serve to delegitimize the CCP’s rule in the long run. For example  if the CCP fails to 
meet nationalist’ expectations when deal with international conflict, the national rejuvenation 
discourse might be used against the CCP’s rule.  imilarly  if the CCP fails to maintain social 
stability and promote economic growth, those informal ideological discourses can be used to 
delegitimize the CCP’s rule. In addition  as mentioned  the national condition discourse 
suggests that social stability and economic growth should be national priorities of developing 
countries, while democratic rights are not that important. If China maintains its current 
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economic growth, it may become a developed country within decades. Then, should Chinese 
people maintain or abandon the authoritarian rule?  
Moreover  we should also bear the huge cost of the CCP’s national political market in 
mind. In addition to the considerable human capital of the CCP’s department of propaganda 
and advocacy group at all levels of governmental and party organs, the CCP has also spent a 
great amount of money in reinvesting its ideological changes, posting pro-government 
popular slogans across the country, holding big events such as the Olympics and Shenzhou 
Space Project that cost billions of dollars, funding countless party newspapers and journals, 
etc. Thus  the CCP’s national political marketing is a huge expense. 
Table 3: Effectiveness of Key Informal Ideological Discourses in China 
Informal Discourse Survey evidence 
 
(In)stability discourse 
 hi’s survey of “ ocial Change and  ocial Value”: 45% of 
respondents were concerned that “introducing more democracy 
might cause instability or a loss of social order” and over 6 % 
agreed that “if there were too many political parties, this would 
bring chaos to national politics” (Wang, 2007:568). 
 
 
 
National condition discourse 
 2008 Asian Barometer: over 93% of respondents agreed that 
“although our political system has various kinds of problems  
it is still the best that fits our national conditions” (Wang, 
2010e). 
 2001 World Value Survey: the majority of respondents 
ranked economic development, national defence, and stability 
as the top national priorities, while democratic rights such as 
political participation and freedom of speech were considered 
less important (Wang, 2007).  
National rejuvenation 
discourse 
Based on the 2008 China Survey and 2003 ISSP National 
Identity Survey, Tang and Dar (2012:815) find that “China 
shows the highest level of nationalism among all countries and 
regions, with a score of 80 out of 100”.  
 
5.6.3.2. Formal Ideological Promotion: Maintaining Party Cohesion  
 In terms of cultivating beliefs, the promotion of formal ideologies to the party is hardly 
effective. In contemporary China, the declining communist beliefs within the party are an 
undeniable fact. The school training of party cadres, for example, has become a kind of social 
occasion for building personal networks and a period of holiday for many trainees. As the 
training sessions are considered by many trainees as opportunities to build political networks 
and form groups, those trainees often use public funds to entertain or buy gifts to other 
classmates during the training. It is also common for many to ask their secretaries to write 
essays assigned in the training. Thus, those school training classes are called, by many 
Chinese people  “the classes of corruption”  fu bai ban).16  
 In addition, as mentioned, Three Represents urged the party to maintain its advanced 
nature – especially its probity. However, until now, the CCP has still failed to control 
                                                            
16 After Xi Jinping took power, the party has been taking action to regulate the training session. The organization 
department has issued a stipulation for cadre trainings in order to improve their unhealthy practices. 
(Organization, 2013). 
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corruption. Similarly, socioeconomic inequality deteriorated during Hu Jintao’s term  
although the CCP proposed Scientific Outlook of Development and Harmonious Society so 
as to shift its focus on welfare. This is also why Bo Xilai’s Chongqing Model received the 
enormous, nationwide support of New Leftists. In these respects, formal ideology did not 
achieve its goals. In these respects  the CCP’s formal ideological work failed to cultivate 
beliefs even within the party.   
 Nonetheless  formal ideology is still important in justifying the CCP’s rule in 
contemporary China. As mentioned above, formal ideology provides an ex post facto 
justification to make the ideological basis of the CCP consistent with the reality of the 
political economy in China. Although it cannot become the sincere beliefs of party members, 
it helps to justify if not legitimize the CCP’s rule to itself. This self-justification is crucial to 
explain why China needs a communist party to monopolise power and settle intra-party 
disputes. It also shows that establishing ideological orthodoxy and leaders’ credentials are 
important for inner party consolidation and organization. Yet, formal ideology is not always a 
force of regime stability. As Jiang Zemin’s Three Represents proved, it may sometimes 
contribute to factionalism and thus division among ruling elites.  
   
5.7. Summary 
 Chinese leaders and intellectuals are highly concerned about ideology; however, 
western scholarship has made far less of an effort to understand the puzzle of ideological 
modernization in China. As this thesis demonstrates  ideology is crucial to the CCP’s survival. 
The CCP has heavily relied on formal ideology to maintain party cohesion by justifying the 
communist rule and informal ideology to discredit liberal democracy.   
   Arguably  this dual ideological strategy has managed to maintain the CCP’s internal 
stability (i.e. party cohesion) and external stability (i.e. popular legitimacy). Although 
modernization theories suggest that socioeconomic modernization will lead to 
democratization, the case of China shows that the authoritarian rule is much more resilient 
than expected. The capability of the CCP to maintain popular support in the age of 
information has been greatly underestimated by the literature on comparative politics and 
media. As this chapter shows, the regime has developed a set of ideological discourses and 
advanced propaganda strategies to gain political support. In the short term, the development 
of technology might help the authoritarian regime to reach some goals that the traditional 
propaganda mechanism will never achieve. Yet, this is not to say that the political marketing 
of the regime’s ideation-based popular support can sustain the authoritarian rule in the long 
run. As discussed, informal ideology is only a short-term solution.  
 More importantly, to achieve communism is the ruling basis of a communist party. 
Making the ideological basis of the CCP consistent with the political economy of China is 
crucial to settling intra-party disputes and thus maintaining internal stability of the CCP. In 
this regard, the CCP will definitely continue to revise its formal ideology. Yet, ideology also 
creates problems sometimes when formal ideology is heavily used for power struggles. As 
this chapter shows, Three Represents was used by Jiang Zemin to consolidate his power and 
thus intensified intra-party conflicts. Thus, whether party cohesion can be continuously 
maintained or not is not decided by ideology alone: how to minimize the negative effects of 
power struggles is also very important. In this respect, the institutional development of power 
succession plays a crucial role in maintaining the internal stability of the CCP, as the next 
chapter will address.  
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Chapter Six 
The Institutionalization of the Authoritarian Leadership in China 
 
“If we don't carry out this revolution [streamlining organizations] but let the old and ailing 
stand in the way of young people who are energetic and able, not only will the four 
modernizations fail but the Party and state will face a mortal trail and perhaps perish.” 
– Deng Xiaoping (1983:397),  excerpt from his talk at a Politburo conference17 
 
6.1 Introduction  
A core argument in this thesis, as established in the Introduction Chapter, is that the 
institutionalization of power succession in China plays a key role in maintaining the CCP’s 
internal stability and its capability to maintain legitimacy. Leadership transitions have always 
been turbulent moments for authoritarian regimes (Clapham, 1988; Hughes and May, 1988). 
A challenging task for authoritarian regimes is to prevent the division between ruling elites 
during the process of power succession. A smooth leadership transition rarely proceeds 
without violence in authoritarian regimes. Yet, owing to institutionalization, power 
succession in contemporary China has demonstrated a high degree of stability in the past two 
decades. This chapter studies the institutional development of the Chinese succession system 
and its impacts on party cohesion and legitimacy.  
Before institutionalization, power transfer had caused endless fierce power struggles 
and thus national chaos in China. The purge of Mao Zedong’s two successors plunged the 
country into chaos, which indirectly led to economic stagnation and national upheaval. Afraid 
of elite divisions and brutal power struggles, the CCP has taken great efforts to 
institutionalize its power succession system. This concern about a split in the leadership was 
firmed up following the protest of 1989. Arguably, three decades of institutionalization has 
produced a relatively stable and predictable power succession system.   
The institutional development of power succession in China provides a dramatic 
example of “authoritarian resilience” – a hotly debated academic discussion inspired by the 
CCP’s first smooth leadership transition in     . As Chapter   discussed  while some argue 
that the institutional changes have made the authoritarian system more sustainable and served 
to strengthen the CCP’s rule  others contend that this view overestimates the strength of the 
authoritarian system and ignores its vulnerability. The success of the leadership transition in 
2012 further supports the existence of authoritarian resilience.  
Although power struggles within the party remain intense in contemporary China, the 
institutionalization has undermined the negative effects of political struggles. None of the fall 
of Chen Xitong, Chen Liangyu, and Bo Xilai generated considerable level of political 
instability and crisis compared with power struggles before the institutionalization. In 
addition, the removal of those high-level leaders followed certain institutional procedures, 
whilst the interrogation of Liu Shaoqi and his wife was launched without any formal 
resolution or any written document, as this chapter will examine.  
  
 
                                                            
17 For the English version of the Selected Work of Deng, please see page 284 
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6.2 Academic Debates about Power Succession in China 
In addition to the aforementioned debate over authoritarian resilience, the topic of 
power succession in China also involves several relevant debates. 
   
6.2.1 The Relationship between the Institutionalization of Power Succession and Regime 
Legitimacy 
The CCP’s survival is decided by party cohesion and popular legitimacy  as established 
in the introduction chapter. Obviously, institutionalization of power succession is crucial to 
minimize the negative effects of power struggles and thus maintain the unity of the CCP 
leadership. Equally importantly, the institutionalization of power succession also plays a role 
in deciding the CCP’s legitimacy. As Hughes and May (1988) argues  the “transfer of 
political power from one substantive ruler to another is generally regarded as a major test of 
the stability and legitimacy of a political system.”  
  In the CCP’s discourse  its ruling capability decides its legitimacy  as mentioned in the 
Introduction Chapter. Arguably  the CCP’s ruling capability is built on its internal stability. In 
other words, this internal stability is a prerequisite for the CCP’s ruling capability to maintain 
its legitimacy by maintaining social stability, promoting economic growth, and defending 
national interests. The institutionalization of the leadership transition is a crucial factor in 
maintaining this internal stability. Thus, the institutionalization of power succession is a 
prerequisite for the CCP to maintain its legitimacy. As a professor of the Central Party School 
argues, the cadres appointment system is crucial to the CCP’s ruling capacity and thus to its 
legitimacy (Zhao, 2011). Figure 7 summarizes the argument raised above.  
 
Figure 7: Regime legitimacy and the institutionalization of power succession 
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 This chapter focuses on the impacts of institutional development at the top level, 
because of the gap in the existing literature and its significance. Most of the existing literature 
focused on the CCP’s popular support as a whole  i.e. its overall legitimacy)  however  how 
has the CCP gained and lost its legitimacy? As Schubert (2008:194) argues  “deficits in 
legitimacy which might occur at one point within this system can be compensated by gains in 
legitimacy  at another point  resulting in overall regime support”. This is particularly true in 
China. Empirical studies show that the central government of China enjoys strong support in 
contrast with the relatively low legitimacy of the local states (Cai, 2008; Gilley, 2008; Saich, 
2005; Tong, 2011; Wang, 2005a). In other words, the legitimacy of the central state has been 
compensating for the legitimacy deficit of the local states. In addition, as discussed in Chapter 
3, the regime’s disaster relief and post-disaster reconstruction after the Wenchuan earthquake 
led to the increased legitimacy of the central government and the decreased legitimacy of 
local governments because of the propaganda campaigns. Thus, partial legitimacy – of which 
the overall regime legitimacy is made up – is important.  
In order to analyze this partial legitimacy, it is necessary to disaggregate the Chinese 
political system and to examine potential “zones of legitimacy” at different levels of the 
bureaucracy (Schubert, 2008:194). In studying this partial legitimacy in China, scholars 
proposed different research agendas. On the one hand, some argue that the political elite are 
more important than the masses in determining regime legitimacy ( Sandby-Thomas, 2014). 
The Weberian typology of legitimacy disaggregates society into three principal groups – 
chiefs, staff and masses; when applying this classification to the case of China, Sandby-
Thomas identifies chiefs as the political elite who are at the administrative rank of 
county/division or above, the staff as those cadres who are below the administrative rank of 
county/division, and the masses as the ordinary people (Sandby-Thomas, 2014). Sandby-
Thomas (2014) claims that the rank in terms of their significance to regime legitimacy should 
be the relationship between the elites and cadres, the relationship between the elites and 
masses, and the relationship between the cadres and masses. Sandby-Thomas’ model makes a 
valuable contribution in highlighting the importance of the political elites; however, the 
administrative ranks of the Chinese political system are much more complex than this model, 
and therefore Weber’s three strategic groups are not particularly appropriate for applying to 
the case of China.
18
  
On the other hand, Schubert (2014) argues that the “elites and masses” and “cadres and 
masses” relationships are as important as the “elites and cadres” relationship  and the most 
important factor in partial legitimacy is “the lowest administrative level of the Chinese 
political system”. Thus   chubert’s (2008) new research agenda emphasizes the micro-level 
of the political system, such as villages and counties. It is valid to a certain point that the local 
levels of the political system are important to regime legitimacy; however, in the highly 
centralized authoritarian system, party leaders have the overwhelming power to determine the 
legitimacy of the regime. In addition, as mentioned above, the central government has been 
compensating for a legitimacy deficit in the local states. This suggests that the partial 
legitimacy of the political system at the top is crucial to the overall legitimacy of the regime. 
As Walder (2004:197) argues:  
“The political elite of 5        cannot rule the country unless it can retain the 
obedience of 4  million state cadres… and if the elite maintains the discipline of state 
                                                            
18 Administrative ranks cannot fully reflect the real power of political actors. In China, some administrative posts 
are symbolic (xu zhi). For example, the party head of a country shares the same administrative rank – at the 
county/division level (xian chu ji) –  as a leading cadre at a Women's Federation (fu lian); however, in their real 
power, there is a huge difference. Indeed, the county/division level cadres in many non-real power sectors (fei 
shi quan bumen) in China  such as women’s federations  hardly warrant being called “chiefs” in Weber’s sense.  
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bureaucrats and the allegiance of the party members, it can withstand challenges from 
other groups in society  even in periods of economic hardship and social upheaval.”  
 
As such, this chapter emphasizes the institutional development of the CCP hierarchy at 
the top level, in particular the party leaders whose administrative ranks are at vice-ministry 
level (fu bu ji) or above. Arguably, in the highly centralized authoritarian system in China, 
those party leaders are much more influential than any others in determining the legitimacy of 
the CCP.  
 
  
6.2.2 Is power succession in China more institutionalized?  
The third debate is about the institutionalization of power succession in the field of 
Chinese elite studies. On the one hand, many are sceptical of the institutional development of 
leadership transition in China (Fewsmith, 2013; Shirk, 2002; Zheng and Lye, 2003). For 
example, Susan Shirk (2001:139) contended that the then key leaders – Jiang Zemin, Li Peng, 
and Zhu Rongji – might not step down under the constraints of institutional rules, and thus 
Shirk concluded that the “trend toward institutionalization might not survive the transfer of 
power that, under the new rules, is scheduled to occur in 2002 at the 16
th
 Party Congress”. 
This prediction, of course, proved to be wrong. On the other hand, many have recognized that 
power succession in China has been increasingly institutionalized (Guo, 2013; Huang, 2008; 
Lee, 2010; Miller, 2013; Teiwes, 2001).  
Different views on institutionalization in this debate led to contrary understandings of 
Chinese succession politics. While the proponents of institutionalization argue that 
institutional rules have become a significant factor in selecting Chinese leaders nowadays, the 
opponents consider power succession to be a result of factional politics or a “black box 
operation” (Fewsmith, 2013; Li, 2012c:3; Zheng and Lye, 2003). By using qualitative 
comparative analysis, one of my recent studies analyses the selection criteria of Chinese 
leaders at the most powerful leading body – the PSC – in 2012 (Zeng, 2013). A key finding is 
that age combined with the institutional rules was one of the most important factors in 
selecting top Chinese leaders at the 18
th
 Party Congress in 2012, which lends strong support 
to the proponents of institutionalization (Zeng, 2013). This chapter provides an in-depth 
analysis of the institutional development of the succession system in the past three decades.  
 
6.3 Before Institutionalization, Power Succession: a Source of Instability and Crisis  
Power succession can not only legitimize but also delegitimize political regimes. Power 
transition before institutionalization was a main source of crisis and instability in China. In 
Mao Zedong’s era  the lack of an institutionalized succession system led to a cruel power 
struggle within the party. In order to consolidate his power, Mao launched waves of radical 
mass campaigns that led to national upheaval and economic stagnation. Similar to succession 
politics in contemporary North Korea with the fall of Jang Sung-taek, the power struggle was 
a life and death game in Mao’s China. Mao’s first heir apparent  iu  haoqi was defeated 
during the Cultural Revolution and died soon after his fall. The institutional rule in Mao’s era 
was so weak that the interrogation on the then PRC President Liu Shaoqi and his wife was 
launched without any formal resolution or any formal written document.   
After the fall of  iu   in Biao became the new heir apparent. In   6    in’s status was 
confirmed by the CCP constitution, which stated that “Comrade  in Biao is a close ally and 
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successor of Comrade Mao Zedong”. However  two years later in   7    in mysteriously 
died with numerous waves of purges of  in’s supporters. The CCP offered no explanation for 
nearly two years until 1973  when  in’s fall was acknowledged at the   th CCP congress. The 
fall of  in disillusioned many Chinese people about Mao’s rule. Although Mao began to 
emphasize the unity of leaders – “stability and unity” – in 1975 (Mao, 1996), Mao still failed 
to prevent the crucial power struggle in the then un-institutionalized political system. One 
month after Mao’s death in   76  Hua Guofeng cooperated with military leaders to arrest the 
Gang of Four  including Mao’s wife Jiang Qing. Afterwards  Hua used Mao’s note – that 
“with you in charge  I am at ease” – to justify his claim as Mao’s successor.  
As discussed in Chapter 2, mass campaigns combined with endless waves of political 
purges during Mao’s rule had caused the long-term political upheaval in China. The Cultural 
Revolution in particular seriously disrupted normal lives of Chinese people and reduced 
normal economic activities because the CCP mobilized ordinary Chinese people to participate 
in mass campaigns. It also made the CCP less capable to deliver public goods to the society. 
The CCP’s popular support significantly decreased even before Mao died.  
Recognizing the necessity to minimize the negative effects of the power struggle, Deng 
Xiaoping and his supporters launched ambitious projects to formalize the political system in 
the early 1980s. Various institutional rules of power succession were made at that time. The 
grand project of “four transformations” is particularly notable, as it marked the starting point 
of the thirty-year institutionalization in China. This project stipulated four criteria to select 
cadres: more revolutionary, younger, more knowledgeable and more professional. Specific 
guidelines to adhere to these criteria include age limit, tenure system, step-by-step promotion, 
work experience, and educational qualifications, which I will discuss below.  
Compared with Mao’s period  power succession under the watch of  eng had been far 
less damaging to the party’s rule. After Deng forced Hua Guofeng to step down, Hua was still 
a respected cadre and enjoyed full personal freedom. The fall of Hua is also the first power 
transition in the PRC without bloodshed. In addition, there had been some relatively open 
discussions within the CCP about whether Hua was still suitable as the top leader, which was 
quite democratic when compared with Mao’s era. This helped to reduce the negative impact 
of power struggles on the legitimacy of the leadership. Although Deng laid a foundation for 
today’s stable power succession, he also expelled two of his heirs apparent – Hu Yaobang and 
Zhao Ziyang. The elite division more or less strangled the decision-making ability of the CCP 
when dealing with popular protests in 1989, which almost put the party on the brink of 
collapse. This suggests that the level of institutionalization in  eng’s era was still insufficient 
to preserve the internal stability of the CCP.  
 
6.4 After Institutionalization, Power Transition: Predicable, Smooth, Orderly, and 
Stable  
In the post-strongman era, power succession has turned a new page. Elite politics has 
been much more stable than ever before owing to two key factors: the changing power 
distribution and the institutionalization of power succession. The existing literature on the 
subject of Chinese elite politics focus on the former factor, but the role of institutionalization 
is widely recognized. Many emphasize the fact that no single political group is willing nor 
able to dominate succession politics is key to explaining the stable elite politics in 
contemporary China (Li, 2005; Nathan, 2003). However, the institutional development also 
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matters. Indeed, learning from the painful lessons about orderless succession that I mentioned 
above, the CCP has made impressive efforts to institutionalize its power succession in the 
past three decades. This reflects a key aspect of its authoritarian resilience – the CCP’s ability 
to learn, which allows the party to adapt to the rapidly changing socioeconomic environment 
(Tsai and Dean, 2013).   
This is not just fawning praise over the CCP leadership’s brilliance, because 
institutionalization is a decision that the CCP leaders have to make. As the PRC founders, the 
legitimacy of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping came from their personal authority rather than 
their institutional posts; however, the power of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao – who were 
promoted from the bureaucratic system – was mainly granted by their official posts instead of 
personal authority. Thus, contemporary Chinese leaders have to strengthen the existing 
institutional arrangements for consolidating their power. The continual institutionalization of 
power succession has formalized the process of selecting and removing leaders, and thus 
developed a power succession system with Chinese characteristics. The following section will 
explore the institutional development and key features of the Chinese succession system.  
 
6.4.1 Routinized Turnover of Political Elites  
The turnover of political elites reflects the effectiveness of the political system. If the 
level of political mobility is low, a bureaucratic system occupied by old leaders who refuse to 
retire will systematically push young elites out of the system and discourage new elites from 
joining the system. It will indirectly contribute to the rise of external forces that might 
overthrow the rigid political system. In this sense, a rapid cycle of political elites helps the 
political system to co-opt young political elites and thus prevents divisions amongst the elite.  
Political mobility is also relevant to the high adaptability of the authoritarian system. 
Without a high turnover rate of political elites, the political system – occupied by a group of 
party elders who tend to resist change – is hardly adaptive to the changing environment. In 
addition, by incorporating younger leaders into the leading bodies, it portrays a positive 
image of the CCP leadership as opposed to the image which suggests that the party is 
governed by a group of party elders. In this sense, the high turnover rates matter to the vitality 
of the CCP leadership. Chinese leaders considered routinized turnover of political elites to be 
crucial to maintain the CCP’s rule. As  eng Xiaoping (1983:397) clearly warned: 
 “If we … let the old and ailing stand in the way of young people who are energetic and 
able, not only will the four modernizations fail but the Party and state will face a mortal 
trail and perhaps perish”. 
In order to ensure a rapid cycle of political elites, the CCP has developed and practised two 
specific rules: term limits and age limits.  
 
6.4.1.1 Term limits 
Putting an end to the tenure of top leaders is one of the most challenging tasks for the 
CCP in institutionalizing its power succession, because there is no such tradition in Chinese 
culture – the abdication system is ideal, but rarely happened in practice, as discussed in 
Chapter 5. The post of Chairman belonged to Mao Zedong until his death. Before Deng 
Xiaoping took power, there were no effective institutional rules to regulate the terms of 
Chinese leaders. Recognizing the importance of term limits, the CCP began to implement a 
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tenure system and incorporated it into the PRC constitution in 1982. This amended 
constitution ruled that President and Vice-President of the PRC, Chairman and Vice-
Chairman of the People’s Congress  and Premier  Vice-Premier, and State Councillors of the 
State Council shall not serve continuously for more than two terms. It officially announced 
the end of Chinese leaders’ life long tenure. In order to put this rule into practise  Deng 
Xiaoping voluntarily set an example to hand over all his institutional posts. Nowadays, this 
term limit has become highly institutionalized – all Politburo members, except top leaders, 
have served for no longer than two terms since 1997.  
 
6.4.1.2 Age Limit: Retirement and Promotion  
Unlike term limits that first regulated the top leaders, the early efforts towards 
establishing an age limit in the 1980s mainly focused on mid-level leaders. In 1982, the CCP 
announced the relevant rules to institutionalize the retirement system. It rules that the minister 
level or equivalent cadres should usually retire at 65 years old and those at the deputy 
minister level should usually retire at 60 years old (CCP, 1982). This age limit has since been 
gradually reinforced and developed to regulate the top leaders.  
In Jiang Zemin’s era  the specific retirement age of top leaders was established and 
strictly implemented. In 1997, the retirement age for the PSC members was set to be 70 years 
old. In       Qiao  hi retired from the post of People’s Congress Chairman because of this 
new policy – Jiang Zemin was 71 in 1997, but he stayed in power because he was the first 
leader. In 2002, the retirement age was lowered to 68. Li Ruihuan – who had just turned 68 – 
retired; however, Luo Gan – who was 67 – got promoted into the PSC in 2002. This new 
retirement age has been retained until now and has widely been called the custom of “67 stay 
and 6  retire”. Many argue that retirement age served as a tool to force Jiang’s political rival 
to relinquish power (Fewsmith, 2003a; Fewsmith, 2008; Fewsmith, 2013; Ou, 2012; Shirk, 
2012). This is valid to a certain point, because there was much room to manipulate this rule 
during the initial process of its institutionalization. Jiang and his supporters could take 
advantage of their younger age and the relevant rules; however, to set up a specific rule to 
regulate retirement is actually an important progress as long as the rule-makers follow this 
rule themselves.  
As mentioned above, some skeptics of institutionalization predicted that Jiang Zemin 
and his supporters would not follow the age limit rule and step down in 2002. On the contrary, 
Jiang and his supporters strictly followed this rule  which further strengthened the rule’s 
authority. In 2002, Zhu Rongji – who is considered a close supporter of Jiang (Li, 2001a; 
Miller, 1996) – retired from his post as PRC Premier, and Jiang Zemin handed over the top 
position of power to Hu Jintao – which marked the first smooth leadership transition of the 
PRC. Zeng Qinghong  who was considered Jiang’s most powerful supporter (Li, 2001a; Li 
and White, 2003), also retired from his post as the PRC Vice-President when he was just 68 
in 2007, – without violating the “67 stay and 6  retire” rule. My recent study suggests that 
this retirement age limit became one of the most important factors in selecting the 18
th
 PSC 
members in 2012 (Zeng, 2013). In addition to the retirement age, a specific age limit for 
promotion was made at the 17
th
 Party Congress that the age of new Politburo members should 
not exceed 63.  
Figure 8 shows the age distribution of the PSC members in the past three decades. It 
shows that the retirement age of 68 and 70 has been strictly implemented since the relevant 
rules were made. The strict implementation of age limits changed the age trends of the PSC 
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and Politburo members. As indicated in Figure 9, in 1982, the oldest member of the Politburo 
Ye Jianying was 85 years old, in contrast with the youngest member who was 49 years old. 
The age span among Politburo members reached 36 years in 1982, while it was only 18 years 
in 2012. After thirty years of institutionalization, the Chinese leaders are now much younger 
than before. Figure 10 shows the average age of Chinese leaders. The average age of the new 
PSC members in 2012 is 63.4 and that of the new Politburo members is 61.1, both of whom 
are ten years younger than those in 1982. Arguably, the growing institutionalization of term 
and age limits has achieved one of key goals of “four transformations” – younger leaders. 
 
Figure 8: Age distribution of the Politburo Standing Committee from 1982 to 2012 
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Figure 9: Age distribution of Politburo members in China from 1982 to 2012 
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The author’s own tabular representation and data 
 
Figure 10: Average age of Chinese leaders when they were appointed from 1982 to 2012   
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In addition to younger leaders, the growing institutionalization of age/term limits also 
led to a rapid turnover of Chinese leaders. Figure 11 shows that the turnover rate of Chinese 
leaders has been very high since the 1980s. The turnover rates of both the Central Committee 
and the Politburo reached over 60% in 2002 and 55% in 2012. In 2007, four out of the nine 
16
th
 PSC members retired; and in 2012, the turnover rate of the PSC exceeded 77% – seven 
out of the nine PSC members retired including President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao. 
In 2012, 113 members of the 17
th
 Central Committee retired and 91 remained in office; and 
15 out of the 25 members of the 18
th
 Politburo are new.  
Figure 12 compares the turnover rate of the Chinese Central Committee and the 
Politburo with that of the US Congress from 1973 to 2012. Although these institutions are 
very different, this comparison still reflects certain aspects of political mobility among 
powerful politicians in the two largest world economies. It indicates that the turnover rate of 
Chinese leading bodies has been at least 40% more than that of the US Congress. In 2012, the 
turnover rates of the US Senate and House are around 10% in contrast with 56% of the 
members of the Chinese Central Committee and the Politburo.  
The high turnover rate of Chinese leaders indicates that the CCP has managed to select 
and remove its leaders by using its own rules – as opposed to liberal democratic elections. 
The succession system with Chinese characteristics has been effectively and efficiently 
recruiting new blood into its leadership, which helps to maintain regime stability and 
contributes to the CCP’s “adaptability”. 
 
Figure 11: Turnover rate of the CCP Central Committee and the Politburo from 1973 to 
2012 
 
The author’s own tabular representation.  ource: for   7 -2002 data, please see (Li, 2012b: 
29; Li and White, 2003: 560). For 2007-2012 data, please see (Wu, 2012) 
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Figure 12 Turnover rates of American political representatives and Chinese leaders 
from 1982 to 2012 
 
The author’s own tabular representation.  ource: the Centre for Responsive Politics available 
at http://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/reelect.php ; the data on the 2012 re-election rate of 
US congress members are reported by Bloomberg at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-
12-13/voters-throw-bums-in-while-disdaining-congress-bgov-barometer.html 
 
6.4.2 Meritocratic Bureaucracy  
Political meritocracy is also closely relevant to legitimacy. Without democratic 
elections, the selection procedures cannot provide as much procedural legitimacy as 
democratic procedures do; thus the legitimacy of the succession system heavily relies on the 
outcome (i.e. a meritocratic bureaucracy) rather than the procedures (i.e. elections). The 
Chinese culture highly values the performance of the rulers rather than how they come to 
power. As discussed in Chapter 3, the Chinese understanding of democracy has been shaped 
by the Confucian doctrine – minben. A key difference between minben and liberal democracy 
is that the doctrine of minben assesses regime legitimacy from the government’s performance 
rather than how the government ascends to power, whilst liberal democracy highly relies on 
the procedures of democratic elections to assess the regime’s legitimacy. In this sense  the 
good performance of the cadres can compensate for the non-democratic procedures of their 
selections. In other words, high performance legitimacy can compensate for low procedural 
legitimacy.  
Notably, before institutionalization, the selection and removal of leaders – such as Gao 
Gang and Rao Shushi – took place on a whim, depending on whether they were on the right 
side of the prevailing political climate or not. The number of provincial leaders who lost their 
jobs under Mao’s rule was startling. It seemed that merit and ability were unimportant when it 
came to developing a political career, whilst personal contacts and factions were key. As 
discussed above, nowadays, institutional rules have become a key factor in selecting PSC 
members, while patron-client ties have become less important. Specific institutional rules to 
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train Chinese leaders include step-by-step promotion, the exchange of cadres, and the 
succession track of heirs apparent.  
 
6.4.2.1 Step-by-step promotion  
 Step-by-step promotion means that leaders are usually promoted level by level. For 
instance, a candidate should usually be a regular or alternate member of the Central 
Committee or a minister level official in order to be eligible for Politburo membership. This 
promotion mode helps the Chinese leaders to broaden their visions, increase their leadership 
experiences, and hone their skills. Since the 1990s, most regular members of the Politburo 
have followed the step-by-step promotion mode. Almost all Chinese leaders have followed 
this promotion mode except in establishing heirs apparent.  
 Many argue that Chinese top leaders are well-trained and experienced before they 
assume power owing to step-by-step promotion (Bell, 2012; Zhang, 2012). Theoretically, this 
institutional rule also provides a way of filtering out incapable leaders, because there are 
many opportunities to test their capability. Provincial administration is an important ground 
upon which to examine leaders’ capability and skills. With China’s rapid economic growth  
many Chinese provinces are now much bigger than many countries, not only in terms of 
population but also in terms of total economic output (Li, 2010a; Zhang, 2012). Thus, Zhang 
(2012) argues that  
“It takes extraordinary talent and skills to govern a typical Chinese province  which is 
on average the size of four to five European states. Indeed, with the Chinese system of 
meritocracy in place, it is inconceivable that people as weak and incompetent as George 
W. Bush or Yoshihiko Noda of Japan could ever get to the top leadership position”.  
 
6.4.2.2 The Exchange of Local Cadres 
In order to curtail the localism and to broaden the vision and experience of cadres, the 
transfer of cadres in different departments and provinces except Shanghai was effectively 
implemented in Jiang’s era. Most PSC members had abundant experience in governing 
provinces. Hu Jintao, in particular, used to work as the secretary of Communist Youth League 
and the head of Gansu and Tibet. All the 18
th
 PSC members except Liu Yunshan used to be 
the head of at fewest two provinces or key cities. Xi Jinping used to work as the head of the 
Fujian Province, Zhejiang Province and City of Shanghai, and Li Keqiang worked as the head 
of Henan and Liaoning.   
 
6.4.2.3 The Institutionalized Procedures of Training Heirs Apparent   
Built on step-by-step promotion and the exchange of local cadres, the succession track 
of heirs apparent has been increasingly institutionalized since Jiang’s era. Many posts are 
reserved for heirs apparent of the General Secretary and Premier in order to broaden their 
visions, increase leadership experience, and hone their skills. As indicated in Table 6, Hu 
Jintao was appointed to the roles of Vice President of the PRC in order to be exposed to 
foreign affairs, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) to gain military 
knowledge, and Chancellor of the Central Party School in order to handle ideological affairs 
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before becoming the top leader. Xi Jinping followed the same succession track. Zhu Rongji, 
Wen Jiabao and Li Keqiang served as Vice Premier for more than four years before they 
became Premier. Now, the CCP seems deliberately to normalize the rule that heirs apparent 
of the General Secretary and Premier should serve in the PSC for at least one term before 
succession. It is designed to make the new General Secretary and Premier more familiar with 
national affairs before they inherit the top posts.   
 
6.4.2.4 Educational Qualifications 
 nowledge is one of the four criteria for selecting leaders in the “four transformations” 
project. Partly because of this project, the educational qualifications of Chinese leaders have 
been largely increasing since the 1980s. Figure 13 shows the changing educational credentials 
of Politburo members in the past decades. In 1982, when “four transformations” had just been 
incorporated by the party constitution, only 4% of Politburo member received a college 
education. Twenty years later, only 4% of Politburo members had not attended higher 
education. In 2012, over 68% of the 18
th
 Politburo member held masters’ degrees or Ph s. In 
particular, both the new President and Premier hold doctorates from the top two Chinese 
universities: Xi Jinping received a PhD in law from Qinghua University, and Li Keqiang was 
awarded a PhD in economics from Peking University.  
Another important change in leaders’ educational qualifications is their academic 
disciplines – the majors of the leaders’ highest academic degree.  Most leaders of the third 
and fourth generations are technocrats who studied engineering or natural sciences in higher 
education, in contrast with the mainstream majors of social sciences and humanities in the 
fifth generation. Figure 14 shows the academic disciplines of PSC members from 1992 to 
2012. Social sciences include management, law and economics; the humanities include 
literature and history. This figure indicates that most of the 14
th
 to 17
th
 PSC members studied 
engineering or natural sciences. In the 18
th
 PSC, only Yu Zhengsheng was an engineer, and 
the remaining six members studied social sciences and humanities. In the past two decades, 
the high growth rate of the Chinese economy benefited from the leaders’ technocratic 
backgrounds, leading them to encourage economic efficiency; however, it also created a huge 
gap between poor and rich. The changing expertise of leaders might help the state to increase 
its emphasis on economic equity. Some Chinese intellectuals argue that the new leaders who 
studied social sciences and humanities will emphasize social justice, rule of law and 
governance (Sun and Hu, 2012).  
Notably  the value of Chinese officials’ qualifications has been widely questioned (Li, 
2008a; Pei, 2012). Many Chinese cadres attended their graduate programmes when they still 
worked full time as busy officials; many of their qualifications were awarded from part-time 
programmes or party schools; and some even asked secretaries to write their dissertations. 
Thus, the real value of their education is questionable. Pei (2012) argues that, in terms of their 
education, Chinese officials have cheated in order to compete for power. Nonetheless, an 
undeniable fact is that the educational level of the Chinese leadership has been significantly 
improved in the past three decades. There is little doubt that Xi Jinping’s leadership cohort 
has been much more educated than the revolutionary generation.  
Nowadays, educational qualification is an important criterion for selecting Chinese 
cadres. Empirical studies show that educational qualifications have boosted the chance of 
promotion in China (Lee, 1991; Shih, et al., 2012; Sun and Hu, 2012). Improving one’s 
resume is a practical reason for Chinese cadres to pursue part-time educational qualification; 
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however, we should not ignore the fact that the CCP is a learning Party. The party has 
institutionalized a learning system to organize lectures and study groups for the Politburo 
members in order to train their leaders (Tsai and Dean, 2013). Many senior officials did not 
receive a full education when they were young, mainly because of the political unrest and 
limited educational resources at that time. In light of China's increased difficulty to govern, it 
is reasonable for them to attend training or degree programmes in order to meet work needs. 
The proportion of part-time or party school degrees will definitely decline with generational 
change in the future.  
 
Figure 13: Changing tendency of educational qualifications of Politburo members in the 
past decades 
 
Source: (Sun and Hu, 2012); the data of the 18
th
 Party Congress are updated by the author. 
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Figure 14: Academic disciplines of PSC members from 1992 to 2012 
 
The author’s own tabular representation 
 
6.4.3 Representation 
In democratic countries, the composition of voters would translate to certain kinds of 
representation in the leadership. Although there are no such kinds of elections in China, the 
CCP has been keen to build a representative leadership for maintaining stability and 
legitimacy. 
 
6.4.3.1 Ethnic Minorities  
The CCP clearly recognizes the importance of co-opting ethnic minorities. In order to 
legitimize its leadership, the CCP developed several institutional rules – certain proportion of 
ethnic minority at various levels of party and governmental organs – to promote 
systematically ethnic minorities elites into its leadership (Mackerras, 2003:21; Shih, et al., 
2012). As evidenced by an empirical study, ethnic minorities are more likely to be promoted 
in the CCP Central Committee(Shih, et al., 2012). Figure 15 shows the proportion of ethnic 
minorities in the CCP Central Committee. It suggests that ethnic minorities have been slightly 
over-represented in Chinese leadership compared with the proportion of ethnic minorities in 
the entire Chinese population – 8.49% (China, 2011). Thus, in terms of quantity, ethnic 
minorities are well-represented in the CCP leadership; however, the distribution of ethnic 
minorities in the Central Committee is imbalanced.  
Figure 16 shows the proportion of ethnic minorities in the Central Committee, the 
Politburo and the PSC. It indicates that the higher the party rank, the fewer the ethnic 
minorities. If we apply the population proportion as a standard, ethnic minorities have been 
over-represented in alternate members of the Central Committee, approximately well-
represented in regular members of the Central Committee, and under-represented in the 
Politburo and the PSC from 1982 to 2012. A possible interpretation is that: at the lower level, 
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the CCP wants to ensure that a certain percentage of positions are reserved for ethnic 
minorities; however, at the higher level (e.g. the Politburo and the PSC), the CCP are less 
able to do that because of more intense competition.  
 
Figure 15: Proportion of Ethnic Minorities in the CCP Central Committee from 1982 to 
2012 
The author’s own tabular representation.  ource: Xinhua News  more information please see 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2004-10/25/content_2136727.htm  (China, 2011). 
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Figure 16: The Representation of Ethnic Minorities in the CCP Central Committee and 
the Politburo from 1982 to 2012 
 
The author’s own tabular representation.  ource: Xinhua News. For more information  see 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2004-10/25/content_2136727.htm 
 
6.4.3.2 Females  
Similar to the representation of ethnic minorities, the CCP has also been keen to build a 
symbolic image of female representation. In addition to the symbolic image of representation, 
many also argue that a higher representation of women in leadership positions would help to 
improve governance. Bell (2012), for example, argues that a higher representation of women 
in the Chinese leadership will help the government to “rule in a compassionate and humane 
way”. Indeed  Chinese women are under-represented at all levels of cadres. Figure 17 
compares the proportion of the mid- and high-level female cadres in 2000 with those in 2009. 
It indicates that the proportions of female cadres slightly increased by 2009 but they are still 
under-represented in the Chinese government. Notably, the Organization Department of the 
CCP has made institutional rules to stipulate the proportion of women in various levels of 
government. In order to obey this rule, local governments have to select women into their 
leadership, but they are more likely to appoint women into the deputy position (fu zhi) or 
symbolic posts (xu zhi) (Wei, 2012).  
Figure 18 presents female representation in the Chinese leadership. It indicates that the 
distribution of female leaders is somehow similar to that of ethnic minorities – the higher the 
party rank, the lower the proportion. This is perhaps also because the competition becomes 
more intense the higher the party rank, and thus the party is less likely to concern itself with 
gender representation. This has slightly improved. As indicated in Figure 18, women won one 
seat on the 16
th
 and the 17
th
 Politburos, and two seats on the 18
th
 Politburo. This has led to a 
significant increase in the proportion of women in the Politburo in the past decade. 
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Figure 17: Proportion of mid- and high-level female cadres in 2000 and 2009 
 The author’s own tabular representation  source cited from (Wei, 2012)  
Figure 18: Female representation in Chinese leadership 
 
The author’s own tabular representation. Source: (Li and White, 2003). The information of 
Politburo, 17
th
 and 18
th
 Party Congress, is updated by the author. 
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party organs and regions have voices at the highest level.
19
 For example  a “one province 
administration  two full seats” quota has been strictly implemented in the CCP Central 
Committee since 1997 (Li and White, 2003: 576). Some Central Committee members might 
be transferred to other regions or promoted to work in Beijing; however, the equal 
distribution of membership has been strictly implemented when they are elected into the 
Committee (Li, 2012b).  
Table 4 shows the provincial leaders holding full membership of the Central Committee 
from 1997 to 2012. It suggests that this membership is evenly distributed to representatives of 
each region – usually party chief and governor. The two most important ethnic minority 
regions sometimes get more seats. As indicated in Table 4, Tibet had three seats in 2002 and 
2007; Xinjiang had four seats in 2002 and 2007, and three seats in 2012. Notably, all ethnic 
minority regions have at least one local ethnic minority leader who is also an 18
th
 Central 
Committee member. It again suggests the CCP’s deliberate efforts to enhance the stability of 
ethnic minority regions and increase the legitimacy of leadership by co-opting ethnic minority 
elites.  
Needless to say, some key regions are more influential in the top decision-making 
bodies as their leaders are usually Politburo members. Figure 19 shows the Politburo 
members’ bureaucratic affiliations when they were elected. It indicates that the proportion of 
leaders from provincial administrations and central government organizations in the Politburo 
have been increasing at the expense of party organizations’ representation. Provincial leaders 
have been the largest component of Politburo members since 2002. 44% of the 18
th
 Politburo 
members were provincial leaders when they were elected. Table 4 shows the regional 
representation in the Politburo in the past decade. The representation of three major groups of 
Chinese regions in the Politburo – municipalities directly under the central government, 
ethnic minorities’ autonomous regions such as Xinjiang, and coastal, developed province 
such as Guangdong – has shown certain signs of institutionalization. This institutionalized 
representation is perhaps an attempt to protect the interests of key regions in the top decision-
making process.  
The rule that – party chiefs of all four municipalities directly under the Central 
government are usually Politburo members, and their mayors are at least the Central 
Committee members – has been institutionalized. Beijing and Shanghai, in particular, are 
over-represented in the Politburo. As indicated in Table 4, Beijing had two seats in the 16
th
 
(Jia Qinglin and Liu Qi) and the 17
th 
 (Wang Qishan and Liu Qi) Politburos, and both Jia 
Qinglin and Wang Qishan were promoted into the PSC afterwards. Shanghai also had two 
Politburo seats in 2002 and 2012; and four out of five Politburo representatives of Shanghai 
have been promoted to the PSC in the past decade. It reflects the overwhelming political 
influence of Beijing and Shanghai in Chinese politics.  
In addition to regional representation, organizational representation is another important 
factor in selecting leaders. New chiefs of some critical organizations usually select from 
internal candidates. For example, Liu Yunshan was appointed as the head of propaganda, 
largely because of his career experience in propaganda. This consideration is designed to 
ensure that the new selected leaders have abundant experience in their assigned specialized 
areas.  
                                                            
19 The term “region” here includes provinces  municipalities directly under the Central Government and 
autonomous regions. 
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The representation of key organizations in the Politburo has been institutionalized to a 
certain extent in order to maintain the influence of key organizations in the decision-making 
at the top. As indicated in Figure 19  the People’s  iberation Army has held two seats   %) in 
the Politburo since 1992. Notably, the State Council, rather than the military, is the best-
represented organization at the top-level authority  which reflects the CCP’s emphasis on 
economic development. Five of the 18
th
 Politburo members
20
 and three of the 17
th
 Politburo 
members
21
 served in the State Council when they were elected. Figure 20 shows the working 
units of the 18
th
 Central Committee members. 26% of the 18
th
 Central Committee members 
worked in the State Council when they were elected compared with 21% of those who 
worked in the military. Figures 19 and 20 indicate that local governments are the largest 
component of the Politburo and the Central Committee, and the State Council are the second 
largest. It is notable that the People’s Congress and People’s Political Consultative 
Conference hold only 2% of the seats in the 18
th
 Central Committee. This low percentage 
reflects the real political influence of these two organizations in China, although the rule – 
that their heads are PSC members – has been institutionalized.  
 
 
Table 4: Provincial leaders holding full membership of the 15
th
 to 18
th
 Central 
Committee between 1997 and 2012 
 15
th
 (1997) 16
th
 (2002) 17
th
 (2007) 18
th
 (2012) 
Beijing 2 2 2 2 
Tianjin 2 2 2 2 
Hebei 2 2 2 2 
Shannxi  2 2 2 2 
Inner Mongolia 2 2 2 2 
Liaoning 2 2 2 2 
Jilin 2 2 2 2 
Heilongjiang 2 2 2 2 
Shanghai 2 2 2 2 
Jiangsu 2 2 2 2 
Shandong 2 2 2 2 
Zhejiang 2 2 2 2 
Anhui 2 2 2 2 
Fujian 2 2 2 2 
Henan 2 2 2 2 
Hubei 2 2 2 2 
Hunan 2 2 2 2 
Jiangxi 2 2 2 2 
Guangdong 2 2 2 2 
Guangxi 2 2 2 2 
Hainan 2 2 2 2 
Sichuan 2 2 2 2 
Chongqing 2 2 2 2 
Guizhou 2 2 2 2 
Yunnan 1 2 2 2 
Xizang (Tibet) 2 3 3 2 
                                                            
20 Ma Kai, Liu Yandong, Li Keqiang, Wang Qishan and Zhang Dejiang 
21 Wen Jiabao, Hui Liangyu, and Bo Xilai 
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Shanxi  2 2 2 2 
Gansu 2 2 2 2 
Qinghai 2 2 2 2 
Ningxia 2 2 2 2 
Xinjiang 2 4 4 3 
TOTAL 61 65 65 63 
 Source: (Li, 2012b:28; Li and White, 2003:576); the information of 18
th
 Central Committee is 
updated by the author 
Figure 19: Organizational Representation of Politburo Members between 1992 and 2012 
 
The author’s own tabular representation.  ource: (Li and White, 2003:574) 
 
Table 5: Regional Representation in the Politburo between 2002 and 2012 
  16
th
 Politburo 
(2002) 
17
th
 Politburo 
(2007) 
18
th 
Politburo 
(2012) 
Municipalities 
directly under the 
Central Government 
 
Beijing Jia Qinglin,  
Liu Qi 
Wang Qishan,  
Liu Qi 
Guo Jinglong 
Shanghai Huang Ju 
Chen Liangyu 
Xi Jinping Han Zheng, 
Yu Zhengsheng 
Chongqing  Wang Yang Zhang Dejiang
22
 
Tianjin Zhang Lichang Zhang Gaoli  Zhang Gaoli 
Ethnic Minorities 
Autonomous 
Regions 
Xinjiang Wang Lequan Wang Lequan Zhang Chunxian 
Inner Mongolia   Hu Chunhua 
Coastal Provinces
23
 
Guangdong Li Changchun Zhang Dejiang Wang Yang 
Fujian   Sun Chunlan 
                                                            
22 Bo Xilai was a Politburo member before he was removed; and therefore this seat can be considered to be 
reserved for Chongqing Party Chief.  
23 It also includes Shanghai and Tianjin 
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Zhejiang Zhang Dejiang   
Jiangsu Hui Liangyu Li Yuanchao  
Liaoning  Li Keqiang  
Shandong Wu Guanzheng   
 Sichuan Zhou Yongkang  Liu Qibao 
Jilin   Sun Zhengcai 
Shannxi    Zhao Leji 
Hubei Yu Zhengsheng Yu Zhengsheng   
 ource: The author’s own collection 
 
Figure 20: Working Units of 18
th
 CCP Central Committee Members   
 
The author’s own tabular representation based on the data from 
http://cn.nytimes.com/pages/interactive/central-committee.html  
 
6.5. What Remains to Be Done?  
After exploring institutional development over the past three decades, this section 
analyses two crucial aspects of power succession that need to be institutionalized further. As 
mentioned, even institutionalization might be subject to factional manipulation. The current 
level of institutionalization might not be able to maintain the internal stability of the CCP in 
the long run, as evidenced by the challenge from Bo Xilai who had publicly campaigned for a 
PSC seat. The institutional development of the PSC and the contested elections are 
particularly noteworthy.  
 
6.5.1 The Institutional Development of the PSC  
Over the past decades, decision-making at the top has been gradually moving towards a 
collective leadership with the division of work in China. The institutional arrangement of the 
PSC was set to formalize a collective leadership. Some respond positively to the institutional 
development of the PSC. For example, Hu Angang (2012a), a prominent policy advisor for 
the Chinese government, argues that the current institutional setting of the PSC – “a collective 
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presidentialism with Chinese characteristics” – is key to China’s success in the past decade. It 
is valid to argue that the institutional settings of the PSC and Politburo have been much more 
institutionalized now than ever before; however, the extent of institutionalizations are not 
sufficient. Neither the size of the P C nor its members’ specific division of work is fully 
institutionalized.  
As indicated in Figure 21, the number of PSC members has hovered between five and 
nine over the past three decades. The recent downsizing of the PSC in 2012 led to many 
different interpretations. Some argue that it was because the leaders in charge of internal 
security especially Zhou Yongkang were too powerful (Mattis, 2012). Li Cheng argues that it 
is a “direct signal that political reform is under way”  because Zhou obstructed the progress of 
political reform (Report, 2012). It is also argued that the downsizing of the PSC might 
increase the efficiency of decision-making (Hart, 2012; Report, 2012) and give more 
authority to Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang (Report, 2012).  
Others argue that the changing size of the PSC is simply a result of factional struggles. 
For example, Fewsmith interprets the expanding membership of the PSC in 2002 as Jiang 
Zemin’s attempt to restrict Hu Jintao’s power (Fewsmith, 2008; Ou, 2012), and the 
downsizing of the P C in      as a way to prevent Hu’s supporters – Li Yuanchao and Wang 
Yang –  from entering the PSC (Ou, 2012). In this regard, that the number of the PSC remain 
stable is important to leave less room for people to manipulate the result, because political 
manipulation would undermine the effects of institutional rules.  
The division of the P C members’ work responsibilities also needs to be 
institutionalized further. Table 3 lists the positions of leadership held by the PSC members. It 
shows that the PSC did not reserve seats regularly for the Chairman of the Chinese People's 
Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), the PRC President, or the Chairman of the 
People’s Congress until     . The lack of representatives at the top leadership is one reason 
why the People’s Congress and the CPPCC are “rubber stamps”.  ince       it has become 
the norm that the PRC President, the Premier, the Chairmen of the Congress and the CPPCC 
are PSC members; however, the assigned areas of other PSC members – except the Secretary 
of Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the Executive Vice-Premier – have been 
changing all the time.  
 
Figure 21: Size of the Politburo and its Standing Committee from 1982 to 2012 
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The author’s own tabular representation.  ource: (Miller, 2011: table 1); the information 
about the 18
th
 Party Congress is updated by the author
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Table 6: Politburo Standing Committee Members’ Leadership Positions in Major Institutions from 1982 to 2012  
                                                            
24 Zhu was elected as the Vice-Premier in 1991 and he became the first Vice-Premier in 1993.  
 12
th
  (1982)  13
th  
(1987) 
 
13
th  
(1989)
 
14
th
(1992) 
 
15
th
 (1997) 16
th 
(2002)
 
17
th
  (2007) 18
th
  (2012) 
General Secretary of 
Central Committee 
Hu Yaobang Hu 
Yaobang 
Jiang Zemin Jiang  Zemin Jiang  Zemin Hu Jintao Hu Jintao Xi Jinping 
President of PRC Li Xiannian 
(1983) 
       Jiang  Zemin  
(1993) 
Jiang  Zemin  Hu Jintao (2003) Hu Jintao Xi Jinping 
(2013) 
Vice President of PRC     Hu Jintao (1998) Zeng Qinghong 
(2003) 
Xi Jinping 
(2008) 
 
Chairman of CMC Deng Xiaoping  Jiang Zemin Jiang  Zemin Jiang  Zemin Hu Jintao (2004) Hu Jintao Xi Jinping 
Chairman of People’s 
Congress 
Ye Jianying    Qiao Shi Li Peng 
(1998) 
Wu Bangguo 
(2003) 
Wu Bangguo Zhang 
Dejiang 
Premier Zhao Ziyang Li Peng Li Peng Li Peng Zhu Rongji 
(1998) 
Wen Jiabao 
(2003) 
Wen Jiabao Li Keqiang 
(2013) 
Executive Vice- Premier  Yao Yilin Yao Yilin Zhu Rongji
24
 Li Lanqing 
(1998) 
Huang Ju Li Keqiang 
(2008) 
Zhang Gaoli 
(2013) 
Chancellor of Central 
Party School 
   Hu Jintao 
(1993) 
Hu Jintao Zeng Qinghong Xi Jinping Liu Yunshan 
Secretary of Central 
Commission for 
Discipline Inspection 
Chen Yun Qiao Shi Qiao Shi  Wei Jianxing Wu Guanzheng He Guoqiang Wang 
Qishan 
Secretary of Central 
Commission for Politics 
and Law 
 Qiao Shi Qiao Shi   Luo Gan Zhou 
Yongkang 
  
Chairman of CPPCC    Li Ruihuan  
(1993) 
Li Ruihuan 
(1998) 
Jia Qinglin (2003) Jia Qinglin Yu 
Zhengsheng 
Other posts 
 
 Hu Qili Song Ping Liu Huaqing 
(VP of CMC) 
 Li Changchun Li Changchun  
  Li Ruihuan      
In total 6 5 6 7 7 9 9 7 
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6.5.2 The Practice of Uncontested Election 
The CCP has been practising elections to select leaders since 1957. Chinese elections 
are very different from those in democratic countries – it is called “socialist democracy with 
Chinese characteristics” in China. The uncontested election  deng e xuanju) and the contested 
election (chae xianju) are the two principal types of elections in China. An uncontested 
election is a type of election that has the same number of nominees and elected candidates. A 
contested election or differential election refers to those elections that have more candidates 
than elected seats. Before 1987, the uncontested election was the only type of election in 
China. The contested election was officially added into the Party Constitution and 
experimented with in electing the 13
th
 Central Committee members in 1987, and a few high-
level leaders including two former ministers of the Propaganda Department, Zhu Houze and 
Deng Liqun, lost this election. Since then, the CCP has gradually institutionalized contested 
elections in selecting the Central Committee members (Yan, et al., 2012).
25
 
Figure 22 shows the difference in the proportion of nominated and elected seats in the 
elected seats of the Central Committee and the Central Discipline Inspection Commission in 
the past decade. It indicates that this proportion has gradually increased at each Party 
Congress. In this regard, Chinese elections have been improving – but at a very slow pace. 
Liberal democracy and competitive elections are still very sensitive in China, and those 
efforts to practise elections were designed to strengthen rather than democratize the party – 
although these two are not necessarily contradictory. Nonetheless, the contested elections of 
Chinese leaders provide a good starting point for practising intra-party democracy. It might 
be true for the CCP to claim that the immediate implementation of direct elections might 
cause tremendous social instability. Thus, the gradual process of increasing the proportion of 
nominees in the elected seats of leaders might find a balance between the practise of party 
democracy and the maintenance of political stability.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
25 The former Premier Wen Jiabao also confirmed that the CCP has been practising the contested election for 
selecting Chinese leaders when he answered a journalist’s question in      (Xinhua, 2011). 
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Figure 22: Ratio showing the difference between the number of nominees and the 
number of elected seats (cha e bi li) in the Central Committee and the Central Discipline 
Inspection Commission  
 
 
 
The author’s own tabular representation.  ource:  ata of the  6th and the 17th Party Congress 
are from the Xinhua News Agency http://news.xinhuanet.com/18cpcnc/2012-
11/13/c_113680755.htm  accessed on December 21, 2012; for data from the 18
th
 Party 
Congress, see (Shan, 2012) 
 
6.6. Summary 
This chapter studies the institutional development of power succession in China over 
the past three decades. It argues that this institutionalization has developed a power 
succession system with Chinese characteristics, which has guaranteed the seamless transfer of 
power that rarely proceeds smoothly in authoritarian regimes. As a result of this 
institutionalization, the leadership transition since 2002 has been distinct from the previously 
cruel “life and death” power struggles in Mao’s era. The stable power transition under the 
authoritarian rule in China provides a dramatic example of authoritarian resilience. 
Yet, political reforms – including the institutional development of power succession, in 
China is under-researched in the English language literature as mentioned in the Introduction 
Chapter and Chapter 3. As this chapter shows, the institutional development of power 
succession plays an important role in legitimizing and stabilizing the authoritarian rule in 
China  which strongly supports  chubert’s (2008) argument that political reforms have been 
generating a “critical degree” of regime legitimacy in China.   
 It must be acknowledged that the current power succession system in China is still less 
transparent than those in developed democratic countries nowadays. However, the current 
succession politics in China have no doubt been more predictable, transparent, and stable 
now than ever before in the history of the PRC. The institutionalization of the Chinese 
succession system has managed to overcome the fatal weakness of the authoritarian system – 
how to transfer power successfully at the top without splitting the leadership. This does not 
mean that the current level of institutionalization is sufficient to guarantee authoritarian rule 
in the long run – the case of Bo Xilai clearly warned of the potential dangers of division 
among the elites. For the sake of its survival, the CCP is still under enormous pressure to 
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develop its succession system further. Whether this development will lead to democratic 
elections or not is in the hands of the CCP (i.e. party cohesion) and – more importantly – the 
Chinese people (i.e. popular legitimacy).    
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Chapter Seven: Conclusions 
A Journey to Popular Legitimacy and Party Cohesion 
7.1. Introduction 
While some scholars have been debating whether – or even when – China will rule the 
world (e.g. Beeson, 2013; Jacques, 2009), the CCP has been seriously concerned about the 
continuation of its rule. Not only the collapse of Eastern European communist regimes and 
the Soviet Union but also and the failure of republicanism and the  MT in China’s modern 
history have constantly alerted the CCP to the consequence of losing popular support and 
consensus among the elite. As discussed in Chapter 2, after Mao Zedong died in 1976, the 
CCP realized that its legitimacy was at an all-time low because of the long-term national 
chaos and the almost collapsed economy. Since then, the CCP has taken a completely 
different performance-based approach from Mao’s ideology-based one.  
Moving away from communist ideologies did help the CCP to promote economic 
growth. However, as this thesis has frequently stressed, there is a fundamental contradiction 
between generating economic success by utilizing quasi-capitalist economic policies and the 
fact that this is a communist party that supposedly justifies its rule by being the vehicle to 
deliver a communist society. As Chapter 2 shows, this contradiction has generated endless 
ideological battles within the party. In the late 1980s, this power struggle within the CCP 
leadership combined with social challenges – led by complaints about negative consequences 
of economic growth – and almost overthrew the CCP.    
In contemporary China  rapid economic growth has not undermined the CCP’s 
concerns about its potential existential crisis. Indeed, various threats to the CCP’s rule  such 
as corruption and socioeconomic inequality, are derived from this rapid growth. Nowadays, 
addressing the negative consequences of rapid economic growth has become a leading 
challenge to the CCP’s rule. This challenge does not only involve economic aspects – such as 
pushing for more economic reforms to generate a more sustainable growth – but also 
ideological ones. A communist party is not supposed to tolerate problems such as 
socioeconomic inequality; in this context, the CCP has to produce ideological discourses to 
justify its rule.      
As this thesis shows  driven by the CCP’s own concerns about existential crisis, it has 
taken impressive efforts to modernize its ideologies and institutionalize its power succession 
system in order to search for popular legitimacy and party cohesion. Yet, the topics of 
ideology and power succession do not receive sufficient attention in the political science 
literature of Chinese studies in general. 
 
7.2. Popular Legitimacy: A Wide Gulf between Western and Chinese Scholarship 
 Based on a mixed qualitative/quantitative analysis and primary data, this thesis makes a 
valuable contribution to reveal a remarkable division between the Western and Chinese 
scholarship on the subject of legitimacy in China. When explaining the CCP’s legitimacy  the 
conventional wisdom of Western scholarship focuses on performance legitimacy. Economic 
performance in particular has been highly valued. As mentioned, economic performance is 
important; however, it also creates many legitimacy threats, such as corruption and inequality. 
In addition  economic performance needs to be transformed into people’s subjective 
perceptions in conducive ways so that it will enhance legitimacy, and ideological factors play 
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a significant role in this process. In other words, ideology will influence the impact of 
economic growth on regime legitimacy. More importantly, economic growth also created a 
fundamental dilemma for the CCP’s rule – a party that is supposed to deliver a communist 
society in order to justify its rule.  
Social stability is another important element of the CCP’s performance legitimacy. 
 imilarly  ideology also plays a role in maintaining social stability. The CCP’s  in)stability 
discourse exploited people’s concerns about an unstable and fracturing China by portraying a 
potential scenario of an unstable and divided China. In this way, ideology interacted with the 
CCP’s capability to maintain social stability  as discussed in Chapter 5.   
In addition to economic performance and social stability, nationalism is also crucial in 
legitimizing the CCP’s rule. However  nationalism alone is not an ideology  as Chapter   
discussed. It is better considered as informal ideology that consists of a set of incoherent and 
relatively fleeting values. As discussed in Chapter 5, the discourse of national rejuvenation is 
a part of the CCP’s broad ideological construction  which interacts with the CCP’s 
 in)stability discourse  national condition discourse  and China’s  “uniqueness”.  
While the topic of ideology in China is under-researched in the English language 
literature, it remains a crucial topic in the Chinese literature. This thesis finds that Chinese 
intellectuals consider ideology to be crucial to the CCP’s legitimacy. It also finds that 
Chinese intellectuals are more pessimistic about performance legitimacy than Western 
scholars are. In China, it is clearly recognized that simply relying on economics is not 
sufficient – even if the economy continues to do well (and of course, there is a clear 
understanding that bad economic performance will harm legitimacy). In the relevant Chinese 
literature, the most perceived threats to legitimacy are all problems caused by economic 
growth –changing values, socioeconomic equality, and corruption. Ideology is considered by 
Chinese intellectuals to be helpful in justifying those problems under the CCP’s leadership.  
In addition to ideology, institutional change in China is another under-researched topic 
in the English language literature, although a few studies address this issue, as discussed in 
Chapter 6. Institutional change has both direct and indirect impacts on regime legitimacy, as 
discussed in Chapter 3.  
 
7.3. Party Cohesion 
 Legitimacy is certainly crucial, but it is not a sufficient condition of regime survival. As 
this thesis establishes, the CCP’s survival is decided not only by external stability reflected in 
popular legitimacy but also internal stability reflected in party cohesion. As Figure 1 shows, 
party cohesion and popular legitimacy are inter-related. In the CCP’s discourse  its ruling 
capacity is an inner cause of its legitimacy, and party cohesion is obviously a prerequisite for 
the CCP’s ruling capability. A highly divided party leadership will restrict the CCP’s 
capability to maintain its legitimacy by delivering economic growth, maintaining stability, 
and defending China’s national interests. By studying both party cohesion and popular 
legitimacy  this thesis links the CCP’s internal stability with its external stability for 
explaining its survival. 
 This thesis also shows that ideology and the institutionalization of power succession 
play crucial roles in maintaining party cohesion. In order to settle ideological battles within 
the party, the CCP has produced various formal ideological discourses to redefine socialism. 
154 
 
In addition to ideological reforms, the CCP has also taken great efforts to institutionalize its 
power succession system in order to minimize the negative effects of power struggles.  
 With rapid economic growth, the reality of the political economy in China may move 
away from the CCP’s socialist commitment. The quest for popular legitimacy may sometimes 
conflict with the search for party cohesion. As Chapter 2 discussed, in the 1980s, reform-
minded leaders intended to push for more market reforms in order to generate economic 
success and thus maintain legitimacy; however, less reform-minded leaders were concerned 
that excessive liberal reforms might make China a capitalist society  and thus lose the CCP’s 
meaning of existence. The CCP’s desires to generate legitimacy by economic success led to 
further ideological divisions within the CCP and thus harmed party cohesion. The protests of 
1989 combined with the elite divisions at that time were a notable consequence of this 
struggle between legitimacy and party cohesion. Further research should look into how the 
CCP deals with the potential contradiction between popular legitimacy and party cohesion, 
and how it balances its needs for these two crucial notions.  
 Party cohesion and popular legitimacy are definitely interconnected; however, party 
cohesion may be a greater threat to the CCP’s rule compared with popular legitimacy. As 
mentioned in this thesis, the majority of the authoritarian rule is overthrown by the ruling 
elites instead of the masses. In China, the communist party is most likely to be overthrown 
when it is divided.  
 If there is a waning of the power of informal ideology and/or inappropriate choices over 
how to refresh or renew the informal ideology, the loss of party cohesion may be more 
harmful to the CCP’s rule. For example, as discussed in Chapter 5  the CCP’s informal 
discourses argue that the CCP’s legitimacy is based on its capacity to promote economic 
growth, maintain stability, and defend national interests. If the regime fails to achieve those 
goals, the forces within the regime may pose quicker and perhaps stronger challenges to 
overthrow the then leaders than the social forces do. This is especially dangerous to the 
CCP’s rule in the post-Deng era because it lacks strongmen such as Mao Zedong and Deng 
Xiaoping who are willing and capable of pulling the party together by all necessary means – 
without Deng Xiaoping, the CCP perhaps could not survive the protest of 1989. 
 
7.4. Formal Ideology and Informal Ideology: A Dual Strategy  
By examining the CCP’s formal and informal ideological discourses, the mechanism of 
ideological promotion, and their effectiveness, this thesis makes a valuable contribution to the 
limited studies of ideology in China. A core argument of this thesis is that ideology is by no 
mean obsolete; it still plays a crucial role in maintaining the CCP’s rule. This thesis also 
proposes a new theoretical distinction between formal ideology and informal ideology. 
Formal and informal ideologies have inter-related but different functions in justifying its rule.  
While the CCP has been using quasi-capitalist economic policies to promote economic 
growth, it needs to justify why China still needs a communist party to monopolise power. As 
mentioned, the contradiction between quasi-capitalist policies and the CCP’s commitment to 
socialism has generated endless ideological battles within the CCP. Thus, the CCP has 
constantly put forward formal ideology to justify its communist rule to itself for settling intra-
party disputes. However, as this thesis also shows, formal ideology can undermine the 
consensus within the party when it deeply involves in factional struggles.  
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In addition to the self-justification of communist rule, the CCP also needs to justify its 
authoritarian rule to the entire society. In other words, it needs to legitimize its one-party rule. 
The CCP learnt a painful lesson about the importance of popular beliefs from the popular 
protests in the late 1980s. Learning from the protest of 1989, the CCP has taken great efforts 
to construct various informal ideologies to maintain popular beliefs.  
A major strategy of the CCP’s informal ideology is to legitimize the one-party system 
by discrediting alternative political systems in particular liberal democracy – a kind of anti-
westernism or negativism more generally. Although this strategy helped the CCP to maintain 
one-party system, this kind of anti-westernism informal ideology may delegitimize the CCP’s 
rule in the long run.  
Even if the CCP feeds other components into this informal ideology, it may still be 
inadequate to secure the CCP’s position in the future. As this thesis explained  the CCP’s 
ideological hegemony depends on not only informal ideology but also formal ideology. As I 
mentioned in the Introduction Chapter, unlike formal ideology that consists of a coherent 
value system, informal ideology is formed by a set of relatively fleeting and incoherent 
values. It alone cannot replace the value system to justify the party’s rule – it neither provides 
an ideological basis for forming certain policies nor guides the establishment of a political 
system. Thus, to adapt informal ideology alone is not able to maintain the CCP’s rule. 
Moreover, most components of informal ideology are closely embedded into this anti-
westernism approach. Other components or streams may be able to feed into the informal 
ideology; however, it is very difficult to shift this anti-westernism approach because informal 
ideology is significantly constrained by formal ideological discourse and thus has very 
limited room to do so. If there is no significant change on both formal and informal 
ideologies, the legitimising role of informal ideology may be very limited in the long run.     
In short, formal ideology and informal ideology play roles in maintaining party 
cohesion and popular legitimacy respectively. Driven by the rapidly changing 
socioeconomic-political landscapes, the CCP will definitely continue to revise its formal and 
informal ideologies. As we have observed, there is a tendency to merge formal ideology and 
informal ideology. Formal ideology is, now more than previously, made up of more populist 
elements and less communist elements (e.g. language).  Further research should look into the 
future development of the CCP’s dual strategy driven by rapid economic growth and the 
development of technology.  
 
7.5. The Institutionalization of Power Succession 
 In addition to ideology, institutional change in China also plays a crucial role in 
maintaining the CCP’s rule. This thesis links the institutional development of power 
succession with regime survival (popular legitimacy and party cohesion). A core argument of 
this thesis is that the institutionalization of power succession plays a crucial role in 
maintaining party cohesion and the CCP’s ruling capacity to maintain power. By offering a 
large amount of primary and secondary data, this thesis analyses the institutional 
development of power succession in the past three decades and its impacts on the CCP’s 
survival. Arguably, the institutionalization of power succession is crucial for the CCP to 
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minimize the negative consequences of power struggle among the ruling elites and to 
maintain stable elite politics. In this way, it helps to maintain party cohesion and the 
legitimacy of the CCP leadership.  
 Before institutionalization, power succession in China had always been associated with 
political crisis and chaos, which seriously delegitimized the CCP’s rule  as Chapter 6 
discussed.  ince institutionalization  the CCP’s leadership transition has become predictable 
and smooth. In explaining the stable elite politics in China, the relevant literature focuses on 
the changing power structure and non-strongman politics in the post-Deng era. However, the 
institutionalization of power succession is also crucial in maintaining the internal stability of 
the CCP, as this thesis shows.    
 
7.6. Contribution to General Literature of Comparative Politics: Authoritarian 
Resilience 
 Authoritarian systems are often considered rigid; however, the school of authoritarian 
resilience argues that authoritarian regimes can be resilient as well, as discussed in Chapter 3. 
By presenting a highly adaptive authoritarian regime with a strong learning capability, this 
thesis strongly supports the theory of authoritarian resilience. The success of the leadership 
transition in 2012 further supports the theory of authoritarian resilience. To transfer 
successfully the top power and prevent a split in the leadership during this process have 
always been extremely challenging to authoritarian regimes. Learning from the failure of 
other communist regimes and its past, the CCP has made great efforts to institutionalize 
power succession in the past three decades. This institutionalization has made the leadership 
transition more predictable, smooth, and stable than ever before.   
 Moreover, modernization theory suggests that socioeconomic modernization will 
trigger a series of value shifts towards liberal democracy and democratization. In order to 
maintain its rule, the regime has produced various informal ideological discourses to resist 
pro-liberal democratic values. By deploying this ideological strategy, the CCP has managed 
to promote China’s socioeconomic modernization without damaging its one-party rule. These 
cases suggest that the CCP is not only highly adaptive but also has a strong ability to learn. 
As Tsai and Dean (2013:87) point out  the CCP has carefully constructed itself as a “learning 
party” in order to achieve “thought unification and regime adaptation”.   
 
7.7. Methodological Contribution to the Field of Chinese Studies                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
In addition to the aforementioned theoretical and empirical contributions, this thesis 
also contributes to the field of Chinese studies methodologically. Building on Gilley’s and 
Holbig’s (2009) work, this thesis develops a notable mixed qualitative/quantitative approach 
to study Chinese literature systematically. This thesis also uses Pearson’s chi-squared test to 
analyse how Chinese intellectuals’ arguments are influenced by their research background. A 
principal component factor analysis is employed to study how different policies proposed by 
Chinese intellectuals are knitted together. After a quantitative data analysis frames the debate 
among Chinese elites, discourse analysis is used to study the specific content of the Chinese 
debate on legitimacy.  
This above mixed method can be widely applied in other fields of Chinese studies. 
Although this method cannot capture the opinions of dissidents or confidential discussions 
about the state, it can systematically study the academic discussion among Chinese 
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intellectuals, and thus would likely serve a variety of academic and practical uses in policy 
and business relations. For example  it can delineate and measure Chinese views over China’s 
role in the world and its foreign policies. Specifically, it can be used to study several key 
domestic debates in China’s international relations among Chinese intellectuals  including but 
not limited to “Chinese core interests”  “the China  ream”  “Peaceful Rise/ evelopment”  
and “the China Threat”. Chinese domestic debates over these issues will help to identify, 
measure  and assess China’s assertive foreign policies. Further studies can use this method 
systematically to understand Chinese discourse on its foreign policies. 
 
7.8. The Future of China 
As this thesis establishes, both popular legitimacy and party cohesion are important to 
the CCP’s rule. It also shows that ideology and power succession are crucial for the CCP to 
stay in power. What are the implications of these conclusions for China’s future? Is the 
authoritarian system in China sustainable? Will (or when will) China democratize with its 
rapid socioeconomic modernization?  Or, to put it another way, can the CCP stay in power in 
the long run? It is notable that answers to those questions will necessarily be tentative and 
incomplete  however  this thesis does shed lights on China’s future development.  
 
7.8.1. Economic Crisis = Legitimacy Crisis?  
When predicting China’s future development  many focus on economic aspects. Many 
argue that once the economic growth slows down  the CCP’s rule will be in danger (Krugman, 
2013; Zhao, 2009). It suggests that economic performance is a core factor in deciding the 
CCP’s fate. Economic performance is certainly important; however, ideology plays a crucial 
role in affecting the impacts of economic performance on regime legitimacy, as discussed in 
Chapter 3. As suggested by the 2008 financial crisis and the Wenzhou debt crisis, economic 
crises may bring some challenges to the CCP’s rule  but it will not overturn the CCP’s rule as 
long as proper and effective political actions are taken in response. This thesis suggests that 
there is room for the CCP to manipulate people’s perceptions of economic performance. In 
this sense, performance is not all about economic growth but also responses to economic 
cries including both policies and ideological discourses.  
Future studies should pay more attention to the role of ideological factors in framing 
people’s perceptions of economic performance. More importantly  ideological discourses are 
relevant to the CCP’s future political marketing. Further studies should focus more on 
whether the CCP can establish itself as being the only force that can: 
(a) Identify future challenges 
(b) Find ways of dealing with those challenges  
(c)  eliver social stability and defend China’s national interests  
If the CCP can succeed in persuading the masses over those points, it may increase its 
popular prestige even during times of economic difficulties. In short, ideological factors are 
key to deciding whether economic crisis will trigger a legitimacy crisis. 
  
7.8.2. Socioeconomic Modernization = Challenges to Authoritarian Rule?  
Many also argue that the CCP’s authoritarian rule may not last in the long run even if 
economic growth continues to perform well. This argument is relevant to several notable 
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theories. According to modernization theory, socioeconomic modernization will lead to a 
series of pro-liberal democratic values, which will challenge the authoritarian rule in the long 
run. Performance dilemma and  avies’ “J curve” theory of revolution also suggest that 
performance legitimacy is very fragile and unsustainable in the long term because of people’s 
rising expectations, as discussed in Chapter 3.  
In this aspect, the role of ideology is immediately obvious – ideology is a direct factor 
of regime change, while economic growth is an indirect factor. As this thesis suggests, so far, 
the CCP’s informal ideology has been effective in undermining the impacts of pro-liberal 
democracy values brought about socioeconomic modernization. This is not to say that the 
CCP’s anti-liberal democracy ideological strategy may work in the long run. As this thesis 
also suggests, those informal ideological discourses are short-term solutions that has a shelf 
life rather than more fundamental solutions. In the long run, they may be used against the 
CCP. Thus, the CCP needs constantly to revise its informal ideology to legitimize its rule. 
Further studies should look into the role of the CCP’s ideological discourses in affecting the 
changing social values brought by modernization and people’s rising expectations.   
 
7. . . Why do Communism and Mao Zedong still Matter to China’s Future?  
As conventional wisdom considered ideology meaningless, communism and Mao 
Zedong are widely neglected when predicting China’s future. Indeed  they still matter a lot to 
the continuation of the CCP’s rule. How can the CCP justify communism and Mao Zedong in 
light of what they are doing now? As this thesis suggests, different views on communism and 
Mao Zedong have seriously undermined party cohesion. Bo Xilai’s challenge provides a 
dramatic example to suggest the importance of ideological orthodoxy and Mao Zedong to the 
CCP’s rule.  
 Intensified by Bo Xilai’s challenge and the widening socioeconomic inequality in Hu 
Jintao’s era  the ideological battle between the Leftist and the Liberal has become an 
unavoidable issue for Xi Jinping’s new leadership. The CCP notices that it gradually loses its 
hegemonic discourse on social values. In this context, Xi Jinping attempted to reunite the 
spiritual civilization and the material civilization just as Deng Xiaoping tried to do in the 
    s.  imilar to  eng’s principle of anti-right in politics and anti-left in economics, Xi 
Jinping’s approach is  in short  left-leaning in politics and right-leaning in economics.  
 On the one hand, Xi Jinping’s leadership has showed its firm determination to push for 
market reforms in order to promote economic growth. Immediately after Xi Jinping took the 
top power of the PLA in December 2012, Xi visited the south of China following a very 
similar route to that of  eng Xiaoping’s famous “southern tour” in       setting up a strong 
stance in order to support market reforms.  uring Xi’s southern tour, Xi (2012) promised to 
strengthen China’s market reform and considered  eng Xiaoping’s “reform and open up” as 
“a crucial strategy to decide China’s fate”. On the other hand  after Xi showed his liberal 
stance on market reforms, Xi launched a series of left-leaning campaigns in order to deal with 
political affairs, especially ideology and the party. Xi’s leadership launched a series of Mao 
Zedong’s mass-line campaigns – including the campaigns of “criticism and self-criticism”  
anti-corruption, and rectification. By launching these intra-party campaigns, Xi attempted to 
improve the working style of the party (i.e. against formalism, bureaucratism, hedonism, and 
wasteful custom) in order to strengthen the relationship between the party and the masses.    
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 More importantly, Xi Jinping highly emphasizes ideology. At a national conference of 
propaganda and ideological work, Xi clearly pointed out that “ideological work is extremely 
important” (Ni, 2013). A month after Xi took power, Xi set the official tone to end the 
dispute about the party history between the Leftists and the Liberals (Fewsmith, 2014). As an 
editorial of Guangming Daily argues: 
“Mao Zedong is the founder and the creator of our party, our country, and our socialist 
system. If we negate Mao, it is bound to negate the history of the CCP and the PRC and 
to negate the leadership of our party and our socialist system. This is a true intention of 
some people who negate Mao. ” (Qi, 2013)  
 In dealing with the party’s history  Xi proposed a theory of “The two ‘cannot negates’”. 
Xi (2013) argues that the period of Mao Zedong and the period of “reform and open up” are 
“inter-related”  none of which should be negated. In other words, the period of Mao 
established a foundation of socialism in China  based on which  eng’s “reform and open up” 
can succeed; therefore, China should not negate the contribution of the first thirty years of 
Mao’s rule to today’s success. 
 After setting the tone for the party history  Xi’s leadership is taking a series of actions 
to strengthen ideological and political education. An obvious example is the CCP’s tightening 
control over freedom of speech on the Internet. As Chapter 5 discussed, the party has 
strengthened its political marketing on the Chinese version of Twitter, Weibo, by 
undermining pro-liberal opinions (e.g. the arrest of some pro-liberal opinion leaders) and 
reinforcing pro-government voices. In the meantime, Xi Jinping introduced his ideological 
formula, China Dream, involving a strong appeal towards nationalist sentiment. 
With China’s rapidly changing socioeconomic-political landscape, the CCP will 
continue to revise its formal ideology to justify its communist rule. The rapid economic 
growth may make the justification of the CCP’s socialist commitment more difficult. In the 
context of declining communist beliefs in China, further studies should look into how the 
CCP will revise its link with communism and Mao Zedong. Will the CCP rename itself as a 
socialist party? 
 
7.8.4. Prospects of the CCP’s future ideological strategy 
  ince the CCP’s ideological discourses are path-dependent, it is unlikely to see any 
dramatic change in the short term. The CCP will continue to adapt the current dual 
ideological strategy to maintain party cohesion on the one hand and the popular legitimacy on 
the other. In the long term  what are the prospects for the CCP’s ideological strategy?  
 
Scenarios 1: ideological popularization and the unification of ideology.   
With the increasing educational levels of Chinese people and development of 
technology, there is enormous pressure for the CCP to reform its communist discourse system. 
It may result in ideological popularization. As this thesis shows, formal ideology involves 
more and more populist elements nowadays. In the future, it could contain greater populist 
vocabulary and less communist vocabulary. To what extent will formal ideology become 
popularized? Will the CCP’s dual ideological strategy – formal and informal ideology – 
merge into one? Those questions need further observation.   
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This ideological popularization may lead to two opposite scenarios: more 
westernisation (scenario 1a) or more nationalist and resistant (scenario 1b). In scenario 1a, 
the CCP’s adapted value system may be heavily influenced by the Western liberal values. 
This may make the CCP’s ideological discourses more convincing to the society  however  
those pro-liberal values may present a potential challenge to the legitimacy of the one-party 
system. This may also lead to the resistance of the conservative forces and thus undermines 
party cohesion.   
If the conservative forces lead this ideological popularization, it may lead to scenario 
1b of a more nationalist and resistant discourse system. This ideological move may either 
intensify the conflicts between political system and economic growth or further constrain the 
CCP’s quasi-capitalist economic policies – both of which may undermine performance 
legitimacy.  
 
Scenarios 2: the continuation of dual ideological strategy in the long run 
If the Chinese leaders continue to use this dual ideological strategy in the long run, its 
formal ideological discourses will become more marginalized. As discussed in Chapter 5, 
formal ideology has already become very ineffective in persuading the mass. In the end, the 
CCP’s formal ideology may completely lose its discourse hegemony. This is to say, formal 
ideology may be out of touch with informal ideology and social values.  
A possible consequence of this disconnection is that social values may fundamentally 
go against formal ideological discourses. This will not only make formal ideology become a 
purely political symbol but also further delegitimize the communist rule (although not 
necessarily the authoritarian rule). The rapid socioeconomic development in China will make 
the reality of China’s political economy further move away from communist doctrine and 
thus the CCP will be less capable of justifying its “communist” rule to both the society and 
the party.   
 
7.8.5. Chinese Nationalism 
 As this thesis discussed, so far, Chinese nationalism alone is not an ideology. 
Considering its significance, further studies should focus on the future development of 
Chinese nationalism. Will the appeal of Chinese nationalism become more coherent? Will it 
become an independent force to influence Chinese politics? A related issue is the interaction 
between state nationalism and popular nationalism. In terms of state nationalism, future 
studies may look into how the CCP integrates nationalism into its value system for gaining 
legitimacy. This may be crucial for the CCP to stay in power when facing economic 
difficulties and democratic movements in the future.  
 Popular nationalism is also notable. Specifically, how will this popular nationalism 
influence state nationalism? What are the impacts of popular nationalism on Beijing’s foreign 
policies? Will the rise of Chinese nationalism make China become more assertive? In 
addition, the rise of nationalism may discourage foreign investment and trade, and thus harm 
China’s economic performance. It may also lead to popular protests if Beijing fails to meet 
the expectations of nationalists. In this situation, how will Beijing balance its needs for 
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nationalism and other legitimacy sources such as economic growth and social stability? All 
those questions are crucial to China’s future and thus need further observation.  
 
7. .6. How to  eal with China’s  emocratization?  
The topic of Chinese nationalism is also relevant to how the West should deal with 
China’s democratization. As discussed in Chapter    there are two contrary policy options for 
the West to deal with China’s democratization. On the one hand  some suggest that Western 
governments should be tougher in supporting democracy in China. On the other hand, many 
argue that Western governments should not put too much pressure on China. This thesis 
supports the latter view. The CCP’s informal ideology  including nationalism  takes a 
negative approach that legitimizes the authoritarian rule by discrediting liberal democracy. If 
the West takes a more explicit role in promoting democracy in China and supporting the 
separatist movement of Chinese dissents, it will only lead to the rise of anti-West sentiment 
and thus harm China’s democratic development. This nationalism intensified by the West 
will also constrain Chinese leaders in the move towards liberalization. As Breslin (2010: 206) 
argues:  
“Pressuring China’s leaders to liberalise might actually end up restraining their ability 
to do so. Outside pressure – particularly when it comes in the shape of the US 
government – ‘nationalises’ technical issues and brings them to the forefront of popular 
attention. It also gives succour to those who oppose further liberalization and favour a 
more national-based Chinese economic future.”  
 Thus, any impatient Western attempt to promote dramatic changes in China – liberal 
democracy in particular – would likely harm China’s democratization and to consolidate the 
authoritarian rule in China.   
 
7.8.7. Future Development of Power Succession 
 As this thesis establishes, owing to the institutionalization of power succession, Chinese 
elite politics have become quite stable in the past two decades. As mentioned in Chapter 6, 
my recent study finds that institutional rule combined with age has become a key factor in 
selecting Chinese leaders in 2012 (Zeng, 2013). However, the current level of 
institutionalization is not sufficient to maintain party cohesion and the legitimacy of the 
power succession system in the long run. As discussed in Chapter    Bo Xilai’s challenge to 
the CCP’s rule does not only lie in the field of ideology  i.e. ideological orthodox) but also in 
power succession. Bo’s publicity campaign seriously challenged the legitimacy of the CCP’s 
power succession system. Thus, the CCP is still under enormous pressure to institutionalize 
its leadership transition further.    
 Moreover  Bo’s case also indicates that whether the CCP is capable of distinguishing 
anti-corruption campaigns and power struggles is also very important. Obviously, the CCP’s 
attempt to hold up Bo as an example of anti-corruption does not seems to be convincing to 
the society. This relates to Xi Jinping’s current anti-corruption campaign. In the short term, 
this kind of popular and legitimising anti-corruption campaign may help to generate popular 
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support for new leadership. However, if this campaign is not handled well or it involves 
factional factors, ordinary people and political elites may doubt whether this campaign is 
really launched for anti-corruption. Thus, in the long term, the anti-corruption campaign may 
even harm popular legitimacy and party cohesion.  
 Above all, institutionalization of power succession is crucial for the continuation of the 
CCP’s rule. It is very difficult if not impossible to point out what and to what extent 
institutional reforms will be sufficient to prevent factional discord in the future because of the 
changing political dynamics. For example, whether the recently established Central National 
Security Commission will change the power structure within the party and the influence of 
the PSC still needs further observation, and it will takes years to become clear. So far, it is 
too early to argue whether Xi Jinping’s recent institutional reforms will strengthen or 
undermine institutionalization.  
 As such, this thesis can only point out two potentially significant issues for further 
observation: (a) the institutional development of the PSC and (b) the practise of uncontested 
elections. Future studies on these two aspects will help to understand the unity of the CCP’s 
leadership and its decision-making capability. More importantly, it may point to the future 
development of the selection mechanism of Chinese leaders and thus China’s democratic 
future – even if it is not a Western liberal democratic future. 
Specifically, the development of the PSC will help us to understand to what extent the 
CCP would reinforce/or manipulate the institutional rules to constrain/or serve for factional 
struggles. As Chapter 6 discussed, institutionalization is crucial to prevent factional discord 
and thus maintain a stable elite politics. However, the effects of the institutionalization may 
be undermined by political manipulation. The changing size of the PSC has left many rooms 
for factional struggle and thus harmed the effects of the institutionalization. In this regard, as 
the highest leading body of the Chinese political system  the P C’s current level of 
institutionalization is certainly insufficient. If this problem is not properly solved, it may lead 
to the loss of party cohesion.  
The second crucial development is the practice of the uncontested elections among 
central leaders. It provides an open, transparent, and democratic way to regulate internal 
competition. Of course, the practice of the uncontested elections is far from sufficient to 
maintain party cohesion and popular legitimacy; however, it indicates a positive sign of 
implementing electoral democracy.  
This high-level democratic practice may play a more important role than the local 
democratic practise such as village democracy in the future. Although both are launched to 
strengthen rather than democratize the one-party system, village democracy is more about 
improving local governance and propaganda purpose than the high-level democratic practice 
is. As Chapter 4 discussed, the Chinese intellectuals highly value grassroots democracy; 
however, none of them suggests scaling up this local democratic practice to the national level. 
In addition to political sensitivity, we cannot deny the fact that the current quality and 
influence of village democracy in China is still very questionable. There is little chance that 
village democracy will establish a very positive image of democratic governance. This is not 
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to say that village democracy is not important, but that it is unlikely to be a decisive factor of 
the future development of China’s political system. 
 
7. . .  cenarios of China’s Future 
Although China scholarship is reassessing the resilience of the authoritarian system, 
mainstream political science still holds that democracy is the only effective system to govern 
a pluralistic society in the long run and the authoritarian system is weak in nature. Most 
Western observers firmly believe that the current political system in China is unsustainable, 
and democracy will come to China in the future.  o far  possible scenarios of China’s future 
are offered: “apocalyptic”  “optimistic”  and “muddling through” variants (Baunm, 1996; 
Dickson, 2006; Saich, 2005; Scalapino, 1993). The “apocalyptic” scenario predicts a 
downfall of the regime. The optimistic variant anticipates a gradual transition towards 
democracy, which might be similar to the democratic transitions of Taiwan and Korea. The 
last scenario expects careful problem-solving with limited adaption to preserve the one-party 
system. 
In addition to the above three major scenarios  two proponents of China’s political 
reform, Heberer and Schubert(2006), add a new scenario that the CCP could stay in power in 
the long run if it effectively takes action to solve emerging problems. This scenario is similar 
to but much more optimistic than “muddling through”. Heberer and  chubert (2006) argue 
that political reforms contribute to cadre efficiency and accountability, and thus enhance 
political legitimacy in China.  
All of the above scenarios are valid to a certain point: socioeconomic development, the 
government’s capability to solve various problems caused by socioeconomic development  
and limited political reforms on a macro level, are definitely important. In addition to those 
factors, this thesis also shows the importance of institutionalization and ideological 
adaptation in maintaining the CCP’s rule.  
  Above all  with China’s changing socioeconomic-political landscapes, the CCP is 
forced constantly to adapt itself. The continuation of the CCP’s rule is decided by whether it 
can promote reforms to maintain a dynamic stability. As Li Keqiang (2013) elaborates, 
promoting economic growth in China is like riding a bike. If the bike keeps going forwards, it 
will maintain stability; once it stops, the bike will topple over. This is not only true of 
economic reforms, but also of ideological and political system reforms. Once the CCP’s 
reforms and adaptation stop or slow down, the rapidly changing environment will put the 
CCP’s rule in danger.  
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Appendix A: Coding Manual 
FIELD 
LETTER 
FIELD NAME CODING DESCRIPTION 
Basic 
Informatio
n 
 
Author  Names of Authors 
Authors' 
Institutions 
1,2,3,4,5,6 
Institutions of authors: 1= university/ academic institutions, 2= 
party school, 3= government, 4= think tank, 5=military-relevant 
institutions, 6= others 
Authors' 
Location 
1/0 GDP per person of author's location is higher than national 
average  (first author has the priority)  (yes= 1, no =0) 
Funding Project 1/0 
This article is funded by a governmental institution or a large 
national foundation (Ministry of Education, the National Natural 
Science Scientific Foundation of China, an institution directly 
under the State Council) University funding does not account. 
(yes= 1, no =0) 
Journal  Names of Journal 
Date 2008-2012 Date of publication 
Legitimacy Evaluation 
 High 1/0 
View that political legitimacy in China is high (jiao gao, gao) 
(yes= 1, no =0) 
 Challenge 1/0 
View that the party-state is or will soon facing challenges to its 
legitimacy. E.g. 挑战 (including 巨大挑战， 严峻挑战)， 弱点
, 困境威胁,  匮乏 (yes= 1, no =0) 
 Crisis 1/0 
Use the term legitimacy crisis in reference to China. E.g. 合法性
危机， 合法性面临的危机 (yes= 1, no =0) 
 
Crisis: Local 
government 
1/0 
Use the term legitimacy crisis in reference to local governments 
of China. E.g. 合法性危机， 合法性面临的危机(yes= 1, no =0) 
Source 
 
Economic 
performance 
1/0 
View that economic performance is critical to political 
legitimacy in China (yes= 1, no =0) 
Problems 
 Global Forces 1/0 
Mention that global or foreign forces (such as 敌对势力) are a 
challenge or threat to political legitimacy in China (yes= 1, no 
=0) 
 Globalization 1/0 
Mention that globalization has a negative effects on regime 
legitimacy in China (yes= 1, no =0) 
 Economy 1/0 Worry about slowdown of economic growth (yes= 1, no =0) 
 
Performance 
Dilemma 
1/0 
Mention that China is or will soon be facing performance 
dilemma.  政绩困境 (yes= 1, no =0) 
 
Values 
 
1/0 
Mention that changing social value. E.g. 社会价值观， 意识形
态变化，信仰危机，公民意识，主流意识形态弱化 (yes= 1, 
no =0) 
 
Inequity 
 
1/0 
View that socioeconomic inequality is a major threat or 
challenge to political legitimacy in China. E.g. 社会公平 社会公
正， 分布不平衡， 城乡差距，区域差距，社会差距 (yes= 1, 
no =0) 
 Welfare(threat) 1/0 View that inadequate provision of public welfare, including  
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 health, education, social security, housing or pensions,  is a 
major threat or challenge to political legitimacy in China. E.g. 缺
乏公共保障，社会保障不足,医疗教育保障缺乏 (yes= 1, no 
=0) 
 
Corruption 
 
1/0 
View that corruption is a major threat or challenge to political 
legitimacy in China. E.g. 腐败，权钱交易 (yes= 1, no =0) 
 
Technology 
 
1/0 
Mention that development of technology, such as internet, brings 
negative effect on political legitimacy in China. E.g. 网络发展 
社交网络 (yes= 1, no =0) 
 
Interests 
 
1/0 
Mention that new socio-economic classes and/or interests are a 
major threat or challenge to political legitimacy in China. E.g. 社
会阶层，社会阶级，利益团体，利益主体, 贫富阶层,利益群
体 (yes= 1, no =0) 
 
 
Participation 
 
1/0 
Mention that inadequate citizen participation is a major threat or 
challenge to political legitimacy in China. E.g. 公众监督, 拓宽
民众参与渠道, 公众监督, 参与机制, 利益表达渠道(yes= 1, no 
=0) 
 
Bureaucracy 
(threat) 
 
1/0 
Mention that problems of bureaucracy or government are a major 
threat or challenge to political legitimacy in China. E.g. 官僚主
义, 政府职能缺位， 政府职能错位， 行政不作为, 政绩考核
体系缺陷，政府自利性,官本位思想 ineffectiveness, 
inefficiency (yes= 1, no =0) 
 
Rule of law 
 
1/0 
Mention that inadequate implementation of law is a major threat 
or challenge to political legitimacy in China. E.g. 缺乏法制(yes= 
1, no =0) 
SOLUTIONS 
 
Growth 
 
1/0 
Emphasis on sustained, faster, or better economic growth to 
maintain legitimacy. E.g. 经济发展， 经济发展又快又好， 经
济增长 (yes= 1, no =0) 
 
Welfare 
 
1/0 
Emphasis on improvement of public provision of health, 
education, social security, housing or pensions to maintain 
legitimacy.   社会保险，  社会救助， 最低生活保障(yes= 1, 
no =0) 
 
Equality 
 
1/0 
Emphasis on narrowing of socio-economic inequities to maintain 
legitimacy. (yes= 1, no =0) 
 
Jobs 
 
1/0 
Emphasis on reduction or control of unemployment to maintain 
legitimacy. E.g. 剩余劳动力，再就业(yes= 1, no =0) 
 
Public opinion 
 
1/0 
Emphasis on better work to guide public opinions to maintain 
legitimacy. E.g. 舆论引导(yes= 1, no =0) 
 
Propaganda 
 
1/0 
Emphasis on better building or promotion of ideological work to 
maintain legitimacy. E.g. 意识形态建设(yes= 1, no =0) 
 
Morality 
 
1/0 
Emphasis on better building or promotion of morality to maintain 
legitimacy. E.g. 诚信、 道德标准,  道德教育(yes= 1, no =0) 
 Socialism 1/0 Emphasis on greater attention on Socialism to maintain 
166 
 
 legitimacy(yes= 1, no =0) 
 
Marxism 
 
1/0 
Emphasis on greater attention on Marxism-Leninism to maintain 
legitimacy(yes= 1, no =0) 
 
Maoism 
 
1/0 
Emphasis on greater attention on  Maoism or Mao’s thoughts  to 
maintain legitimacy. 毛泽东思想(yes= 1, no =0) 
 
Dengism 
 
1/0 
Emphasis on greater attention on  Dengism or Deng;s theories to 
maintain legitimacy 邓小平理论(yes= 1, no =0) 
 
Three 
Represents 
 
1/0 
Emphasis on greater attention on  Three Represents to maintain 
legitimacy 三个代表(yes= 1, no =0) 
 
Harmonious 
society 
1/0 
Emphasis on greater attention on  Harmonious society 
to maintain legitimacy(yes= 1, no =0) 
 
Nationalism 
 
1/0 
Emphasis on greater attention on  nationalism,  culture or 
patriotism to maintain legitimacy 传统文化， 爱国主义， 中华
文化， 民族精神(yes= 1, no =0) 
 
Party 
 
1/0 
Emphasis on improvement of internal party organization, cadre 
appointments or promotion system to maintain legitimacy (yes= 
1, no =0) 党内监督 
 
Incorporation 
 
1/0 
Emphasis on greater social inclusiveness/incorporation or 
participation in the party,  including wider membership, and 
political system to  maintain legitimacy(yes= 1, no =0) 
 Congress 1/0 
Emphasis on greater role for people’s congress to maintain 
legitimacy (yes= 1, no =0) 
 
Separate 
 
1/0 
Emphasis on separation of party from the government to 
maintain legitimacy(yes= 1, no =0) 
 
Law 
 
1/0 
Emphasis on better rule of law, legislative quality, judiciary, and 
implementation of law  to maintain legitimacy 依法建设， 法制
， 依法行政， 依法治国(yes= 1, no =0) 
 Anti- corruption 1/0 Emphasis on better control of corruption  to maintain legitimacy 
 
Bureaucracy 
(solution) 
 
1/0 
Emphasis on improvement of bureaucratic efficiency, quality, or 
effectiveness and public service  to maintain legitimacy 有效政
府 透明度，行政监督，执政科学化， 合理性执政 ,行政体制
改革,  (yes= 1, no =0) 
 
Rights 
 
1/0 
Emphasis on provision and protection of improved rights to 
maintain legitimacy 合法权利， 民主权利， 公民权力， 人权 
(yes= 1, no =0) 
 
Freedoms 
 
1/0 
Emphasis on provision of greater freedom  to maintain 
legitimacy 自由 (yes= 1, no =0) 
 
Citizen 
Participation 
(solution) 
 
1/0 
Emphasis on encouragement and promotion of  citizen 
participation to maintain legitimacy 公民参与, 公民监督, 政治
参与, 参与机制， 利益表达机制，公民有序参与(yes= 1, no 
=0) 
 
Civil Society 
(solution) 
 
1/0 
Emphasis on  encouragement and promotion of civil society to 
maintain legitimacy 公民社会，市民社会，中间组织， 第三
部门，民间组织，非政府组织，社团组织，舆论监督，社会
团体,非盈利性组织， 社会公益服务组织(yes= 1, no =0) 
 State Retreat 1/0 View that the government should withdrawal from social areas 
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 and give power to social organizations to maintain legitimacy  
有限政府 , 不属于政府的职能放归市场, 还政于民, 缩小政府
活动范围, 政府推出社会管理领域(yes= 1, no =0) 
 
Repression 
 
1/0 
Emphasis that tighter controls on rights,  freedom (including 
media, dissent, and civil society freedom)  to maintain legitimacy  
监控, 打压(yes= 1, no =0) 
 
Political reform 
 
1/0 
Mentions that China should reform its political system to 
maintain legitimacy 政治体制改革(yes= 1, no =0) 
 
General 
Democracy 
 
1/0 
Emphasis on making the political system more democratic to 
maintain legitimacy (yes= 1, no =0) 
 
Constitutionalis
m 
1/0 
Emphasis on promotion of constitutionalism to maintain 
legitimacy 宪政， 宪政民主(yes= 1, no =0) 
 
Party 
Democracy 
 
1/0 
Emphasis on promotion of  Party Democracy 
to maintain legitimacy(yes= 1, no =0) 
 
Electoral 
Democracy 
 
1/0 
Emphasis on promotion of  Electoral Democracy 
to maintain legitimacy 直接选举，直接民主，基层民主， 投
票制度(yes= 1, no =0) 
 
Consultative 
Democracy 
 
1/0 
Emphasis on promotion of  Consultative Democracy to maintain 
legitimacy  协商制度，协商民主，政协制度，多党合作(yes= 
1, no =0) 
Scholars 
 
Chinese ancient 
philosophers  
1/0 
Mention the name of Chinese ancient philosophers or cite his 
work in legitimacy discourse 孔子，孟子，儒家，法家，道家 
 
Coicaud 
 
1/0 
Mention the name of  Jeen-Marc Coicaud or cite his work  
让. 夸克 
 Lipset 1/0 
Mention the name of Seymour Martin Lipset or cite his work 李
普塞特, 西缪·马丁·利普赛特 
 Yu Keping  1/0 Mention the name of Yu Keping or cite his work 俞可平 
 Rousseau 1/0 
Mention the name of Jean-Jacques Rousseauor cite his work 卢
梭 
 Huntington 1/0 
Mention the name of  Samuel Phillips Huntington or cite his 
work 亨廷顿 
 
Ni Xing 
 
1/0 
Mention the name of Ni Xing or cite his work 倪星 
 
Marx Weber 
 
1/0 
Mention the name of  Marx Weberor cite his work 
 Aristotle 1/0 Mention the name of Aristotle or cite his work 亚里士多德 
 Easton 1/0 Mention the name of David Easton or cite his work 伊斯顿 
 Almond 1/0 
Mention the name of   Gabriel Abraham Almond or cite his work 
阿尔蒙德 
 Habermas  1/0 
Mention the name of Jürgen Habermas or cite his work 哈贝马
斯 
 Karl Marx 1/0 Mention the name of  Karl Marx or cite his/her work 
 NOTE  Special note on article  
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Appendix B:  Chi-Square Tests and Crosstab 
Fund and Welfare (strategy) 
Fund and Welfare Crosstab 
 Welfare Total 
Not 
mention 
Mentioned 
Fund 
.0 
Count 92 13 105 
% within Fund 87.6% 12.4% 100.0% 
% within 
Welfare 
87.6% 65.0% 84.0% 
% of Total 73.6% 10.4% 84.0% 
1.0 
Count 13 7 20 
% within Fund 65.0% 35.0% 100.0% 
% within 
Welfare 
12.4% 35.0% 16.0% 
% of Total 10.4% 5.6% 16.0% 
Total 
Count 105 20 125 
% within Fund 84.0% 16.0% 100.0% 
% within 
Welfare 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 84.0% 16.0% 100.0% 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 6.395
a
 1 .011   
Continuity Correction
b
 4.823 1 .028   
Likelihood Ratio 5.386 1 .020   
Fisher's Exact Test    .019 .019 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
6.344 1 .012   
N of Valid Cases 125     
a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.20. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
Author’s institutions and party democracy 
Crosstab 
 Party Democracy Total 
.0 1.0 
Institutions .0 
Count 100 3 103 
% within 
AuthorsInstitutions0Uni
versityacademic1partysc
hool 
97.1% 2.9% 100.0% 
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% within Party 
Democracy 
84.7% 42.9% 82.4% 
% of Total 80.0% 2.4% 82.4% 
1.0 
Count 18 4 22 
% within 
AuthorsInstitutions0Uni
versityacademic1partysc
hool 
81.8% 18.2% 100.0% 
% within Party 
Democracy 
15.3% 57.1% 17.6% 
% of Total 14.4% 3.2% 17.6% 
Total 
Count 118 7 125 
% within 
AuthorsInstitutions0Uni
versityacademic1partysc
hool 
94.4% 5.6% 100.0% 
% within Party 
Democracy 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 94.4% 5.6% 100.0% 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 7.995
a
 1 .005   
Continuity Correction
b
 5.368 1 .021   
Likelihood Ratio 5.964 1 .015   
Fisher's Exact Test    .018 .018 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
7.931 1 .005   
N of Valid Cases 125     
a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.23. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
  
170 
 
Appendix C: Principal Component Factor Analysis 
Rotated Component Matrix
a
 
 Component 
1 (Ideology) 2 (Social Justice) 3 (Governance) 
 eng Xiaoping’s Theories .938   
Three Represents .924   
Jobs  .794  
Welfare  .744  
Equality  .520  
Bureaucracy   .714 
Citizen participation   .672 
Civil Society   .652 
Anti-Corruption  .356 .599 
Congress    
Consultative Democracy    
Party  .323  
Harmonious society    
Growth  .228  
Nationalism    
Propaganda .262   
Marxism .463   
Constitutionalism    
Law   .232 
State retreat   .379 
General Democracy    
Incorporation    
Electoral Democracy  .515  
Party Democracy   .260 
Freedoms    
Rights    
Public Opinion    
Repression    
Morality    
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a. Rotation converged in 14 iterations. 
Note: variable “political reform” is filtered out. 
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